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terrorism incidents in Pakistan from 1974 to 2007. In addition, I also describe the patterns in target types,
weapon types and terrorist types and the patterns prior to and following the U.S.-led invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq. Analysis methods include the univariate time series, descriptive statistics and the
GIS. The study offers new insights on the measurement of terrorism, the cyclical nature of terrorism, the
role of conflict, the choice of weapons, the sponsorship of terrorism, the selection of targets and the
reactionary nature of terrorism. The second paper analyzes personal, socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics of arrested terrorists in Pakistan from 1990 to 2009. I analyze police data on 2,344
terrorists using the GIS, univariate and bivariate analyses. Significant group differences, as well as
differences based on geography lead to the conclusion that a generic profile of terrorists is almost
impossible. One factor universally present in the circumstances of almost all the terrorists is that they
belong to some area of conflict. In the third paper, I test Sherman’s theory of defiance (1993) to discern
how arrests of different terrorist types and terrorist arrest types result in different types of
reactions—defiance, deterrence, or irrelevance. Terrorist types can be divided into hardcore terrorists and
peripheral terrorists, and arrest types can be divided into ordinary arrests or arrests by killings. I use 20
years of data from eight regions of the Punjab. Using fixed-effects cross-sectional time series (long
panel), instrumental variable approach and Poisson distribution, I conclude that: aggregated arrests,
ordinary arrests, and arrests of hardcore terrorists, in the current period, are associated with higher
expected incidence and seriousness of terrorism in the same six month period. Further, that as compared
to peripheral arrests, hardcore arrests generate more defiance. Lags of arrests and ordinary arrests
decrease the expected incidence and seriousness of terrorism, suggesting a possible decay in defiance
after the first six months.
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DEDICATED TO
Pakistan
Police Service of Pakistan
My Late Parents, Syed Fateh Hussain and Syeda Ghulam Zahra
And to the Children of Pakistan Who Say 1

Baba (father) I am afraid!

Baba, my Miss (teacher) says

“From tomorrow All children

Have to stay at home, study at home”

I have heard

A big man, an ‘Uncle’ with big black
whiskers will come wearing a ‘Bomb’

All children will die!

Baba why would uncle want to kill us

Have we done something bad?

Why is Uncle angry at us?

Baba, should I give him my doll?

Or my blue little box of colors,
remember?

The one you gave me for my last
birthday

And that lovely red pony (hair tie), the
one with a butterfly

Should I give him that one too?

Then he won’t kill me?

Remember Baba once when

I had injured my hand

It had hurt so much

Even bled a little

I had cried so much.

Is a ‘Bomb’ very big, Baba?

Will it hurt a lot perhaps?

Baba, I am afraid!

1

English translation of Atif Javed Atif’s Urdu poem Baba, Mujh Ko Der Lagta Hay, by an anonymous
translator. Brackets added by author of the dissertation to make the poem accessible to non-Urdu speakers.
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ABSTRACT
TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN:
INCIDENT PATTERNS, TERRORISTS’ CHARACTERISTICS, AND THE IMPACT
OF TERRORIST ARRESTS ON TERRORISM

Syed Ejaz Hussain
John M. MacDonald
This dissertation, in a 3-paper format, uses three datasets to study three aspects of
terrorism in Pakistan. In the first paper, using data from the GTD, I describe empirically
the temporal and spatial patterns of terrorism incidents in Pakistan from 1974 to 2007. In
addition, I also describe the patterns in target types, weapon types and terrorist types and
the patterns prior to and following the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Analysis methods include the univariate time series, descriptive statistics and the GIS.
The study offers new insights on the measurement of terrorism, the cyclical nature of
terrorism, the role of conflict, the choice of weapons, the sponsorship of terrorism, the
selection of targets and the reactionary nature of terrorism. The second paper analyzes
personal, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of arrested terrorists in Pakistan
from 1990 to 2009. I analyze police data on 2,344 terrorists using the GIS, univariate and
bivariate analyses. Significant group differences, as well as differences based on
geography lead to the conclusion that a generic profile of terrorists is almost impossible.
One factor universally present in the circumstances of almost all the terrorists is that they
belong to some area of conflict. In the third paper, I test Sherman’s theory of defiance
v

(1993) to discern how arrests of different terrorist types and terrorist arrest types result in
different types of reactions—defiance, deterrence, or irrelevance. Terrorist types can be
divided into hardcore terrorists and peripheral terrorists, and arrest types can be divided
into ordinary arrests or arrests by killings. I use 20 years of data from eight regions of the
Punjab. Using fixed-effects cross-sectional time series (long panel), instrumental variable
approach and Poisson distribution, I conclude that: aggregated arrests, ordinary arrests,
and arrests of hardcore terrorists, in the current period, are associated with higher
expected incidence and seriousness of terrorism in the same six month period. Further,
that as compared to peripheral arrests, hardcore arrests generate more defiance. Lags of
arrests and ordinary arrests decrease the expected incidence and seriousness of terrorism,
suggesting a possible decay in defiance after the first six months.
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PAKISTAN
Pakistan was established in 1947. Historically a part of India, the area comprising
contemporary Pakistan had been ruled primarily by Hindus, Muslims and the British.
Before the British formally colonized this territory in 1857, Muslims had ruled this area
for about 1,145 years. As shown in figure 1, Pakistan shares borders with Afghanistan to
the northwest, China to the north, India to the east, and Iran to the west. In the south, it is
located on the Arabian Sea, very near to the mouth of Persian Gulf, which is one of the
biggest sources of oil in the world. Pakistan has an area of 3, 40,133 square miles and an
estimated population of about 177 million, 95% of which is Muslim. Pakistan is the sixth
most populous nation in the world, and the second biggest Muslim country. Pakistan is
bigger than Russia in population. It is almost equal to France and the United Kingdom
combined, in area.
Pakistan, for historical and administrative reasons, has been divided into four
provinces and four areas administered directly by the federal government. Shown in
figure 2, the four provinces include the Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) and Baluchistan, and they have their provincial governments under chief
ministers and governors. The federally administered areas consist of Islamabad Capital
Territory (ICT), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Northern Areas and Azad
Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The first three are governed by the federal government. The
AJK is the Pakistani controlled part of the disputed area between India and Pakistan. It
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Figure 1. Map of Pakistan

Figure 2. Administrative Divisions in Pakistan
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has its own president and prime minister, but its defense, foreign policy and currency are
with the federal government. These provinces and federal areas are further divided into
121districts and seven agencies (the administrative equivalent of a district). Districts and
agencies are the basic administrative units within the provinces and the federal areas. The
ICT, Northern Areas and the AJK are combined as Islamabad in figure 2.
Pakistan has a multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multilingual society. According to
the 2008 census, the population is comprised of several ethnic groups: Punjabis
(44.15%), Pashtuns (15.42%), Sindhis (14.1%), Seraikis (10.53%), Muhajirs (7.57%),
Baluchis (3.57%), and Others (4.66%) 2 . Pakistan hosts one of the largest refugee
populations in the world. About 8 million Muhajirs (refugees) — arrived from India after
independence in 1947. Added to them are approximately 1.7 million Afghan refugees.
English is the official language of Pakistan and is used in official business, government
and legal contracts. All the provinces have their regional languages, such as Punjabi,
Sindhi, Pashto and Balochi. Urdu is the national language, and is understood practically
everywhere. Pakistan has 95% Muslims, 1.85% Hindus, and 1.6% Christians. Out of the
95% Muslim population, 75% are Sunni and 20% are Shia. As such, Pakistan has the
second largest Shia population in the world after Iran. Pakistani society is largely
hierarchical, with many tribes and castes varying in social status. The FATA remains
highly conservative and dominated by centuries-old regional tribal customs.

2

Most of the statistics in this introductory part come from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan
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Conflicts resulting from this diversity created mainly four types of terrorist groups
in Pakistan: language-based, sectarian, race-based and religious. Muhajirs, especially
refugees from India who settled in Karachi, had their grievances about the transfer of the
country’s capital from Karachi to Islamabad, resultant loss of power in the bureaucracy,
lack of jobs, shortage of housing and paucity of transport. However, there is lot of
ambiguity about what they actually wanted as a solution. People have blamed them for
demanding a separate state, or a separate province, or at least a complete control of the
city governments of Karachi and Hyderabad, in the province of Sindh.
Grievances between Shias and Sunnis date back to the very early period of Islam.
In Pakistan, Deobandis allege that Shias use abusive language against prominent
companions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and hence they want Shias to be
declared a non-Muslim (infidel) minority in Pakistan. On the other hand, Shias’ claim is
that they are about 20% of the total population and very active in national politics. They
are considered Muslims everywhere including Saudi Arabia. The Darul-Aloom Deoband,
the founding madrassa of the Deoband sect of Islam, considers Shias as Muslims except
for the ones who meet certain conditions. Shias claim that hardly a Shia in Pakistan
would meet these requirements. Their Fatwa (86/84=L/1429) about Shias is reproduced
below:
If a person prefers Hadhrat Ali (the son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH))
on other sahabah (companions) and he does not believe in other beliefs of Shias,
then this particular person is not kafir (infidel). But, a Shia is kafir who believes
that Hadhrat Jibreel (the Angel Gabriel) did mistake in conveying revelation to
4

the right person or Hadhrat Ali is god, or one who accuses Hadhrat Ayishah (one
of the wives of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)) of adultery or professes that the
Quran is corrupted or denies Hadhrat Abu Bakr (one of the companions) of being
a sahabi 3 .
Baluchis are less developed economically, and they have less representation in
civil services and military. They allege the lack of provincial autonomy and getting fewer
resources from the federal government, as the resources are distributed on the basis of
population. They have the minimum population and the maximum area. Natural
resources in the province are controlled by the federal government, allegedly without
giving them adequate share of those rents. The solution they seem to be proposing is a
separate country of Baluchis based on their race. They are 3.57% of the total population
of Pakistan and spread across the country.
The religious militants in Pakistan are varied and their expressed demand is to
enforce Sharia (Islamic law) in the country, and their contemporary ideal is the erstwhile
Taliban government in Afghan established by Mullah Omar. Their opponents argue that
there is nothing in the laws in Pakistan which defies the laws of Islam. The majority of
Pakistani citizens would want to live a modern life, instead of following the obscurantism
of Taliban. A practical issue they point out is as to what brand of Sharia should be

3

Darul-Uloom, Deoband website http://darulifta-deoband.org/viewfatwa.jsp?ID=10440, retrieved on April
04, 2010, at 9:40 a.m. Brackets added by the author.
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imposed in Pakistan. There are practically as many interpretations of Islam as there are
religious leaders. And there is an element of absolutism in all these interpretations.
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PAPER 1
TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN: CHANGING INCIDENT PATTERNS
With varying motives, using the newest weapons, engulfing a wider area, and
claiming more lives, terrorism in Pakistan has attracted considerable local and global
attention. Consequently, a large literature has been published on root causes of terrorism
in Pakistan (Asal, Fair, and Shellman, 2008; Looney, 2004); Pakistan’s Jihad Culture
(Stern, 2000); Madrassa Culture ( Schaffer, 2008); sectarian terrorism (Grare, 2007);
Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts (Riedel, 2008); Pakistan as sponsor of terrorism
(Williams, 2008); and Pakistan’s performance as an ally of the U.S. in its war against
terrorism (Tellis, 2008). No paper specifically studies temporal and spatial patterns,
patterns in weapon use and target selection, and distribution of terrorist types. If data
were presented in publications (see Barshied, 2005: 21; Grare, 2007: 139), they typically
just give a short-term view of annual comparisons or rates based on press or government
analyses. This lack of comprehensive analysis of terrorism incidents limits our ability to
formulate and test hypotheses, to do operational planning properly and to develop
counterterrorism policy.
Trying to fill in this gap, this paper describes empirically the changing incident
patterns of terrorism in Pakistan from 1974 to 2007 and attempts to answer the following
four questions: What is the temporal distribution of terrorist incidents in Pakistan? What
is the spatial distribution of these incidents? What is the temporal and spatial distribution
of target types, types of weapons used, terrorist groups involved, and the number of
7

people killed and wounded? And what are the patterns of terrorism incidents pre and post
the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq?
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. It begins by discussing theories about
causes of terrorism, describes the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) as its data source,
defines the variables analyzed and explains the analytical methods used. The paper then
presents results and discussion on temporal patterns, spatial patterns and distributions of
victim types, weapon types and terrorist group types. Results also compare and contrast
these patterns, pre and post U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The paper then
concludes with a summary of the findings and their importance for theory, policy and
operations.

THEORIES OF CAUSES OF TERRORISM
At least for the last 10 years, terrorism is one of the most discussed topics in
social sciences. Nevertheless, social sciences lack a coherent explanation of why
terrorism occurs, why it escalates and de-escalates, why certain types of victims are
selected and what determines the choice of weapons. Despite some contributions by
academics from political science, international relations and law, the state of theory and
evidence about causes of terrorism remains in disarray. Especially the contribution of
sociology and criminology in understanding terrorism is negligible. Many scholars
lament the general lack of solid research and a viable theory of terrorism (see Deflem,
2004; Bergesen and Lizardo, 2004).
8

Facts about terrorism, revealed through research, are scattered, and the theory is
fragmented. Some theories explain causal relationships between certain historical,
cultural and sociopolitical characteristics of larger society, and the occurrence of
terrorism. Some international level explanations discuss relations between states and the
occurrence of international terrorism. However, all theories seem to be unanimous on one
thing; that some type of conflict is at the base of every terrorist movement. Some theories
just confine themselves to explaining what generates this conflict, while others explain
how this conflict may turn into acts of terrorism. Hence, there is a strong need for
developing a theory of terrorism after synthesizing the scattered facts and theories, which
could offer “explanation of its causation, the dynamics of its escalation and deescalation” (Turk, 2004: 285). The main hypothesis is that terrorism is the culmination of
a conflict process. But the conflict needs some attending conditions to reach to that end.
The following scholars describe different factors generating conflict. Crenshaw
(1990) lists two types of societal factors associated with terrorism: permissive factors and
direct situational factors. Permissive factors include modernization, industrialization, and
urbanization, which create vulnerabilities, opportunities and motivation. Direct
situational factors include grievances, discrimination, lack of opportunity for political
participation and elite disaffection. Tocqueville, quoted in Brynjar and Katja H-W (2000:
17), indicates the social inequality as a factor responsible for terrorism. Engene (1998)
focuses on three factors, the unsolved ethnic demands, the problems of continuity in the
development of democracy, and the problems of integrating politically marginalized
groups. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) consider feelings of indignity and frustration
9

developed in repressive political environments, as causes of terrorism. Recognizing that
terrorism is a product of a blending of demographic, economic, and political
determinants, a panel of the National Research Council (Smelser and Mitchell, 2002)
observes that regions most likely to generate terrorist threats have a history of colonialist
exploitation by Western interests, and of postcolonial economic and cultural penetration.
Particularly in nondemocratic societies, conflicts generally reflect class, ethnic, racial, or
religious divisions. Brynjar and Katja H-W (2000) mention state sponsorship of
terrorism, hegemony, bipolarity and weak and collapsed states, as causes of international
terrorism.
To explain dynamics of terrorist organizations, Boyns and Ballard (2004)
construct a sociological theory of terrorism, by means of six theoretical propositions.
They, quoting Scott (1990), define terrorism as “a violent response to hegemonic
dominance and may represent an attempt to overcome the dominant hegemony by the
creation of an alternative, a counter hegemonic movement.” According to them, terrorism
(T) is a function of Counter Hegemony (CM); Resource Mobilization (RM); CounterInstitutionalization (CI); Power Prestige (PP); Ritualization (R); and Solidarity (S).They
place their six propositions in the form of an equation: T = f (CH + RM + CI + PP + R +
S). To reproduce these propositions, the authors’ exact words are used:
1. The greater the perceived powerlessness of a counter hegemonic group, the more
likely terrorist acts committed by that group against the hegemonic order are to occur.
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2. The greater the access to necessary resources, the more likely terrorist groups will be
able to plan, initiate and execute their strikes. The greater the globalization and
democratization of educational and technological resources, the more available such
resources will become and the more likely new forms of terrorism will be to emerge.
3. The greater the institutionalization or routinization of a counter hegemonic group, the
more likely terrorism will be to emerge against a hegemonic order in reaction to this
institutionalization.
4. The greater the imbalance in power-prestige between the hegemonic and counter
hegemonic groups, the more likely a symbolic act of terrorism will transpire.
Additionally, the more severe and more publicly visible the terrorist attack, and the
greater the power-prestige of the victim, the more that prestige will be gained by a
terrorist group within its network of power-prestige.
5. The greater the salience, legitimacy, and commitment to the symbolic nature of the
objects attacked by an act of terrorism, the greater the impact of the attack and the
more profound the feeling of victimization it will provoke.
6. The more successful or visible a terrorist attack, the greater the internal solidarity of
both hegemonic (the victimized by the attack) and counter hegemonic (those
responsible for the attack) groups.

11

CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES OF TERRORISM
Criminology of terrorism is in its infancy. Donald Black’s theory of terrorism as
social action is considered the first criminological theory on terrorism (Rosenfeld, 2004).
Black (2004: 9) defines terrorism as the “unilateral self-help by organized civilians who
covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians”. By unilateral self-help, he means the
one-sided handling of grievance with aggression. He takes terrorism as a means of social
control because it defines and responds to deviant behavior. The social control of
terrorism according to Black (2004) is an instance of the social control of social control—
justice in response to something that is itself a form of justice.
While describing the characteristics of terrorism, Black (2004) takes terrorism as
highly violent, well-organized and covert. It is a quasi warfare—because it is unilateral
and covert, it targets civilians, not military forces and obeys no rules. He distinguishes it
from crime by saying that it is moralistic in character like law and social control—it is a
form of justice. Black (2004) takes terrorism as always perpetrated against superior
forces. It is usually caused by a chronic grievance. Terrorism as an offense is collective.
Black (2004) argues that because terrorism is crime as well as social control, it is
difficult to deter with punishment or other forms of social control. Just as terrorism is not
merely a form of crime, so then the social control of terrorism is not merely a form of
criminal justice. Terrorism begets terrorism. He asserts that, in fact, existing theory
suggests that terrorism may be effectively controlled by answering it in kind—a policy of
“tit for tat”—with equal violence against civilians associated with the terrorists.
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Terrorism, according to Black (2004: 17), is a rare species of social control; the
conditions of its existence ultimately become the conditions of its decline. The
intermingling of peoples and cultures—as the social universe shrinks; right and wrong
lose the clarity that comes only with sufficient distances in social space. Therefore, the
conditions of terrorism’s existence ultimately become the conditions for its demise.
Black’s thesis about the control of terrorism is summarized in his statement that
“terrorism’s inevitable fate is sociological death.”
Rosenfeld (2004) critiques Black’s theory of terrorism and makes some additions.
He says that Black’s theory is a good starting point, but that it neglects two things: the
predatory character of terrorism and the institutional conditions under which terrorism
emerges and is sustained. He criticizes Black for emphasizing structures and ignoring
agency. He says Black’s theory is free of thoughts, feelings, goals, purposes, psychology,
and teleology—it is free of people. He takes Black’s explanation of terrorism as limited
not only by conceptions of the form of but also the motivation for terrorist violence. In
his opinion, Black says little about the social origin and distribution of the grievances that
motivate terrorism.
While amending Black’s theory of terrorism, Rosenfeld (2004: 21) concludes that
terrorism is moralistic or justice-oriented violence, accomplished by predatory or
criminal means. According to him, the genesis of terrorist violence lies within a particular
configuration of social institutions, at odds with the institutional triumvirate of modern
society—free markets, democratic polities and religious tolerance. He adds that terrorism
is collective moralistic violence requiring the co-existence of grievances and high social
13

distance—differences in religion, language, customs and modes of livelihood. If any of
these conditions is missing, terrorism will not occur.
In sum, a wide diversity of conditions could provoke terrorism. Brynjar and Katja
H-W (2000: 8) give us an idea that:
Terrorism occurs in rich as well as poor countries; in the modern industrialized
world and in less developed areas; during a process of transition and
development, prior to or after such a process; in former colonial states and in
independent ones; and, in established democracies as well in less democratic
regimes.
Because of this wide variety of conditions, “many rival explanations have been advanced
but none has managed to command widespread respect” (Kegley, quoted in Brynjar and
Katja H-W (2000: 8)). Despite a great deal of theorizing and research, the state of
knowledge on the topic is in flux. In particular, the field of criminology, which should
deal with the criminal aspects of terrorism, has yet to formulate ideas about motivational
factors at individual levels, causal factors at societal levels, and enforcement systems at
both the governmental and societal levels. However, the gist of the matter seems to be
that conflict matters most; poverty, form of government, intergovernmental relations,
race, religion, and sects are important, as long as they generate conflict. Rests of the
dynamics are strategic and tactical decisions, when to divert to terrorist strategy, when to
escalate, when to deescalate, what victim to chose and what weapon to use. This is
exactly what Collins (1975) seems to be saying that social inequities may be causally
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involved, particularly in originating conflicts, analytical or “structural” conflict theories
attend more to the possibility that violence may be a product of strategic and tactical
decisions in a process of ongoing conflict.

DATA AND METHODS
DATA
Initially, I proposed using data from three sources: the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD), the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 4 , and the Pakistan Police forces’
records 5 . After reviewing the tradeoffs of the GTD, the SATP, and the Pakistan police, I
used the GTD data only for the following reasons. First, the GTD is an open-source
database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland and is the world’s
largest database on terrorism incidents. It covers period from 1970 to 2007 and includes
8,164,100 cases, globally. Second, the GTD has a vast amount of information on 120
variables. This information enabled me to collapse some of the categories and verify

4

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is the biggest open source web-based data available in the South
Asian region maintained by the Institute for Conflict Management, India. Information is derived from
newspapers and is presented mainly in the form of descriptive news arranged chronologically.
5

Since 2006, Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) has started compiling data at national levels. FIA has
formatted the data including variables of date and location of the incident, the weapons used and the target,
the number of killed and wounded, and motive. FIA data would be the most reliable for the time period
they are available.

15

information on the others. Third, the GTD is supervised by academicians trained in the
technicalities of research, and the SATP and FIA data are supervised by police officers—
in the case of the SATP, a former police officer. Fourth, the GTD data are in a ready to
use format and available on CD, while FIA data were procured through request to the
senior officers and the SATP data are not formatted. Fifth, the main audience of this
paper is the academic community and they recognize the GTD well and are confident of
its veracity. Many articles have already been published using the GTD data (see, LaFree
Dugan, and Korte, 2009).
Despite all these advantages, the GTD has to be used with two warnings. First, the
data were lost for 1993. Although the GTD has reconstructed the total number of
incidents, people killed and wounded, details of the incidents are not available below the
yearly aggregates. Therefore, analyses below year levels encounter the problem of
missing values. As the missing values are less than 2% in my analysis, I deleted them
case-wise. Second, as the data were originally compiled from the newspapers, the
possibility of media bias cannot be ruled out.
Variables
Terrorist Incident. The GTD defines terrorism as the “threatened or actual use of illegal
force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear,
coercion or intimidation.” Its application is confined to non-state actors. The word
“incident” is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as “a definite and separate
occurrence; an event.” The GTD codebook (2009: 6) considers an incident as single if
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occurring in both the same geographic and temporal point, but if either the time of
occurrence of incidents or their locations are discontinuous, the events will be regarded as
separate incidents.
Time and Location. The variables of time include day of the week, day of the month,
month, and year during 1974-2007. The choice of 1974 as the beginning year is
deliberate. Pakistan in its current geographic form exists only since 1971, when East
Pakistan separated as Bangladesh and 1974 is the first year in which a terrorist incident
for Pakistan is recorded in the GTD.
The GTD provides names of the location either as name of the district, city,
village, or province—whatever is available. By tracing district names from village and
city names, I compiled information on the variable of the district name. To tabulate data
on the province level, I extracted the province name from the district name or the
province/state name variable already present in the GTD.
Target Types. The GTD provided 22 categories of target types. On the basis of their
commonalities, I collapsed these categories into 11 categories. For example, categories of
food and water supply, telecommunication, utilities were collapsed to get a category of
infrastructure and facilities. The eleven categories are listed as: private citizens, property,
and businesses; infrastructure and facilities; civil administration; military and
paramilitary; police; sectarian; foreigners; educational institutions; political leaders,
meetings, activists; civil society institutions; music and barber shops; and minorities.
Civil administration means government officials excluding officers in uniform; military
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includes army, air force, navy and paramilitary forces; infrastructure means gas pipelines,
train tracks, and government buildings; sectarian targets include Shia or Sunni
individuals, worship places, and congregations; minorities include Christian, Hindu, and
Ahmaddiyya (a Muslim sect declared non-Muslim under Pakistani law in 1974). Barber
shops, music, and CD shops were combined to make category of music and barber shops.
Civil society institutions include media and non-governmental organizations.
Weapon Types. By reorganizing some of the weapon categories provided in the GTD, I
came up with the following types: Firearms; explosives, bombs, dynamite; incendiary;
melee (hand to hand fights or with blunt weapons); projectiles (rockets, rocket propelled
hand grenades, mortars); suicide bombers; and others. I made a separate category of
suicide bombers and projectiles, taking them out of explosives in general to study them in
detail because of their current usage in Pakistan.
Group Types. The GTD shows 82 terrorist groups involved in terrorism in Pakistan but
instead of using their names, I classified these groups on the basis of their motives:
sectarian, ethnic, political, Muslim militants, foreigners, and Al-Qaeda. It simplified the
analysis, and furthermore it was not the group name but the group motive which
mattered. For example, sectarian terrorists in Pakistan used different names—Sipah-eSahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Omar, Group of 313, Sipah-e-Muhammad—but
their motive was to kill people on a sectarian basis. They used different names for
personal, operational, or political reasons. Therefore, I combined groups with the same
basic motive as one group. Al-Qaeda, because of its importance, needed a separate
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category. So I kept it separate from the categories of Muslim Militants and Foreigners,
although by definition it could be included in that category.
Number of People Killed and Wounded. The GTD provides the number killed and
wounded in a terrorist incident including terrorists; I counted the victims only. To
investigate the severity levels of terrorist incidents, I computed the number of people
killed and wounded per incident.
ANALYSES
I analyzed the data by using descriptive statistical methods, univariate time series
analysis, and the Geographical Information System (GIS).
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistical methods used here include, mean, median, standard
deviation and graphs.
Univariate Time Series Analyses
Time series are sequences of observations ordered in time, and they have four
components: trend, cycles, seasonality and irregulars. This trend component is the long
term movement in a series, whereas cycles are regular fluctuations which are not
seasonal. Seasonality is a component of a series which is dependent on time of the year
and irregular is what is left over once the other three components of the series have been
accounted for. Autoregression in time series occurs when observations in a time series at
different points of time are correlated.
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Spatial Analyses
For locating patterns in the geographical distribution of incidents, the best method
was to use coordinates as the space point, which in this case were not available. The best
alternative available in the present case was to use the district as the geographical unit to
show the geographic spread of incidents. I used geographic information system (GIS)
base layers for Pakistan and Asia from DIVA-GIS and used ArcGIS to make GIS maps.

RESULTS
In 34 years of terrorism in Pakistan, 2590 incidents took place in which 5840
people were killed and 11597 wounded. As shown in table 1 based on the GTD, the
average number of incidents remained at 76 per year, with an average of 173 people
killed and 341 wounded. The people killed and wounded per incident were 2.25 and 4.48
respectively. The median number of incident was 36, with a median number of 106
people killed and 261 wounded. The statistics of standard deviation, and the minimum
and maximum in table 1 show high dispersion in the distribution of the number of
incidents, killed, and wounded.
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Table 1. Terrorism Incidents, People Killed and Wounded in Pakistan (1974-2007)
Variable

Sum

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Incidents

2590

76

36

124

0

665

Killed

5840

172

106

251

0

1273

Wounded

11597

341

261

449

0

2385

TEMPORAL PATTERNS
Before presenting and discussing the time patterns in terrorism incidents, a brief
review of the macro dynamics of terrorism in Pakistan would facilitate the readers’
understanding. The evolution of terrorism in Pakistan, in its present form, is the result of
five internal and external factors intersecting together over the years. Please see figure 1.
First, General Zia-ul-Haque came to power in 1977 after toppling and arresting an
elected Prime Minister Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Mr. Bhutto was later executed by
General Zia in 1979. A direct result of this execution was the formation of a terrorist
group named Al-Zulfikar. The group committed acts of terrorism, including hijackings.
Throughout his life, General Zia feared the resurgence of Mr. Bhutto’s Peoples Party.
Sindh was Bhutto’s resident province, and hence their stronghold was a nightmare for
Zia. To break Bhutto’s influence in Sindh, he helped form Muhajir Qaumi Movement
(MQM) (Kukreja, 2003: 143), a language-based party of refugees from India in Karachi
and the other urban areas of Sindh. Violence by and against the MQM, which passed
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Figure 1. Terrorism Incidents in Pakistan (1974-2007)
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through certain evolutionary stages became responsible for almost 90% of terrorism in
the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad and 40% in the country.
Second, General Zia, to legitimize his dictatorship and create his own
constituency, enforced some Islamic laws in the country. One of the laws was a tax law
named Zakat and Usher Ordinance (1980). In the meantime, the Iranian Revolution
(1979) established its influence in the Shia community of Pakistan. Encouraged, Shias
demanded exemption from the new tax law which was based on the Sunni jurisprudence.
They also required the government to enforce Shia jurisprudence in their personal
matters. Shias forcefully agitated in Islamabad and General Zia had to accept their
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demands. To counter the Shia ascendance, General Zia helped Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
(SSP) (Haqqani, 2006), an anti-Shia Deobandi religious organization. Coincidentally, the
SSP was further supported by the Iraq-Iran war of 1980’s, as the parties to the war made
Pakistan a proxy theater (Fair, 2004: 104). The SSP was funded by both Iraq and Saudi
Arabia (Stern, 2000: 124) making it a “cash rich organization” (Kamran, 2008: 80). The
SSP, later on, gave birth to militant splinter groups, the most dangerous and notorious of
them Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), meaning army of Jhangvi, the killed founding father of
SSP. Almost 30 % of terrorism in Pakistan is traced back to the SSP or its subgroups and
the Shia groups like Sipah-e-Muhammad (SMP). Therefore, language and sectarian
motivations explain about 70% of terrorism in Pakistan.
Third, the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979) prompted the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia to invest nearly six billion dollars (Weiner, 1998) in the region to organize, train,
and arm fighters against the Soviets. Thousands of Muslim fighters were brought to
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the name of jihad. American and Saudi money pushed the
Mullahs (Islamic religious scholars) in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to prominence 6 ,
established madrassas (religious schools) as sanctuaries of jihad culture, and made
carrying a Kalashnikov an honor in the society. In addition, it strengthened General Zia
against the Peoples Party and Shias.
Fourth, after the Afghan Jihad against Soviets ended in 1989, the U.S. left the
region with thousands of battle-hardened mujahedeen, many of them in Pakistan. This

6

($6-$8 billion were distributed to them: Bhatia and Sedara quoted in Nawaz et al., 2009: 14)
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void created by the US leaving the region without demobilizing the mujahedeen
according to Nawaz (2009: 10) drew Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) into action. It tried
to divert mujahedeen in two directions: to create strategic depth in Afghanistan (Rashid,
1999: 118) and to support the independence struggle in the Indian-held Kashmir. With
the help of the ISI, mujahedeen (Taliban) came to power in Afghanistan, and they gave
refuge to Arab mujahedeen like Osama bin Laden, their erstwhile companions in jihad.
After the establishment of Taliban government in Afghanistan, two important factors led
mujahedeen to challenge the United States. First, the U.S. created grievances in them by
ignoring mujahedeen once the Soviets withdrew. Second, the success of the mujahedeen
against the Soviets—a super power—boosted their confidence. Arab mujahedeen had
their own grievances especially the presence of the U.S army in Saudi Arabia.
Mujahedeen, ultimately, challenged the U.S. in the form of 9/11 which brought the U.S.
again to Afghanistan now not as an aide of mujahedeen but as an enemy.
Fifth, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 and the Government of
Pakistan assisted. Pakistan as a result bought enmity of the Arab mujahedeen and the
Taliban. Terrorism nowadays in NWFP, FATA and some parts of the Punjab is a direct
result of Pakistan’s confrontation with the Arab mujahedeen and Taliban. To further
aggravate the situation, drone attacks inside Pakistani territory have created “a backlash
among the tribesmen and even among the general population of Pakistan (Nawaz, 2009:
15). Once the Northern Alliance with the U.S. help formed their government in
Afghanistan, India was allowed to establish four consulates and one embassy in a small
country like Afghanistan. Foreign Minister of Pakistan alleged India to be sponsoring
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race-based terrorism in Baluchistan 7 . These allegations against India are confirmed by C.
Fair from Rand Corporation when she said: “Indian officials have told me privately that
they are pumping money into Baluchistan” (2009). The weapons used against the
Pakistan army in Swat operation were coming from Afghanistan and these were U.S.
made 8 which U.S says were stolen from the arms supplied to Afghan forces. The U.S. is
also concerned about China building Gwadar port in Baluchistan which China is believed
to use this port “to project force and undermine U.S. and regional security.” 9
Now, I present results on time patterns of terrorism incidents in Pakistan at three
levels: year, month, and day of the week. Then I compare and contrast these results with
the world data from the GTD except Pakistan.
Yearly Patterns
Figure 1 mapping the outbreaks of terrorism onto other international events
depicts that Pakistan has seen five peaks of terrorist violence since 1974. The first peak is
located in 1987 with 60 incidents out of which 22 occurred in NWFP alone and 11 in
Islamabad. The GTD shows them as incidents committed by unknown terrorists. The
location and the year of the incidents strongly suggest their link with Afghan secret

7

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/print/Politics/23-Nov2009/India-fuelling-terrorism-in-Pakistan-Qureshi accessed on January 4, at 12:06 p.m.
8

http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/stolen-usarms-being-used-in-swat-ispr-059 accessed on January 2, 2010 at 2:48 p.m.
9

http://www.vqronline.org/articles/2007/spring/schmidle-waiting-for-worst/ accessed on 01/05/10 at 6:46
p.m.
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agency or the Soviet secret agency—KGB to put pressure on Pakistan for its role in
Afghan Jihad against the Soviets. The second peak is visible in 1991 with 150 incidents
out of which 77 incidents occurred in Sindh followed by the Punjab with 34 incidents.
This peak was the result of two streaks in terrorism in Pakistan running together:
language-based and Sectarian terrorism. The third and the highest peak in figure 1 are
seen at 1995 with 665 incidents out of which 630 incidents occurred in Sindh alone. It
was mainly language-based terrorism confined to Karachi and nearby city Hyderabad.
The fourth peak occurred in 1997 with 206 terrorist incidents. These were mainly
sectarian and mostly in the Punjab. However, there were some language based incidents
in Sindh as well. Presumably, because of strict government actions against sectarian
organizations and language-based terrorism in Karachi, the situation improved and there
was some peace time from 1998 to 2003. After six years of pause, terrorism resurfaced in
2004 with more power and revenge this time in two forms: Taliban in NWFP and the
FATA and Ethnic (Race) groups in Baluchistan. Out of 256 incidents in 2007, 133
incidents occurred in NWFP and 64 in the adjacent FATA. Baluchistan also has 34
incidents.
There is a correlation of 0.267 between terrorism in Pakistan and the world, as
shown in figure 2 suggesting a moderate association between the two. Cross correlogram
of Pakistan and the world incidents shows a maximum correlation of 0.5 at Lag 3
indicating the lagged effect of world incidents on Pakistan after three years.
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Monthly Patterns
Figure 3 giving a month wise break up of incidents over 34 years (1974-2007)
demonstrates that generally the summer months have more incidents as compared to the
winter months, indicating seasonality. In the case of the world, similar pattern is
observed with May, March, June, July, August, and October as the months with higher
number of incidents. Chi-square goodness of fit test indicates statistically significant
differences in months.
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Terrorism incidents in the world except Pakistan
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Scholars for a long time have been interested in the twin questions of whether
there is seasonality in crime and if yes why is it there—because of temperature influences
on criminals or availability of more victims. Research generally supports routine activity
theory—availability of more victims due to good weather and long hours—in explaining
more crime in summer months (Morken and Linker, 2000; Landau and Fridman, 1993;
Hird and Ruparel, 2007).
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Day of the Week
As shown in table 2, Monday is the leading day of terrorism in Pakistan with 20%
incidents followed by Sunday 15% and Saturday 14%. Friday remained the day with the
minimum 11% of incidents. In the case of world, Monday is also the leading day of
terrorism with 15% incidents. However, Saturday and Sunday are at the bottom with 13
and 12 percent incidents, respectively. Chi-square goodness of fit test indicates
statistically significant differences in days of the week for Pakistan and the world.
Table 2. Incident Patterns on Day of the Week—Pakistan and the World
Day of Week
Monday
Sunday
Saturday
Wednesday
Thursday
Tuesday
Friday
Total

Pakistan %(N=2487)
19.90
15.36
14.52
14.11
12.67
12.10
11.34
100

World %(78447)
15.36
12.92
12.49
15.22
15.06
14.91
14.05
100

Terrorism patterns on days of the week could also be explained with the routine
activity theory—availability of more victims on Mondays and less on holidays. Friday
has the minimum incidents in the case of Pakistan and Saturday and Sunday in the case of
world. One commonality between Friday, Saturday, and Sunday is the concept of
holiday. Friday is generally a day of peace, rest, and prayers for Muslims and remained a
weekly holiday in Pakistan for many years. Saturday and Sunday are generally the
weekly holidays all around the world. Terrorist incidents are occurring less on Friday,
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Saturday, and Sunday because terrorism generally is against the private citizens and the
government institutions as victims, and these are available less on holidays. Reemergence
of terrorism on Monday makes sense because after holidays, it is the first day of the
week, more activity is expected.
Trend, Seasons, Cycles, and Autoregression
Correlogram of daily data in figure 4 shows that incidents on lag 1, lag 2, and lag
3 show a correlation of more than 0.5. Then again stronger correlation emerges after
every 14 days. One explanation could be that the terrorists make their preparation,
preempt, and commit acts of terrorism for some days. In the meantime, the law
enforcement agencies react and the terrorists go into hideouts to come again after 14 days
once the law enforcement activity slows down.
Figure 5, showing weekly data, indicates that significant strong pulses are felt at
week 14 and 28, suggesting a more or less 14 week seasonal pattern. Autocorrelation of
observations suggests the same boom and bust pattern of violence as discovered in daily
data. The stronger return of autoregression after 14 weeks suggests a seasonal pattern of
about three months confirming the findings as suggested in figure 3.

30

Autocorrelations of Daily Incidents (Moving Averages)
0.00
0.50
1.00

Figure 4. Autocorrelation of Daily Incidents

0

20

40

60

80

100

Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands

-0.50

Autocorrelations of Weekly Incidents
0.00
0.50

1.00

Figure 5. Autocorrelation of Weekly Incidents

0

10

20
Lag

30

Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands

31

40

Figure 6 presents fluctuations of more than 3-month duration. Trend line over 34
years shows upward movement. Whereas polinomial of the order 11 shows 10 turning
points and five cycles of varying duration. Figure 7 of number of killed and wounded
shows a similar pattern in terms of rising trend but cycles show a difference—an
extraordinary rise at the end of the graph indicating beginning of a very pwerful cycle.
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Temporal Patterns in Number of People Killed and Wounded
Figure 8 graphs quantum of terrorism in Pakistan in a different way—by counting
the number of people killed and wounded in terrorist incidents excluding the terrorists
themselves. Here the patterns of terrorism in Pakistan seem different; the graph instead of
showing a peak in the middle at 1995 shows peaks at 1987, 1995, and 2007, a different
pattern from the incident graph in figure 1.
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Depicting the distribution of severity levels—defined as the number of people
killed and wounded per incident—figure 9 makes it clear that more people were killed
and wounded per incident in 1980 (35), 1984 (20), and 1987(20) than in 1995 (2), the
peak year in respect of the number of incidents. Reaching at two persons wounded or
killed per incident in 1995, the graph has taken an upward turn and is averaging about 15
persons killed and wounded per incident in 2007.
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The patterns based on the analysis of number killed and wounded in terrorism
(magnitude) are different from patterns based on the analysis of frequency (number of
incidents). One possible explanation for this difference is the weapons' different degrees
of effectiveness. This finding urges us to measure terrorism not in terms of incidents only
but also in terms of number of people killed and wounded. There is a need to develop
some index for measuring terrorism.

35

SPATIAL PATTERNS
In the following section, I display the spatial distribution of incidents at country
level, province levels and at the district levels, the three important hierarchical
administrative units in Pakistan.
Figure 10. Geographical Spread of Terrorism Incidents in Pakistan (1974-2007)

Geographical Information System (GIS) map in figure 10 presents the
geographical spread of terrorism in Pakistan. Terrorism incidents mostly occurred in the
four provincial Capitals—Karachi (1211, 49%), Peshawar (133, 5%), Lahore (109, 4%),
and Quetta (82, 3%) and the country capital Islamabad (69, 2.7%). Some of the rural
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districts also attracted more than twenty terrorism incidents as shown by the large number
of dots at some places. In addition to the capitals, dots concentrate in the FATA, Swat,
Southern Punjab and the central Baluchistan.
To show the geographical distribution of terrorism in different provinces and
federally administered regions of Pakistan, I made bar graphs as presented in figure 11.
Figure 11. Spatial Distribution—Provinces and Districts (1974-2007)

The bars clearly show that the province of Sindh has the maximum number of incidents
(1338, 54%), followed by Punjab (347, 14%), NWFP (280, 11%), Baluchistan (242,

37

10%), and FATA (155, 6%). Islamabad Capital Territory, Northern Areas, and Kashmir
combined as Islamabad had the minimum incidents (87, 4%).
To look at the spatial distribution of incidents below country and province levels,
I have shown the incidents at district levels in figure 12. Top 20 districts are shown with
Karachi at the top with 1211 incidents—49% of the total incidents in the country and 90
% incidents in the province of Sindh. Karachi is followed by Peshawar, Lahore, Quetta,
and Islamabad—all are capitals. Some other peripheral districts which also attracted
Figure 12. Spatial Distribution—Top 20 Districts (1974-2007)
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higher number of incidents included North Waziristan, Hyderabad, Rawalpindi, South
Waziristan, Dera Bugti, Swat, Multan, Jhang, Bajaur, Bolan, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura,
Bannu, Kurram, and D.I. Khan listed in order of their frequency.
Spatial patterns show that provincial capitals and some other districts attracted
more terrorism than the others. Provincial capitals probably attracted more terrorism
because they were the power base of the government. Terrorism there made it more
didactic, theatrical, and symbolic. Additional factor which may have increased terrorism
in them are their bigger sizes allowing for availability of more targets, more media
coverage, and more hiding places available. Other districts excluding capitals which have
more terrorism in them are the districts which have some source of conflict in them. For
example, the districts of Dera Bugti, Kohlu, and Sibi are where the gas fields are in
Baluchistan and these are one source of grievance of the locals against the federal
government. In the same way, the districts of Jhang, Faisalabad, Multan, and
Bahawalpur, attracted comparatively a larger number of terrorist incidents in them
because these districts were source of sectarian conflict between the Sunnis (Deobandis)
and Shias. Districts of Swat, D.I. Khan, and agencies of North and South Waziristan,
Kurram are having more terrorism because they have some local conflict in them.
The Evolution of Terrorism in Karachi (1974-2007)
To further investigate the highest number of incidents in Karachi—49 % of the
national total—I made a temporal distribution of the incidents to study their evolution
over time. Figure 13 shows that Karachi started to have perceptible levels of terrorism in
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1990 with a peak in 1995 with 616 incidents. The percentage of terrorism in Karachi in
the national total is far higher than what is due to Karachi in terms of its population 18
mil. (10%) and area 3,530 square km (0.44%). Factors which may explain frequency of
terrorism in Karachi include but are not limited to: being capital of the Sindh province,
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Figure 13. The Evolution of Terrorism in Karachi (1974-2007)
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source of the conflict, its demographic composition, and being a metropolitan. First,
because it is capital of the province, terrorism here has more symbolic and theatrical
value. Second, Karachi is unique; it is not only a capital but the sole source of conflict in
the province of Sindh. The bases of this conflict are its socioeconomic conditions and
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demographic changes. Karachi had a population of 4, 00,000 in 1947 which swelled up to
18, 00, 00,000 in 2009—an increase of 450 times 11 . This exceptional increase in
population was because of many reasons: Karachi became the first national capital; the
only seaport; the first international airport; major industrial city; financial center; and
house of millions of Urdu-speaking migrants from India, major chunk of Afghan
refugees, Pathans from NWFP, and Punjabis from Punjab.
Karachi’s queer demographics serve as a perennial source of conflict here.
Although, it is capital of Sindh province but the Sindhis are only 7.22% of the total
population. Ninety three percent of the population comprises of immigrants: Urdu
speaking (48.52%), Punjabi (13.94%), Pashto (11.42%), Balochi (4.34%), Saraiki
(2.11%) and others (12.44%). Karachi has become the largest Pashtun city in the country;
there are more Baluchis in Karachi alone than in Baluchistan and it is the sixth largest
Punjabi town (Kukreja, 2003: 152). Now the politics of Sindh revolves around ethnic
conflicts: Sindhi v. Muhajirs, Muhajirs v. Punjabis, Muhajirs v. Muhajirs, and Muhajirs
v. Pathan—creating a situation of everybody against everybody else. Sectarian violence
in the city has further aggravated the situation creating a new line of division as many of
the MQM are Shias and most of the Pathans are Deobandi.
It is not just the linguistic composition of the city but the prevalence of youth,
which also mattered. In 1987, the year in which violence in Karachi actually started,

11

It is instructive to look at Karachi’s population graph presented in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kharak
accessed on 01/07/2010 at 4:54
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almost 36% of Karachi’s population was between the ages of 14 and 30. 71% of them
were literate, as compared to the overall Karachi literacy figure of 55% and the overall
Pakistan figure of 26.17%. Twenty two percent of its members were graduates.
No wonder the infrastructure—housing, roads, transport—could not keep pace
with the fast growth of the population. Originally housing conflicts turned into ethnic
rivalries, and transport problem provided the immediate context. The first ethnic violence
was between the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs and Pathans in 1987 on killing of a Muhajir
female college student by a Pathan passenger van driver in an accident. This clash was
aggravated by the easy availability of weapons at unusually cheap prices. Between 1986
and 1989, the prices of guns went down by 40 to 50% in Karachi. A pistol could easily be
bought at Pakistani Rupees 3000 (US $40 now) and a Kalashnikov for 16,000 Pakistani
Rupees (US $188). The MQM with the active support of the government split in 1992
(Fair, 2004: 112). Violence within the two MQM factions was most intense during 1993
and 1994.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TARGET TYPES
Private Citizens, properties, and businesses remained at the top with 844 (39%)
incidents against them. Infrastructure and facilities remained the second important target
with 315 (13%) incidents. Police and military also remained under attack in a large
number of cases—251 (10%) against police and 151 (6%) against military and
paramilitary forces. Sectarian targets attracted 221 (8%) incidents. Civil administration
was attacked in 147 (6%) incidents, foreigners in 131 (5%) incidents, civil society
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institutions in 32 (1%), educational institutions 22 (0.9%), minorities in 19 (0.8%) and
music shops and barber shops in 18 (0.8%) cases. Private Citizens, property, and
businesses remained at the top as victims probably because of three reasons. First, they
are a soft target, undefended, and have no deterrence. Second, they are available in large
numbers; all groups targeted them. Third, once attacked, they are more likely to compel
the government to yield to terrorist demands. Data show that police are the target in
almost 10% incidents in Pakistan and the world both. This pattern is easy to understand
because terrorism whether it is against the government or some other entity, police must
come in as the first line of response. Therefore, they are targeted necessarily.
Figure 14. The Distribution of Target
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Although the language-based organization attacked police in the 1990s, after 9/11,
the trend generally is to target government agencies like police, military, schools, and
barber and music shops as shown in figure 14. Military is at the top followed by police,
civil administration, educational institutions and music and barber shops. Targeting of
military and paramilitary, police and the civil administration is interpreted as reaction
against the government policies or a deliberate attempt by the vested interests to
destabilize the state of Pakistan. Educational institutions (girls’ schools) are targeted
because according to Taliban, their education is un-Islamic. In the same way, Taliban
target music and barbers’ shops because they consider listening music and shaving beards
as against Islam.
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEAPON TYPES
Figure 16. Distribution of Weapon Types
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Figure 16 indicates that firearms were the main weapon in 1003 cases—near 40%
of the terrorist incidents, very closely followed by explosives in 806 (32%) incidents.
Incendiary was used in 264 (11%) incidents, suicide attacks in 81 (3%) cases, melee in 75
(3%), and projectiles in 49 (2%). Firearms remained on the top as weapons because these
were easily available, less expensive, and did not need much of training to be fired.
Additional reason was the MQM’s liking for firearms, as asserted by Fair (2004: 112).
She claims that the MQM’s use of rocket launchers was inaccurate and ineffective.
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Therefore, they did what they could do competently—acts of assassinations, terror, and
street violence—and pistol was their favorite weapon.
Another dimension of weapon type analysis could be the study of casualties per
type of weapon. Such an analysis is presented in table 3. Suicide attacks killed and
wounded 42 people per attack, explosives 9.4 per incident, firearms 4.3 per incident and
projectiles 7.3.
Table 3. Killed and Wounded per Weapon Type (1974-2007)
Weapon Type

Killed and Wounded
Total

Killed and Wounded Per
Incident

Firearms

4354

4.3

Explosives

7543

9.4

Suicide Attack

3361

42

Projectiles

359

7.3

Figure 17 presenting the use of firearms and explosives is very revealing. Starting
from 1987 until 1990, explosives dominated the terrorism scene in Pakistan. First time in
1991, firearms started to dominate and for seven years until 1997, firearms kept on
dominating. Then from 1998 onward until 2007, explosives are the weapon of choice
with the terrorists. It is interesting to note that when explosives are dominating the scene,
they do it for quite some time, so do the firearms. Explosives are comparatively difficult
to acquire and use and their use also need meticulous planning. Therefore, my
explanation of the observed pattern supported by the data is that when explosives are
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used, a foreign hand behind the terrorism in generally there, for example pre-1991 years,
and post-1997. Secondly, explosives are more likely to be used directly against the
government targets, or to destabilize the government, otherwise.
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Figure 17. Evolution of Firearms and Explosives (1987-2007)
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As we learned that suicide attack is the most damaging type of weapon used by
the terrorists and its frequency is increasing day by day, its in-depth investigation is
necessary. Therefore, I present the suicide attacks separately. Figure 18 shows that
suicide attacks in Pakistan started in 1995 but were not so frequent until 2001. From 2001
onward the graph took a sharp upward turn and 56 suicide attacks resulted just in 2007
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alone. The seriousness of the issue can be gauged from the fact that worldwide from
1980-2001, 188 suicide attacks were reported (Pape, 2003: 343) but in Pakistan, in just
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Figure 18. Trends in Suicide Attacks
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one year, 56 suicide attacks took place. Suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic (Pape,
2003: 344). The strategic goal according to him is “to compel modern democracies to
withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland”
(Pape, 2005: 4). Data here seem to reject Pape’s hypothesis. In Pakistan, there is no
foreign occupation. Suicide attacks took place as a reaction against the government of
Pakistan’s operation in Islamabad Red Mosque, in July 2007. During 2007, until June,
there were 8 attacks. And in the next six months of 2007, there were 48 attacks, mostly in
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the second half of July. It clearly shows a reaction of the government’s policy. The data
here show that suicide attacks are used against hard targets, or where a lot of damage was
required. In Collins’ opinion, growth of suicide attacks, using explosives, might be
explained by the demonstration of their greater effectiveness, achieved through the
delivery system. According to him, the humans operating covertly have the highest
reliability rate of delivering the weapon close to its target. (R. Collins, personal
communication, November 18, 2009). While explaining this sharp rise, Hassan (2004:
42) wrote “foreign jihadis brought the technique; Arab clerics escaping from Afghanistan
preached its virtues; Pakistani merchants and smugglers provided funding; and local
zealots supplied bombers.”
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TERRORIST GROUPS
Two hundred and six (8%) terrorist attacks are traced back to Ethnic (Language)
groups, 121(5%) to sectarian groups, 103 (4%) to militant Muslims, 47 (2%) to Ethnic
(Race), 21 (1%) to foreigners, 26 (1%) to political terrorists, and 13 (0.5%) to al-Qaeda
as shown in figure 19. A major portion of 1878 (75% of the total) incidents is attributed
to unknown terrorists. Although the GTD shows them as untraced but majority of these
incidents have been traced out and linked to language-based and sectarian terrorists.
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Table 4 shows that number killed by al Qaeda per incident are 10.15, against 2.25
overall. Number of wounded per incident attributed to al Qaeda are 25.27, against the
overall mean of 4.47. It shows that al Qaeda incidents are, comparatively, more severe.
Table 4. Severity of Al-Qaeda Incidents
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Number Killed

13

10.15385

9.007831

0

24

Number Wounded

11

25.27273

24.02537

2

70
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TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN PRE AND POST THE U.S.-LED INVASIONS OF
AFGHANISTAN
The study compares and contrasts the two periods by using descriptive statistics,
GIS map, and bar graphs. To make comparisons valid, I used data immediately preceding
and following the Afghan invasion and immediately preceding and following the Iraq
invasion for equal number of days. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001
and including the attack day, it makes 2277 days to December 31, 2007. To count 2277
days backward it takes us to July 14, 1995. Whereas the U.S. invaded Iraq on March 20,
2003 and it counts 1748 days from the invasion day to December 31, 2007. To count
1748 days backward, I took June 6, 1998 as the starting day.
Results of data analysis on the change in total number of incidents, severity
levels, change in spatial distribution of terrorism, change in weapon types, target types,
and weapon types are given in table 5. Summary statistics show that the frequency of
incidents went down but their severity levels went up.
Table 5. Comparison of Pre and post Statistics
Before

After

Incidents

827

619

Killed

1410

2277

Killed per Incident

1.92

3.68

Wounded

2675

4840

Wounded per Incident

3.70

7.82
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Figure 20 and figure 21 show the spatial distribution of terrorist incidents in
Pakistan pre and post U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. Figure 20 makes it vivid that
terrorist incidents in Pakistan before the invasion were concentrated mostly in Punjab and
Sindh—the two eastern provinces of Pakistan bordering India. Figure 21 showing the
distribution of incidents after the Afghan invasion indicate a geographical shift from the
eastern regions of Pakistan to western regions like Peshawar, Swat, Quetta, FATA, and
Bolan and Dera Bugti areas of Baluchistan.
Figure 20. Spatial Distribution before U.S.-led Invasion of Afghanistan
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Figure 21. Spatial Distribution after U.S.-led Invasion of Afghanistan

Table 6 portrays the changes in distribution of terrorism incidents in terms of
number of incidents pre and post the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. Incidents in terms
of percentages increased in NWFP, Baluchistan, FATA and incidents significantly
decreased in Punjab and Sindh. Islamabad has attracted almost the same percentage of
incidents.
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Table 6. Pre and post Percentages of Incidents in Provinces and Regions
Incidents

Before %

After %

Punjab

22.84

6.86

Sindh

71.32

10.20

NWFP

1.34

24.92

Baluchistan

1.70

31.44

FATA

0.49

23.08

Islamabad

2.31

3.51

Total

100.00

100.00

Table 7 below presents the percent changes in the incidents attributed to them and
indicates that Muslim Militants, and Ethnic (Race) increased their incidents but languagebased ethnic incidents, and sectarian decreased substantially from 5.19 % to 0.97%.
Table 7. Percent Changes in Terrorist Types
Terrorist Type

Before%

After%

Ethnic (Language)

5.19

0.97

Sectarian

8.33

3.23

Muslim Militants

0.97

12.44

Ethnic (Race)

0.12

7.43

Al-Qaeda

0.00

2.10
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Table 8 shows that military and paramilitary forces, infrastructure and facilities and civil
administration attracted a higher percentage of incidents after the U.S.-led invasion of
Afghanistan.
Table 8. Percent Changes in Target Types
Target Type

Before%

After%

Private Citizens and Businesses
and Property

31.28

20.36

Infrastructure and facilities

11.11

15.51

Police

10.02

10.66

Religious Figures/Institutions

12.20

7.43

Military and paramilitary

1.57

19.06

Civil Administration

5.07

9.21

Educational Institutions

0.72

1.94

Music shops, Barber shops

0.12

2.75

Table 9. Percent Change in Weapon Types
Weapon Type

Before%

After%

Firearms

49.03

22.94

Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite

16.06

57.67

Incendiary

20.65

0.65

Suicide Attack

0.72

12.12

Projectile (rockets, mortars, RPG)

1.69

2.75
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Table 9 makes it clear that explosives and suicide attacks have increased
substantially from 16 % to 58%, and 1 % to 12% respectively. The use of firearms has
decreased from 49% to 23% and incendiary from 21% to 1%.
TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN PRE AND POST THE U.S INVASION OF IRAQ
Table 10 indicates that terrorism incidents increased from 162 to 573 and people
killed and wounded from 427 to 2160 and from 1208 to 4543, respectively. The number
killed per incident and the number wounded per incident increased from 2.64 to 3.77 and
7.46 to 7.93.
Table 10. Comparison of Pre and post Statistics
Before

After

Incidents

162

573

Killed

427

2160

Killed per Incident

2.64

3.77

Wounded

1208

4543

Wounded per Incident

7.46

7.93

Incidents in Punjab and Sindh decreased from 36% of the total to 6% and from 42
% to 7%, respectively. Incidents in NWFP increased from 3 % to 26%, Baluchistan from
8 to 33%, and FATA from 3 to 24%. As shown in Table 11, incidents in Islamabad also
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Table 11. Pre and post Percentages of Incidents in Provinces and Regions
Region

Before

After

Punjab

35.63

5.98

Sindh

42.50

6.70

NWFP

3.13

26.45

Baluchistan

7.50

33.33

FATA

3.13

24.28

Islamabad

8.13

3.26

Total

100.00

100.00

decreased from 8% to 3%. Table 12 presents that Muslim militants and Ethnic (Race)
increased their share of incidents while Ethnic (Language) and sectarian terrorists
decreased their percentage share in the total incidents.
Table 12. Change in Terrorist Group Types
Terrorist Type

Before

After

Ethnic (Language)

4.29

0.35

Sectarian

20.25

2.27

Muslim Militants

4.91

12.06

Ethnic (Race)

0

8.04

Al Qa’eda

1.23

1.92
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Table 13 while showing changes in target types tells us that terrorism against
infrastructure increased by 7%, against military 20%, civil administration 4% but
decreased against minorities by roughly 2%.
Table 13. Change in Terrorist Target Types
Target Type

Before

After

Private Citizens and Businesses and
Property

27.61

20.62

Infrastructure and facilities

9.20

16.08

Police

8.52

10.49

Religious Figures/Institutions

20.25

6.82

Military and paramilitary

0.61

20.45

Civil Administration

6.13

9.79

Foreigners

12.88

3.32

Educational Institutions

1.84

2.10

Minorities

3.68

0.87

Music shops, Barber shops

0.61

2.80

Table 14. Change in Weapon Types
Weapon Type

Before%

After%

Firearms

36.42

21.68

Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite

51.85

58.57

Suicide Attack

2.47

12.76

Projectile (rockets, mortars, RPG)

7.41

2.27
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Changes in weapon types as brought out by table 14 indicates that use of firearms
decreased 14%, projectiles by 5% while suicide attacks increased by 10%, and explosives
by 7%.

CONCLUSION
The study aimed at understanding the dynamics of terrorism in Pakistan through
analyzing temporal and spatial patterns in terrorism incidents. In addition, it analyzed the
victim types, weapon types and terrorist group types to understand patterns in them.
Results from this study highlight the importance of conflicts, communism, capitalism,
cycles, capitals, citizens and Kalashnikov, in understanding the evolution of terrorism in
Pakistan. The factors listed above provide us the gist of the spatial and temporal patterns
of frequency and magnitude of terrorism, and patterns in victim, weapon, and terrorist
types. While giving the gist, we can say that terrorism in Pakistan is an extreme form of
reaction to inappropriately handled political and economic grievances turned into ethnic
and religious dissensions. Internal and external vested interests provided the support,
which aggravated the situation. In addition, the analysis of data shows that the the U.S.led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have brought some profound changes in terrorism
patterns in Pakistan. Frequency of incidents has increased, more people are dying,
weapons have changed from firearms to explosives, especially noticeable is the increase
in suicide attacks, and the government institutions especially army is the target. Terrorism
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has moved from east to west of the country with substantial increases in NWFP,
Baluchistan and FATA. Sectarian and language-based incidents have decreased but
terrorism committed by Ethnic (race) and Muslim militants have increased. The striking
shift in the geographic concentration of terrorism post-USA invasion of Afghanistan is
prima facie evidence of the dynamic nature of terrorism. Terrorism has moved from east
to west because now area of conflict has shifted to the west of the country. The second
explanation might be sponsorship of the post 9/11 terrorism in Pakistan which allegedly
comes from India, the U.S. or Iran and they are sitting in Afghanistan, on the western
border of Pakistan. Findings have theory, practice, and policy related implications.
Ethnic, political and religious conflicts, like many states, are endemic to Pakistan,
sometimes real, sometimes perceived and sometimes concocted, even. Despite these
conflicts, life in Pakistan went as usual, unless the government agencies turned these
natural conflicts into well-defined divisions and the outside state actors used these
divisions to advance their geostrategic interests in the region. All of these conflicts have
resulted from some genuine socioeconomic grievance, for example, lack of civic
amenities, unfair distribution of resources among provinces, issues of provincial
autonomy and changes in demographics. Conflagration caused by inappropriately
handling these conflicts became the essence of terrorism in Pakistan. Ultimately, the
political conflicts turned into sectarian, ethno-linguistic, ethno-secessionist and religious
motives for terrorism. Conflict not only explains varied motives for terrorism but spatial
distribution of terrorism at some places too. Places with the source of conflict in them, for
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example, the central districts of Baluchistan, the southern Punjab, Waziristan and
Karachi, attracted more terrorism as compared with the others.
Communism and capitalism are the two essential part of the story of terrorism in
Pakistan; no account of terrorism is complete without a discussion of the two. Since the
earlier days of Pakistan’s establishment and after 1979, geostrategic politics of the region
revolves around battles between communism and capitalistic forms of governance.
Pakistan was affected by communism in two ways. First, a sponsored zeal for fighting
communism in Afghanistan filled Pakistan with mullahs, madrassas, mosques,
movements, bigots, narcotics, jihadists and weapons. As a collateral damage of the
Afghan war, Pakistan has to bear a big quantum of sectarian terrorism as well. Second, to
avenge for the grievances against Pakistan for its role in Afghan war, communist
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union sponsored terrorism activities in Pakistan.
Capitalism becomes more relevant to explain terrorism in Pakistan after 9/11,
especially in the FATA and Baluchistan. The U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan has three
commonly known objectives: hunting out al Qaeda and to fight Taliban; pumping the oil
reserves in the Central Asian States through Pakistan; and encircling and containing
China. Because of its geostrategic location in the region, Pakistan is the key to achieving
all the three objectives. First, against al Qaeda and Taliban, Pakistan has already helped
the U.S a lot except for a few instances where Pakistan’s national interest was severely
damaged. Second, pumping oil reserves is also possible and Pakistan has no objection if
the U.S. succeeds in securing a corridor to Turkmenistan through Afghanistan. Third,
issue of China’s containment is problematic for Pakistan and Pakistan’s reservations,
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most probably, have created problems for it in Baluchistan. Pakistan is neighbor of China
and a China’s shortest possible access to the Indian Ocean near Persian Gulf. Pakistan
has built Gwadar port near the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of Persian Gulf with the
Chinese help. The U.S. analysts believe that this port is likely to project China’s naval
presence in the region near the Gulf where 55% of the oil reserves are. It is making
China’s access to the world market easy. It will also make China’s relations with Pakistan
stronger. India having enmity with China, also takes Chinese presence near its waters as
something intimidating. There is likelihood of Gwadar port being offered as an
alternative to Dubai and Iran’s newly built free trade port Chabahar. Therefore, the U.S.
India, and Iran would never like this port to work 12 and terrorism in Baluchistan is
closely linked to the establishment of Gwadar port.
As a consequence of Afghan war, ‘Kalashnikov Culture’ developed in Pakistan,
engendering in people a love for weapons. That’s one of the worst things ever happened
to Pakistan. The U.S. bought weapons from China and supplied to mujahedeen through
Pakistani ISI. Half of the weapons never reached the mujahedeen or were sold in the local
market by the mujahedeen. Arms became dirt cheap. Arming of the society made taking
up arms on any issue, an easy option for the disgruntled. According to C. Fair (2004:
101), “as the rise of terrorist movements in Karachi were generally coincident with the
spread of small arms in Pakistan, these outfits have had little problem acquiring light

12

For a detailed account of the U.S. interests in Baluchistan please read a U.S. government document
“Baloch Nationalism and The Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in
Pakistan” by Robert G. Wirsing, April 2008.
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machineguns and rocket launchers” which explains increased violence and the resultant
lethality.
Cyclical movement is the characteristic pattern of daily, weekly, monthly and
yearly incident data. Terrorism occurs in waves: terrorism today is correlated with what
happened yesterday; terrorism this week is correlated with what happened last week;
there is seasonality in monthly data; and yearly data show longer cycles every time.
Cycles are reflective of the internal and external dynamics of terrorist organizations.
Terrorists’ preparation, initiative and the government’s indecisiveness take the violence
to the peek. Terrorists’ exhaustion or the government’s action brings the violence down
but for some time. As the conflicts, the basis for the violence, remain intact, the terrorism
comes again with new agenda.
Provincial and national capitals are the hardest hit places, as brought out by the
spatial analysis in the paper. Capitals are the hardest hit because they have symbolic
value as the seat of the government, making the terrorist act more theatrical. Moreover,
whatever the source of the grievance, the government serves the strategic logic of
terrorism better—challenge the authority, attain theatrical value, and be more symbolic.
The case of Karachi is unique; it is not only the provincial capital but the source of
conflict too. This leads us to the proposition that capital and conflict combined create
more terrorism compared to either capital or place of conflict singly.
Private Citizens, their property and businesses remain on the top as victims of
terrorism in Pakistan. Most likely, they are defenseless and hence soft targets; they are
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innocent, hence hitting them creates more alarm as compared to hitting the police or
military personnel. Hitting the citizens is in line with the strategic logic of the terrorists;
citizens are more likely to compel the government to accept terrorist’s demand.
The paper has a value for theoretical, policy and operational reasons. As far as its
contribution to theory is concerned, there are some important observations to make. First,
terrorism is still hard to define and measure and as it is true that one man’s terrorist is
other man’s hero, it is also true that one times hero may be other times villain. Second, no
account of terrorism is complete without discussing the internal and external state actors
and the geostrategic politics of the region; terrorism in Pakistan is never apolitical. Third,
terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon changing patterns with time: temporal patterns,
spatial patterns, victim type, weapon types and motives all change with the situation.
Fourth, unresolved conflicts are the essence of terrorism. It is permanent feature of every
terrorism movement. Fifth, terrorists select targets because of some strategic logic. Either
the targets afford them maximum propaganda value, or they have symbolic value for
them, or they are confronting them to counter their actions, or they are the direct enemy,
or there are some ideological grounds for attack. Sixth, the terrorists’ weapon choice may
indicate their linkages. Generally speaking, locally sponsored terrorists would use
firearms and the externally controlled terrorists would most probably use explosives. In
addition, the weapons use also indicates strategic logic of the terrorists; destabilize the
state, or the government, or just one section of society. Frequency of the events is the
forte of the locally sponsored organizations and magnitude of the events strength of the
externally sponsored. Target selection also indicates the likely sponsorship of terrorism.
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Locally sponsored terrorists would attack their direct enemies, most of the times, while
externally sponsored terrorists would attack infrastructure or the government agencies or
the private citizens.
The study provides evidence against Black (2004)’s view that terrorism is
essentially against the superior. In Pakistan, sectarian terrorism and language-based
terrorism are all against the weak minorities. The study also rejects Rosenfeld’s view
that terrorism requires the co-existence of grievances and high social distance. In
Pakistan, the religious militants may have maximum social distance from the Hindus
(Muslims have maximum things in common with Christians and Jews as followers of the
revealed religions), and obviously they have very deep grievances against them. But
terrorism against them in Pakistan is unheard of. May be the immediate context is
important for understanding terrorism dynamics. Pape’s view that suicide attacks are
against foreign occupation finds no support here, as suicide terrorism in Pakistan is
mostly against the government of Pakistan’s operation in Islamabad’s Red Mosque.
Rather the findings tend to support defiance theory.
The paper’s results from the analysis of time and spatial patterns of terrorism in
Pakistan are of particular relevance for policy. Resources could be deployed keeping in
view the time patterns and spatial patterns observed. Additionally, conflicts generated by
socioeconomic conditions have surfaced as the mainstay of terrorism. It makes it
important for the policy makers to look into the prevailing conflicts. Conflicts, generally,
have valid grounds and could be dealt with conflict management through constitutional
measures. It is also important for policy makers to look at how they should place
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themselves within the changing geostrategic politics of the region. For the immediate
amelioration of the situation, an enhanced law enforcement infrastructure is required.
Finally, every terrorism ends but end of terrorism does not mean beginning of peace
(Cronin, 2009). Terrorism cycle, which is going on in Pakistan nowadays would end in
near future, unless further fuelled by the vested interests. Policy makers will have
sufficient time to avert or lessen the severity of the next cycle and that is what they
should be preparing for now.
The analysis of data raises a number of important theoretical questions, as it
answers the others. First, is there a regular pattern by which government-sponsored
organizations lead to spin-offs (LeJ in the case of SSP and MQM (H) in the case of
MQM), over what time period, and by what conditions? Second, lethality is increasing,
what is it about the current flavor of state destabilizing terrorism that motivates such
higher causalities? Is the planning better than in the past? Are the actors less controlled
by political parties that in the end want some legitimacy with the polity? Is there less
evidence of specific deterrence with these groups after large sweeps and arrests are
made? Third, why should the sectarian and language-based terrorism decrease, instead of
continuing and adding to the overall amount of terrorism? Is it because of life cycle of
growth and decline through which all terrorists organizations pass; or there is a structural
limit to the amount of terrorism that can go on at one time? It may also be an interesting
investigation to understand at what stage of a conflict, people turn to terrorism tactics.
In sum, the descriptive exploratory analysis in this paper reveals the patterns,
producing new insights, prompting new thoughts and generating new hypotheses
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contributing to make up for lack of ‘facts’ and lack of ‘theory’ on terrorism in Pakistan.
However, there is one main study limitation. As compared with the FIA, the SATP and
other sources, the GTD data are lower in number. Therefore, absolute numbers should be
interpreted keeping this thing mind. However, the percentages are not significantly
different except for the statistics on terrorist group types. But we could rely on the
relative position of each group according to the percentages of cases they were involved
in.

67

PAPER 2
POOL OF PAKISTANI TERRORISTS: THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

Since the 1990s, the international community in general and Pakistan in particular
have faced quite a robust threat of terrorism. Pakistan is associated with this threat, either
as a prime victim or a major source. Pakistan is a victim in the sense that during 1990 and
2009 approximately 6,000 terrorism incidents have occurred, making it one of the highest
countries for which terrorism is experienced. The majority of terrorism incidents in
Pakistan were perpetrated by the Pakistani citizens themselves. Also during recent years,
some cases of terrorism in the U.S., Britain, Spain and France have been traced back to
the people of Pakistani origin (Bergen, 2008: 19). Therefore, Riedel (2008: 31) is right to
some extent that Pakistan, almost uniquely, is both a major victim and sponsor of
terrorism.
Given that the Pakistanis are deeply involved in terrorism both as victims and
perpetrators, it becomes necessary to probe in detail as to why such a large number of
Pakistanis have turned to terrorist activities. The need is to locate the causal variables. As
Babbie and colleagues note: “Often the search for causal variables involves the
examination of demographic (or background) variables, such as age, religion, sex, race,
education, class, and marital status. Such variables often have a powerful impact on
attitudes and behaviors.” (Babbie, Halley and Zaino, 2007: 189). This is exactly what this
study does through an analysis of the personal, socio-economic, and demographic
variables of arrested terrorists in Pakistan. I attempt to identify the common features of
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terrorists in Pakistan, and possibly to make a profile of terrorists operating in the country.
The study also investigates the extent to which terrorists are just a cross-section of the
society they belong to, and what makes them terrorists—are their characteristics different
from society in general? I also probe two additional questions: How terrorists belonging
to different terrorist group types might differ in personal, socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics? And what predicts the number of cases against a terrorist?
Therefore, this study is not a direct answer to the question of why Pakistanis
indulge in terrorism, but is an analysis of terrorists’ characteristics. Identification of
potential causal factors through studying these characteristics may serve as a springboard
for further in-depth research on why people engage in terrorism. This is the intended
theoretical contribution of this study. Law enforcement practitioners and policy makers
can also benefit from this study in many ways. Most importantly, policymakers would
know what sections of society are more inclined to terrorist activities, and they might
focus on that particular section of society. Through this study, it becomes clearer what
variables are important in detecting and explaining the prevalence of terrorists in a
society. Therefore, another benefit of this study might be identifying what data to
maintain helping the practitioners and policy makers in operational planning and future
policy-making.
Despite the theoretical, practical and policy implications of such a study, the
literature on this topic regarding Pakistan is scant. The research seems to be either at an
early stage, or it has not started yet. The study by Bajoria (2008) although titled
“Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists” attempts to profile terrorist groups not
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individuals. Asal et al. (2008: 973), using data from 141 families of slain militants from
Pakistan, examine the factors that lead household members to give or refuse consent for
other household members to become a militant. Their study concludes that comparatively
well-off people do not allow their household members to join Jihad, and that unemployed
people are more likely to become militants. The madrassa education and sect did not
matter. The study uses a convenient sample, too small to be considered representative.
The results concerning the madrassa education and sect are surprising because in
Pakistan, 90 % of the Jihadis are from the Deobandi sect, and there is a strong likelihood
that areas with more madrassas may be producing more religious militants. Except for
these two studies, no worthwhile study could be available on search.
The studies beyond Pakistan have a variety of conclusions as will become clearer
from the following account of the state of theory and evidence on terrorists’ personal,
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.

PERSPECTIVES ON PROFILING TERRORISTS
Profiling terrorists is not an easy task, because terrorists are not “a single entity—
as billiard balls without any distinctions” (Rosenthal, 2006). Generalizations come with
qualifications, and more so in the case of characterizing terrorists, because they come
from diverse backgrounds. Realizing this difficulty, McCauley and Moskalenko
commented in their research brief titled Pathways Towards Radicalization on the
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START 13 website, that it was unlikely that there would be any one “conveyer belt” to
terrorism that could be identified and targeted to reduce terrorism. Despite these two very
relevant observations, researchers have produced some interesting work on profiling
terrorists. The research has resulted in some stereotypes being exploded. Some
characteristics have been true for a particular type of terrorists but not for others. A few
characteristics have been found in almost all terrorists. Given this diversity of results,
research on terrorist profiling provides us some insights on the sociological, demographic
and personal characteristics of terrorists. This helps us understand better the causal
factors which may have led individuals to turn to terrorism.
According to Hudson (2002), the theories offering psychological explanations of
terrorism fall into two categories: Psycho-Pathological theories and Psycho-Sociological
theories. These theories focus on questions such as: Who are terrorists? Why do they join
and why they stay? Is there a specific terrorist personality, and what are the psychological
mechanisms of group interaction? Psycho-Pathological theories take nonviolent behavior
as the norm, and violent behavior as an abnormality. Schmid and Jongman (1988), basing
their opinion on behavioral studies and profiles, identified a distinguishable terrorist
personality—spoiled, disturbed, cold and calculating, perverse, excited by violence,
psychotic, maniac, irrational and fanatic. However, Crenshaw (1981) believed that
terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology. Rather, the most outstanding

13

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of
Maryland.
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characteristic of terrorists is their normality. Collins (2008) argues that terrorists are
rather more normal than the others. “Terrorist bombing is, so to speak, the violence of the
meek.” These terrorists, according to him, are from the respectable middle class and they
are very calm. Turk (2004: 278) asserts that “opposition to authority or a particular social
order is more likely to stem from a reasoned position than from pathology or deficient
socialization.” This reasoned position, according to him, is now emanating from some
cosmological or religious beliefs. He adds further that people adopt terrorism when they
start believing that their objectives cannot be accomplished by nonviolent means.
Psycho-Sociological Theories explain terrorism by individual characteristics
supplemented by environmental factors. They consider unique political, historical, and
cultural contexts, as well as the ideology and aims of the groups involved. The first
variant of the theory—relative depravation—connects individual mobilization of
aggression and political violence to social, economic and political circumstances. This
variant defines relative deprivation as the gap between expectations and satisfaction.
Brynjar and Katja H-W (2000: 12) states: “Several systematic studies of relative
depravation theories have supported the hypothesized relations between frustration and
aggression”. The second variant—contagion theory—posits that the decision by terrorist
groups to launch an attack is influenced by similar attacks elsewhere, a finding confirmed
by the study conducted by Weimann and Brosius (1988: 498-499).
Turk (2004) discusses the background and the socialization process of radicals
and terrorists. In democratic societies, political radicals belong to relatively advantaged
sectors, he asserts. They start with conventional political activism. More educated and
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affluent they are, the more impatient they are likely to be with the inevitable gaps
between ideals and reality. Terrorism “is nearly always the work of radicalized younger
persons with the intellectual and financial resources, and the ideological drive, to justify
(at least to themselves) and enable adopting the violence option” (Turk, 2004: 279).
Based on his analysis of the case of Timothy McVeigh (the convict of bombing the
Murrah federal office building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people), Turk concludes
that “exposure to ideologies justifying terrorism appears to be a crucial ingredient in the
mix of personal and vicarious learning experiences leading to a commitment to terrorism”
(279). Turk observes that Islamist fundamentalism, in particular, seems to depend on
radicalization through formal education consisting mostly of religious indoctrination. He
quotes Kushner (2003: 357–59) as saying that madrassas drill into the potential recruits’
mind, the most extreme interpretations of Sunni theology (which he terms archaic and
rigid version of an Islamic society), emphasizing the duty to engage in holy war (jihad)
against all enemies of the true Islam.
Turk (2004: 279) explains that “Once underway, campaigns of terrorism and
related political violence tend to gain momentum. Inspired by the ideological messages,
the charisma of leaders, the potential for material or status gains, or whatever else attracts
them, others are likely to join.” Out of many reasons as to why specific individuals reach
the point where they see themselves as “bearers of the responsibility for violent actions”
may be the self concept as one who must fight against the threat to “us.” This selfconcept may have been developed through education, training, and socialization.
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Russell and Miller (1977) drew a sociological portrait of the then modern urban
terrorist, using data on 350 individuals in 18 worldwide revolutionary groups which were
active during 1966-1976. According to this study, individuals engaged in terrorism
possessed common characteristics of social origin, political philosophy, education, age,
and family background. The urban terrorists were between 22 and 25 years of age and
were unmarried. They came from middle- and upper-class families and had university
education. To further emphasize the importance of ideology, Albini (2001) claims that
religion or some political ideology serves as “a meta-morality to the terrorists.” And that
the new breed of terrorists is highly sophisticated in technological skills and sometimes
motivated by monetary incentives as well.
Unemployment, social alienation, action-seeking, desire of using learned skills,
ideological motivation and idealism are the characteristics of terrorists identified by
Hudson (2002: 36). While, research conducted at the University of Haifa, identifies
religiosity, previous records in violence and somewhat older age as signs of persons who
decide to become suicide bombers after listening to fiery sermons by charismatic imams
(prayer leaders) (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim, 2003: 142). Further, Atran
(2008: 3) claims that since the invasion of Iraq, Jihadi martyrs are coming from more
egalitarian, less educated, materially well off, and more socially marginalized classes.
People are inspired by the takfiri message of withdrawal from impure mainstream society
and the need for violent action to cleanse it.
Several studies explore some myths to reject them. For example, Barro (2002)
refuted the myth that poverty breeds terrorism by arguing that poverty is not a root cause
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of terrorism. The author mentioned a paper written by Alan Krueger and Jitka
Maleckova, which offers evidence that terrorists have relatively high levels of education
and income. Another study by the British intelligence agency MI5 takes apart many of
the “common stereotypes about those involved in British terrorism” (Travis, 2008).
Contrary to popular belief, the report describes them as British and not illegal
immigrants, and not Islamic fundamentalists but rather religious novices. Nor are they
“mad and bad”. They are over 30 and just are as likely to have a wife and children as to
be loners with no ties. No influence of radical extremist clerics is detected.
In sum, scholars have found some common characteristics of terrorists, but it is
difficult to generalize from these common themes. After examining the social histories of
some 40 neo-Nazi males, Hamm (2004) concluded that there was great diversity in the
human conditions that adapt people to the sub-culture of terrorism. Brynjar and Katja HW (2000: 8) tried to give us an idea of the possible diversity: “We find terrorists among
deprived and uneducated people, and among the affluent and well educated; we find
terrorists among psychotic and ‘normal’ healthy people; and among people of both sexes
and all ages.” Even in the article for The Guardian, Travis (2008) concludes that it is “not
possible to draw up a typical profile of the “British terrorist” as most are
“demographically unremarkable” and simply reflect the communities in which they live.”
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DATA AND METHODS
DATA
The data originate from different police agencies in Pakistan and consist of 2,344
cases of terrorists arrested during 1990-2009. The police agencies which provided the
data include all the four provincial police forces and the federal police, leaving no agency
out. The data include cases of only those arrestees whom the police actually found guilty
after investigations and sent to court for prosecution. The data cover the period from
1990 to 2009 because data before 1990 are not available. The prime reason is that the
specialized agencies maintaining terrorists’ records were established in the 1990s and
afterward: NWFP in 1992; the Punjab in 1996; Sindh in 2002; and the federal capital in
2003. These agencies have collected data from 1990 onward.
Arguably, the data are legitimate source for describing terrorists. The police have
no obvious incentive to make wrong entries; they collected the data as part of their
routine duties; and the data were not originally collected for public use. Furthermore, I
compared the data from the provinces with the data available at the national levels,
removing the duplicates and correcting the information if found different, by going to the
original source. Because there is no alternative source available, we have to be content
with the police sources. However, as far as the number of arrestees is concerned, I
compared the Pakistani police data with the data reported by the South Asia Terrorism
Portal (SATP). I found the Pakistani police data showing a higher number of arrests,
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making it less susceptible to under reporting. The SATP takes data from the media, and
the media is likely to miss many arrests which police actually make a record of.
The number of cases in the dataset is very large (2,344); the highest number
published yet is 141 (see Asal et al., 2008). The data contain cases from all the four
provinces of Pakistan and all the areas administered by the federal government. All the
ethnicities, all the sects, and all the terrorist groups operating in Pakistan are represented
in these data. Information is available on a variety of terrorist types: hardcore, peripheral,
suicide bombers and the terrorists killed during police encounters. Arrestees of both the
sexes are present in the data. Finally the data are for 20 years, making the series represent
different time periods.
However, the data are not representative in the statistical sense of the word
because they are not based on random sampling. Random sampling would have been the
ideal way to proceed as suggested by statistical methods but for many reasons, it was
unfeasible. First, the police records in Pakistan are paper-based and there is no way to
search them for arrests to compile a list to sample from. Second, terrorist arrests generally
are a matter of secrecy, and some records are still secret, making sampling difficult. But
on the basis of the number of cases (2,344) and their consistency with the media, I can
strongly argue that the data encompass all or nearly all terrorist arrests during this period.
Lastly, no open source database exists which could provide this information. Most
databases provide information on terrorist incidents only. Therefore, under the
circumstances, Pakistani police sources are the best sources possible.
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Variables: Definitions and Description
Different personal, demographic and socioeconomic variables included in the data
are listed below along with their brief definitions and descriptions.
Table 1. Variables, their Definitions and Descriptions
Variables

Definition

Significance of
names

According to Bloothooft and Groot (2008: 111), parents do not
choose names for their children at random; names indicate
cultural, linguistic, or ethnic parental backgrounds. Names are
generally affected by underlying cultural themes, with two
major parental characteristics—education and race—modifying
these general patterns. Names also are indicative of parents’
aesthetic dispositions (Lieberson and Bell, 1992: 512). Names
in Pakistan generally suggest the religiosity, modernity,
neutrality, and/or ethnicity of parents.

Significance of
castes

Though the situation is changing, Pakistani society in general
“values and actively seeks similarities in social group identity”
based on caste, a social strata based on lineage, tribes, clans, or
traditional occupation (Hussain, 2005: 145). Barth while
writing about Pakistan (1962: 113) regards castes (quom) as a
hierarchical system of stable social groups, differing greatly in
wealth, privilege, power and the respect accorded to them by
others. Castes are an essential part of police and court records
in Pakistan 14 . Castes traditionally tell about people’s social
status, bravery and religiosity. Therefore, based on police
officers’ knowledge of the area and Rose’s 3-volume book, the
castes of the arrested terrorists were ranked on a 3-point scale
(high, medium, low) in terms of their social status, bravery and
religiosity.

14

Readers interested in a detailed account of caste system in Pakistan which is somewhat different from the
caste system in India may refer to H.A. Rose’s “A glossary of the tribes and castes of the Punjab and
NWFP” (1962).
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Ethnicity

Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi, Brohi, Pashtun, Muhajir

District of residence

Permanent resident district of the terrorist

Rural urban

Within the district, did the arrestee belong to a village or the
district headquarters? District headquarters are not of uniform
population but are generally the biggest town/city in a district.

District of arrest

District where the terrorist was arrested; it may be different
from their district of residence.

Age

Age on the day of arrest; age on the first terrorist act is not
available.

Education

Educational level in the traditional school system

Madrassa education

If attended madrassa on regular basis—Yes or No

Sect

Shia, Sunni (Deobandi, Bareilvi), Ahal-e-Hadith

Terrorist Group
Type

Political, Sectarian, Muslim Militant, Al Qaeda, Foreigner,
Ethnic (Language), Ethnic (Race)

Number of siblings

Number of brothers and sisters including the terrorist

Marital Status

Married, Single

Employment Status

Employed (White Collar, Blue Collar, Professional, Business),
Unemployed

Weapon Training

Yes or No

Specialized Skills

Bomb making, suicide jacket preparation, grenade throwing,
rocket launching, light machine gun firing

Financial position

Good, moderate, poor

Children

Number of children

Number of cases
involved in

Number of terrorism cases involved in
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ANALYSES
I analyzed the data using the Geographical Information System (GIS), univariate
and bivariate statistical analyses. The results’ section, after describing the summary
statistics of data, presents the geographical distribution of terrorists in terms of their
resident districts. The results section proceeds to present the univariate analyses. In the
beginning, the analysis of what may be called the societal factors is given. Then the
results are presented on personal or individual variables. The results section ends with
bivariate analyses and terrorist group comparisons.

RESULTS
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF DATA
The variables in the data are measured at three levels: nominal, ordinal and
interval. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, summary statistics of variables have been
arranged in the same order in table 2. The descriptive statistics show that names of bigger
proportion of arrestees indicate religiosity of their families. Pashtun is the dominant
ethnicity in the arrestees, as Deobandi is the sect. The majority of arrestees (Please
interpret these percentages keeping in mind the number of observations) are madrassa
educated (76% of religious terrorists), married (62%), employed (82%), weapon trained
(87%), city dwellers (55%), and poor (68%). Most arrestees (42%) belong to Muslim
militant type of terrorists. The maximum number of terrorists is educated between 9 to 12
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years. Except for four arrestees, all are male. The bigger proportion measured on district
level belongs to Karachi and is arrested in Karachi.
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Data
Variable

Mean

Median

Mode
(%)

Std.
Dev.

N

Min.

Max.

Nominal Variables
Names

Religious
(76%)

2,272

1

4

Ethnicity

Pashtun
(35%)

1,769

1

7

Madrassa
education

Yes
(76%)

256

No

Yes

Sect

Deobandi
(90.5%)

1600

1

7

Marital
status

Married
(62%)

199

No

Yes

Weapon
training

Yes
(87%)

180

No

Yes

Group type

Muslim
Militants
(42%)

2076

1

9

Employme
nt

Employe
d (82%)

145

Misc.
Employ
ment

Unemploye
d

Specialized
training

Yes
(57%)

121

Yes

No

Urban rural

City
(55%)

1941

Rural

City

Financial
status

Poor
(68%)

176

Poor

Rich

Sex

Male
(99.8%)

2344

Male

Female
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District of
residence

Karachi
(24%)

2196

1

105

District of
arrest

Karachi

2061

1

103

Province

Punjab
(33%)

2195

1

7

Ordinal Variables

Social

Medium

1045

Low

High

Bravery

Medium

1045

Low

High

Religiosity

Medium

1045

Low

High

Educational
attainment

Years (912)

239

Illiterat
e

Professiona
l

Interval Variables

Cases

3.073248

2

1

4.947428

314

1

40

Siblings

4.489362

5

5

2.165664

47

1

10

Children

2.942308

2

0

2.652512

52

0

10

Age

30.73364

30

26 and 30

7.99936

214

16

60

Terrorists’ age ranges between 16 and 60, averaging 30 years. The near equality
of mean, median and mode indicates the normal distribution of age. The average number
of their siblings is 4.5 with a standard deviation of 2.16. The average number of their
children is approximately 3 and the range is from 0 to 10. The number of terrorism cases
against arrestees varied from 1 to 40, with an average of 3 and standard deviation of
approximately 5. A detailed discussion of all the variables is given below.
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UNIVARIATE ANALYSES
Spatial Distribution—Residential Areas of Terrorists
In terms of their birth places and usual residences, terrorists are not uniformly
distributed across Pakistan. Some areas have a conspicuously greater number of terrorists
living in them, and may rightly be called hotspots. For the purpose of this study, I
consider a district hotspot where at least 30 terrorists were living – as a measure of
terrorist density. Terrorists’ distribution on the country, province and district level is
presented below, through the GIS map and bar graphs.
The Geographical Information System (GIS) map in figure 1 presents terrorists’
geographical spread at the country level, highlighting the hotspots with denser
concentration of dots. The density of dots on the map show that the terrorists mostly
reside in Karachi, Swat, Dir, central and southern Punjab, Waziristan, Quetta, and the
central part of Baluchistan. The geographical distribution of terrorists’ residences in
different provinces and federally administered regions of Pakistan is presented through
bar graphs in figure 2. The bars clearly show that the Punjab has the maximum number of
terrorists (721, 33%) living in its jurisdiction, followed by the NWFP (559, 25%), Sindh
(537, 24%), Baluchistan (239, 11%) and the FATA (55, 3%). Islamabad Capital
Territory, Northern Areas and Kashmir have been combined as Islamabad. They have the
minimum number of terrorists (29, 4%). Foreign terrorists are 56 (3%) of the total
arrested. The relative positions of provinces change when population is used as a
standardizing factor. The NWFP leads and is followed by Baluchistan, Sindh, the FATA,
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Figure 1. Arrested Terrorists’ Geographic Spread

the Punjab and Islamabad, in order of the number of terrorists belonging to these areas
per 1, 00,000 persons in the population.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of terrorists at district level with Karachi at the
top with 526 terrorists; 24% of the total terrorists in the country and 98 % of terrorists in
Sindh. Karachi is followed by Swat (9%), Jhang (4%), Lahore (3%), Attock (2%),
Quetta (2%), Lower Dir (2%), Rawalpindi (2%), Dera Bugti (2%), Upper Dir (2%),
Muzaffargarh (2%), Khanewal (1.7%), Multan (1.6%), Bahawalpur (1.5%), Bunair
(1.5%), South Waziristan (1.5%), Dera Ismael Khan (1.5%), Malakand (1.4%) and
Peshawar (1.3%), listed in order of the frequency of terrorists living in them.
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Figure 2. Spatial Distribution of Terrorists in Provinces (N=2196)

Figure 3. Spatial Distribution—Top 20 Districts (1990-2009)

Two factors could be identified as possible predictors of these distribution
patterns. The most important of the predictors of terrorist arrests is the presence of
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conflict—religious, linguistic and racial. Karachi is the battleground for language-based
violence, southern Punjab is the birthplace of sectarian problem, areas of the NWFP
(Swat, Dir and Waziristan) are bastion of Muslim militants trying to enforce their own
brand of Islam, and the central Baluchistan is the base of Baluch nationalism, based on
race. The other important factor which could be a strong predictor of the number of
terrorists (sectarian and Muslim militants) in an area is the number of madrassas. As an
illustration, the correlation between the number of religious terrorists, resident of 35
districts of the Punjab and the number of madrassas in those districts is 0.66. Even with
just 35 observations, this correlation is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000.
It’s a strong association according to the standards described by Babbie, Halley, and
Zaino (2007: 229).
Distribution on Ethnic Basis
In absolute terms, 615 (35%) terrorists belong to Pashtun ethnic group as shown
in figure 4, while ethnically Pashtuns are only 15% of the total population of Pakistan.
Punjabis including Seraikis are about 55% of the total population but 590 (33%) arrested
terrorists are Punjabis. Muhajirs terrorists constitute about 13% (233) of the total
arrestees but they are 7.6% of the population. The number of Balochi arrested are 216
(12%) against their ethnic percentage in Pakistan of only 3.57% 15 . On the scale of
percentage of arrestees divided by the percentage of total population of Pakistan,

15

Percentages of ethnicities were taken from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan, retrieved on
March 19, 2010 at 6:20 p.m.
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Baluchis are on the top, followed by Pashtuns, Muhajirs, and Punjabis. One possible
determinant of their relative position might be the military operation conducted against
them. Military operations meant enhanced effort and more arrests. Military operations
were conducted in the NWFP (2009), Baluchistan (2006), and Sindh (1992-94, 1998). No
military operation was conducted in the Punjab. This leads to the conclusion that the
number of arrested terrorists may be a good proxy of the number of terrorists in an area,
but the number may depend on the efficiency of law enforcement agencies as well. The
more efficient law enforcement agencies leading to more arrests may give us the
impression that the areas have more terrorists living in their jurisdictions compared to the
similar areas with less efficient law enforcement agencies.
Figure 4. Ethnic Distribution of Arrested Terrorists
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Rural Urban Distribution
Fifty five percent (n=1074) of arrested terrorists are city-dwellers, and 45%
(n=869) belong to the rural area. Whereas according to the percentage provided on
Wikipedia, Pakistan’s urban population is 36% of the total, leading us to the conclusion
that urban people are proportionately more involved in terrorism as compared to their
percentage in the total population. This suggests that terrorism, like crime, in Pakistan is
primarily an urban phenomenon involving targeting people in high population areas.
Distribution of Sects
Figure 5 presents bar graph based on 1600 observations of arrestees’ sect
affiliations. These arrestees belong only to the categories of Sectarian, Muslim militants
and Al Qaeda. Sect was not relevant in the case of political and ethnic terrorists, hence
their information was not available. Deobandi stands out with 90% terrorists belonging to
this sect and is followed by Shia with 6%, Sunni with 2%, Bareilvi with 1% and Ahle
Hadith with 0.5%. Sunni category is a generic category comprising of both Deobandi and
Bareilvi. In some cases, only the Sunni is mentioned as a sect and not its specific form,
Deobandi or Bareilvi. Therefore, Sunni is created as a separate category, but in fact they
are either Deobandi or Bareilvi.
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Figure 5. Distribtuion of Terrorists on Sect Basis (N=1600)

It is interesting to look at the beliefs and history of Deobandis to account for their
exceptionally high involvement in religious terrorism (Sectarian, Muslim Militant).
Deobandis are named after Darul-Uloom at Deoband, India—an Islamic school
established in 1866. To describe their beliefs and religious struggle, both peaceful and
violent, Darul-Uloom provides an excerpt from Smith’s book on modern Islam in India.
According to the Darul-Uloom’s website 16 :
Deoband is thoroughly dissatisfied with things as they are… Its aim is to
resuscitate classical Islam, rid the Muslims of the theological corruption's [sic],
the ritual degradation's [sic] …Theologically the school stands for a rigid
orthodoxy…On the practical side, Deoband 'Ulama' (scholars) are puritanically

16

http://www.darululoom-deoband.com/
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strict. …Their ideal is traditional Islam in its purest form with a strict enforcement
of Shari'ah.
Although the Darul-Uloom was established much later, the ideology existed
earlier and was derived from the movement of Shah Waliullah Dehlavi and the Indian
Wahabis (the sect of the rulers of Saudi Arabia). Naturally, as a splinter group of the
mainstream Sunni Muslims (Bareilvis), the Deobandis are more radical and firm
believers in armed struggle. Their spiritual leaders, Syed Ahmad Shaheed (martyr) and
Shah Ismail Shaheed led many revolts and attacks against the Sikhs, and in May 1831
along with hundreds of their followers were killed in a battle. Deobandis actively
participated in the independence war against the British (1857). Many of their leaders
remained in prison for long. In 1913, the British kept Maulana Mahmood Hasan and his
associates under detention in the island of Malta in the Mediterranean Sea. Maulana
Mahmood Hasan’s disciples, Maulana Ubaydullah Sindhi and Maulana Mansoor Ansari
were exiled.
Interestingly, although the Deobandis are puritanical Muslims, they opposed the
creation of Pakistan. They wanted freedom from the British but demanded to keep India
united, perhaps for their support of the idea of Pan-Islamism. However, once Pakistan
was established, they wanted Pakistan to become an Islamic state with Sharia as its basic
law. In contrast, the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), clearly
enunciated his vision in his address to the first constituent assembly, on August 11, 1947.
He said: “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your
mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to
90

any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State.” To
further emphasize his point, in February 1948, he elaborated: “We have many nonMuslims—Hindus, Christians and Parsis—but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the
same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the
affairs of Pakistan."
Although the Deobandis hated Pakistan (the land of the pure) to the extent of
calling it Kafaristan (the land of the infidels) and its founder as the greatest infidel, from
the very start, they tried to impose their own brand of Islam even in the political sphere.
Under their pressure, some constitutional amendments were made by various
governments to make Pakistan an Islamic, rather than a liberal democratic state. It was to
appease them, that Ahmadiyya (a sect of Islam) was declared non-Muslim in 1974.
Encouraged by their success against Ahmadiyya, they turned against Shias to declare
them non-Muslims too, although they were together in the movement against
Ahmadiyya.
Deobandis received unconditional support in the era of General Zia-ul-Haq (19771988), who himself was a staunch Deobandi. With this government support, the U.S.,
Saudi and Iraqi money, weapons, and training made them a force to reckon with in the
Afghan-Soviet Union war. They increased their madrassas and mosques. Consequently,
many mainstream Muslims converted into Deobandis. They sped up their already existing
campaign to declare Shias as non-Muslims and make Pakistan a Sunni Muslim State, a
nomenclature nowhere else exists—a step more down the road.
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A Deobandi madrassa in Akora Khattak in the NWFP gave birth to Taliban, and
they are actually Deobandis. Obviously, they have strong ties with Deobandis in Pakistan
and hence find their support and inspiration from here. Deobandi Sectarian terrorists used
to find refuge in Afghanistan under Taliban, and Taliban find refuge with Deobandis in
Pakistan.
In sum, the Deobandis’ original puritanical views, their historical struggle for
pan-Islamism, and their earlier involvement with Jihad against the Sikhs and the British
gave them an identity as Jihadis. Their opposition of the Pakistan movement and its
leaders, their success in getting some constitutional amendments enacted and declaring
Ahmadiyya as non-Muslims encouraged them to find new targets. Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan provided the one. In the wake of this war (Jihad), they received funds,
weapons, training and moral support. The president of Pakistan and the Inter Services
Intelligence Chief (ISI) were Deobandis. Therefore, the Deobandis found inroads into the
government as well. After the Afghan war, their new targets were Shias and the
Americans, and then after the 9/11, the government of Pakistan became the number one
target.
Distribution of Terrorists on Group Basis
Muslim Militants comprise of 42% (n=872) of the total terrorists arrested in
Pakistan. Sectarian terrorists represent 38% (n=799) of all terrorist arrests; whereas
Ethnic (Race) and Ethnic (Language) motivations comprise only 9% of terrorist arrests,
and Al-Qaeda compromises only 1% of terrorist arrests. Figure 6 presents group-wise
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details of composition of arrestees. Militant Muslims, Sectarian and al Qaeda combined
as religious terrorists are 81% (n= 1697) of the total. Detailed reasons for their
ascendance have already been discussed and can be summarized as the following:
theological conflicts, government support and the supportive international milieu in wake
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Figure 6. Distribution of Terrorists on Group Basis (N=2076)

Names and Family Background
Figure 7 presents the distribution of what the names of arrested terrorists indicate
about their family background. About 1,700 (76%) names show the family as religious,
264 (12%) names demonstrate the family emphasizing its ethnicity, 240 (10%) names are
modern, and only 44 (2%) names are neutral in that they do not tell anything about the
parents. The highest percentage with the religious name is an indication of religious
orientation of the majority of people in Pakistan.
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Figure 7. Names Indicating Religious, Modern, Ethnic or Neutral Orientation of
Families (N=2281).

Distribution on Social Status, Bravery, and Religiosity As Indicated By Terrorists’ Castes
Figure 8 presents the distribution of terrorist arrestees according to social class
distinctions. The most common category for arrestees (n=498; 48%) belong to the socalled high status, followed by medium social status (n=429; 41%); and the minority of
arrestees are represented by lower status castes (n=118; 11%). Figure 9 shows the
distribution of terrorists based on bravery level usually attached to their castes. The
castes, traditionally perceived high in bravery account for 48% (n=501) of terrorists,
medium in bravery for 31% (n=329), and the castes lower in bravery for only 21%
(n=215) of terrorist incidents. Distribution of religiosity level typically attached to
terrorists’ castes is displayed in figure 10. Twenty three percent (n=239) of terrorists
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belong to the supposed-to-be highly religious classes, 43% (n=454) to the medium in
religiosity and 34% (n=352) to low in religiosity.
Figure 8. Distribution of Social Status Based on Castes (N=1045)

Figure 9. Distribution of Bravery Status Based on Castes (N=1045)
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Figure 10. Distribution of Religiosity Status Based on Castes (N=1045)

Distribution on Educational Attainment Levels
Table 3 makes it clear that about 12% (n=29) terrorists are illiterate, 34% (n=81)
have 1 to 8 years of schooling, and 39% (n=92) have schooling between 9 and 12 years.
The people educated up to 12 years of education in Pakistan may hardly be considered as
well-educated. The majority of arrestees went to public schools with bare minimum
facilities and poor educational standards. Arrestees seldom went to schools where the
medium of instructions was English. Furthermore, their detailed interviews indicate that
most of them were just struggling with their education. Terrorists educated beyond grade
12, and terrorists with professional degree (doctors, engineers) may be considered welleducated, and this group represents only about 15 percent of all arrestees.
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Table 3. Distribution of Terrorists on Educational Attainment Levels (N=239)
Educational attainment
levels

Frequency

Percentage

Country
percentage

Illiterate

29

12.13

46.2

Years (1-8)

81

33.89

30.1

Years (9-12)

92

38.49

17.6

Years (13-16)

31

12.97

5.9

Professional (Doctors,
Engineers)

6

2.51

Total

239

100.00

Comparison of the educational attainment levels of the arrested terrorists and that
of the average Pakistani citizens (Ministry of Labor, 2007) shows that proportionately
more educated people are involved in terrorism. Similar conclusions are reached by
Berrebi’s (2007) study of Palestinian terrorists. Hudson (2002) also report that the Cold
War period terrorists have more than average education. To explain this result, Berrebi
(2007) lists many possibilities, using a variety of theoretical perspectives. Comparatively
high educated individuals may be involved in terrorism because of content of education
that they were taught. Another factor is described as: “Highly educated individuals may
be more aware of occasional instances of injustice and discrimination, and may be more
aggravated by their implications”(2007: 8). Improved reasoning skills leading to better
understanding of moral and religious justifications invoked by terrorists groups is listed
as another factor. Berrebi (2007: 8) also argues that “education may contribute to the
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development of a sense of social responsibility and civic engagement, so that highly
educated individuals may feel the need to contribute to particular causes.”
In the context of Pakistan, all of the explanations are partially true. The
curriculum favors a particular version of history sponsored by the military rulers. Military
glamour is projected very clearly. Virtues of Jihad are exalted. The courses on Pakistan
Studies and Islamic Studies are compulsory till the master’s levels. Even in the civil
service competitive examinations, passing these subjects is mandatory. Books on which
Jihadis were educated were compiled by the University of Nebraska in the wake of the
U.S. supported Jihad against the Soviets. "The primers, which were filled with talk of
jihad and featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines, have served since then
[i.e., since the violent destruction of the Afghan secular government in the early 1990s]
as the Afghan school system's core curriculum. Even the Taliban used the Americanproduced books..." -- Washington Post, 23 March 2002 (1).
Enhanced awareness due to education is possibly a strong predictor of
involvement in terrorism. Pakistanis generally perceive that the U.S. had no justification
to invade Afghanistan or Iraq. Further, that the government of Pakistan shouldn’t have
helped the U.S. in this invasion. People also resent the government’s operation against
Islamabad’s Red Mosque. However, the discussion below would indicate that perhaps it’s
the school education combined with madrassa education which may have led people to
join terrorist organizations.
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Madrassa Education
Out of 1697 religious terrorists, data on madrassa education are available for 15 %
(n=253) of them. Seventy six percent of them attended madrassa as a full-time student at
some stage of their lives. Cross tabulation of madrassa education and the school
educational attainment levels is reported in table 4. The analysis shows that majority of
regular school educated terrorists attended madrassa as well, and that the number of pure
illiterate is just 12. Almost 50% of the illiterate terrorists attended madrassa as a
substitute.
Table 4. Cross tabulation of Madrassa and School Educational Attainment
Madrassa Illiterate
education

(1-8
Years)

(9-12
Years)

(13-16
Years)

Professional Total

Yes

11 (10%)

37 (35%)

45 (42%)

12 (11%)

2 (2%)

107
(100%)

No

12 (21%)

16 (30%)

18 (32%)

7 (12%)

2 (4%)

56
(100%)

Total

23

54

63

19

4

162

Marital Status
Strong marital attachment in adulthood inhibits criminal behavior (Sampson and
Laub, 1990). Analysis of arrested terrorists reveals that 62% (n=123) of them are married
and 38% (n=76) single, where single includes unmarried, or widower, or divorcee.
According to the government of Pakistan 1998 estimates, 63% of people aged 15 and
above are married in Pakistan (Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2007, 2007). Therefore, the
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married/single ratio in the terrorist population reflects the married/single ratio in the
country.
Employment Status
Figure 11, based on 145 observations where employment status of arrestees was
known we see that 82% of terrorists are employed. The further distribution of the
employed is as the following: 27 % (n=39) in miscellaneous employments not exactly
identified; 18% (n=26) in blue collar jobs; 12% (n=18) in white collar jobs but not in
government; 15% (n=22)in business; 8% (n=11) in government and 2% (n=3) in
professional jobs.
Figure 11. Employment Status (N=145)
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Weapon Training and Specialized Training
Out of 180 observations on weapon training, 87% terrorists have weapon training
and 13% had none. As presented in figure 12, Forty three percent of terrorists don’t have
specialized training. Out of the remaining 57%, 44% have specialized training but the
type of training not exactly identified. Seven percent have bomb-making, 5% grenade
throwing, light machine gun firing, and 2% suicide jacket preparation training.
Figure 12. Specialized Training (N=121)

Financial Position
Figure 13 indicates that out of 176 observations available on the financial position
of the terrorists, 68% (n=120) very poor financial status. Thirty one percent (n=54)
belong to middle class. Only 1% (n=2) terrorists are comparatively rich.
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Figure 13. Distribution of Financial Status

BIVARIATE ANALYSES
Through bivariate analyses, I attempt to answer two important questions: What
predicts terrorists’ group affiliation? And what predicts the number of cases against a
terrorist? For this purpose, I tested 26 associations. Associations with correlation
coefficients of at least 0.20 are reported below separately, for terrorists group types and
the number of cases as dependent variables.
What Predicts Terrorists’ Group Affiliation?
How different terrorist groups differ on various variables? Or the equavalent
question of what predicts terrorist group affiliation is explored here and the results are
given in table 5.
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Table 5. Relationship Between Group Types and Other Variables

Variable

Measure of
association

Coefficient of
Association

N

Ethnicity

Cramer’s V

0.81

1,511

Weapon training

Phi

0.43

158

Age

Cramer’s V

0.33

167

Urban rural

Cramer’s V

0.32

1,702

Brave family

Cramer’s V

0.29

928

Educational
attainment

Cramer’s V

0.29

191

Number of cases

Cramer’s V

0.25

287

Marital status

Phi

0.24

155

Name

Cramer’s V

0.23

2,011

Sect

Cramer’s V

0.21

1,499

Table 5 shows that ethnicity is the strongest predictor of terrorist group affiliation in
Pakistani setting, with 0.81 coefficient of association followed by weapon training with
coefficient of association of 0.43, age (0.33) and urban rural (.32). Other variables
described below with their coefficients given in parentheses have moderate relationship.
Brave family (0.29), educational attainment (0.29), number of cases (0.25), marital status
(0.24), name (0.23) and sect (0.21) can indicate the group affiliation of an arrested
terrorist. The strength of association has been categorized as strong or moderate under the
guidelines provided by Babbie, Halley and Zaino (2007: 229). Because the dependent
variable terrorist group type and all the predictors except age are at the most categorical,
direction of the relationship is not determined. Stated differently, we can say that the
terrorist groups differ from each other signifcantly on ethnicity, weapon training, age,
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urban rural, brave family, educational attainment, number of cases, marital status, names
and sect of their members.
What Predicts the Number of Cases Against a Terrorist?
Table 6 presents the analyses of the possible predictors of the number of cases
against a terrorist group. Financial poistion of a family and marital status may be
considered as strong predictors with association levels of 0.41 and 0.40 respectively.
Urban rural (0.28), ethnicity (0.27), age (0.27), group type (0.25) and name (0.20), prima
facie, indicate moderate relationships with the number of cases against a terrorist.
Measurement level of age is at the interval level, therefore, the direction of the
relationship could be determined. Age shows a positive relationship. This is
understandable becasue with more age, terrorists have more time to commit acts of
terrorism, and hence the more number of cases against them. The coefficient for age,
although, is of moderate strength, but it should be interpreted keeping in mind its unit of
measurement i.e. year. As a possible change of 0.27 in cases with a one year change in
age may be a strong predictor.
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Table 6. Relationship Between the Number of Cases and their Possible Predictors

Variable

Measure of
association

Coefficient of
Association

N

Financial

Cramer’s V

0.41

55

Marital status

Cramer’s V

0.40

90

Urban rural

Cramer’s V

0.28

285

Ethnicity

Cramer’s V

0.27

268

Age

Gamma

0.27

73

Group type

Cramer’s V

0.25

293

Name

Cramer’s V

0.20

298

Correlation Between the Number of Terrorists and Terrorism Incidents
It is reasonable to suggest that the more number of terrorists in an area lead to
more terrorism in that area. This hypothesis is discussed by Lafree, Yang and Crenshaw
(2009) where they indicates that more than 90% of the non-U.S. attacks were domestic
(i.e., nationals from one country attacking targets of the same nationality in the same
country). This idea could be used saying that terrorists of one area generally commit
terrorism in the same area. With the data available in the current study and the data on
incidents in the first paper, it is possible to have an idea about the realtionship between
the number of terrorists in an area and the amount of terrorism in that area. I found a
correlation of about 0.9 indicating that the terrorists’ number may be a strong predictor of
the number of incidents.

105

CONCLUSION

Purpose of this study was threefold. First, I analyzed the personal, socioeconomic
and demographic variables of arrested terrorists in Pakistan to identify their common
characteristics. Second, I investigated the extent to which terrorists are just a crosssection of the society they belong to, and the extent they are different from the society.
Lastly, I examined how terrorists belonging to different terrorist group types might differ
in personal, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. The overarching objective
remains to locate the possible causes of people joining terrorist organizations.
After the univariate analysis of 2,344 arrested terrorists, some patterns have
emerged. A bigger proportion of arrestees belong to religious families. Most of the
terrorists’ families’ social, bravery and religiosity status determined by their castes is
medium. Pashtun is the dominant ethnicity in the arrestees, and Deobandi is the sect in
religious terrorists. Most have urban origins and are relatively poor. The majority of
terrorists belong to organizations of the type, Sectarian and Muslim militants. Divided on
district basis, the bigger proportion belongs to Karachi and most of them were arrested in
Karachi. The majority of religious terrorists are madrassa educated, married, employed,
weapon trained and have between 9 to 12 years of schooling. Except for four arrestees,
all are male. Terrorists’ age ranges from 16 to 60, averaging 30 years. The average
number of their siblings is 4.5, and the average number of their children is approximately
3. The number of terrorism cases against arrestees varied from 1 to 40 and averaged 3.
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In certain respects, terrorists are just the reflection of the Pakistani society, there
is nothing distinctly different from general population patterns about their backgrounds.
For example most of the Pakistanis have religious orientation, and they are particularly
conscious of their sects. Financially most Pakistanis are poor, as are the terrorists. On
married to single ratio they are reflective of the Pakistani society overall. The aspects on
which terrorists differ from Pakistani society in general include their primarily urban
composition and educational levels. In Pakistan, rural population is in majority while in
terrorists urban portion is dominating. In Pakistan, people educated from years 1 to 8 are
in the biggest portion, while in the terrorist community people with education levels 9 to
12 years are in majority.
Bivariate analyses show that terrorist group types differ significantly on ethnicity,
weapon training, age, urban rural dimension, and family background of bravery,
educational attainment, the number of cases of terrorism, marital status, name and sect.
The characteristic on which terrorist groups do not differ from each other is their social
status; members of all groups generally have the same medium social status in Pakistani
society. The number of siblings, children, and cases has shown group differences but
their number reported in the data is too low to make results reliable.
This study corroborates the findings of the Asal et al. (2008) study in one respect.
The terrorists do not belong to the comparatively richer sections of Pakistani society. But
it differs with Asal et al. (2008) study’ conclusion that sect does not matter and most of
the terrorists are unemployed. The current study concludes that sect is a strong predictor
of one’s group affiliation. Second, that most of the religious terrorists are employed.
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To a large extent, this study supports the findings of earlier international studies
that profiling might be a fruitless exercise in one respect. Terrorist groups in this study
differ on at least 10 dimensions. Two characteristics which all the terrorist groups shared
include the social and financial status of their members. However, generally they are
“unremarkable”. The terrorists seem to reflect the circumstances under which they live;
their times, their geography, ideology of their group.
Perhaps, the better way is to go a little deeper to try to understand terrorists at
homogenous levels: terrorists’ group types, time periods, geography, and particular
movements. It is also desirable to investigate at multivariate levels as to what predicts
terrorists’ group affiliations. Another research question worth investigating is what
determines the number of cases against a particular terrorist. Testing LaFree, Yang and
Crenshaw’s (2009) hypothesis about the relationship between the number of terrorists
and incidents is expected to be a worthwhile exercise.
Theoretical contribution of the current study is its highlighting the importance of
conflict. Majority of terrorists belong to conflict areas. Without exception, all of them
have some ideology to fight for—religious, sectarian, ethnic and Pan-Islamism. The study
also contributes to the debate that a profile of terrorists is not possible as such. The study
enhances our understanding of the terrorism dynamics in Pakistan. One policy
implications is that the government of Pakistan should try to resolve the conflicts, as
much as possible. All ideologies create boundaries, some more than the others. Role of
the policy makers is to promote tolerance. Law enforcement practitioners have many
leads to pick from this study. First, they would know the problem areas to focus their
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resources on. One problem identified through this study is the lack of sufficient data to
reach at certain conclusions with confidence. Practitioners may want to standardize their
data collection for further research.
In short, this study is the first large-scale systematic analysis of socioeconomic,
demographic and personal characteristics of arrested terrorists in Pakistan. Although the
study seems to concur with many international studies that terrorist profiling is a mission
impossible, it has tried to salvage what was possible. At the least it has improved our
understanding of terrorist community in Pakistan and has opened many avenues for
further research.
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PAPER 3
THE IMPACT OF TERRORIST ARRESTS ON TERRORISM:
DEFIANCE, DETERRENCE, OR IRRELEVANCE
In the aftermath of a terrorism incident, the immediate urge, most often, is to
‘capture or kill’ the terrorists involved in the attack. It is considered important both to
initiate the process of criminal justice and to serve as a preventive measure to thwart
future attacks. Whether arrests or killings really prevent further attacks, in fact, remains
an issue seldom explored quantitatively. Despite some commendable research on what
deters terrorists, we still don’t know if their arrests or killings reduce, increase, or show
no effect on future terrorism. Terrorists are a unique type of criminals and as such are
most likely to show a different reaction to their arrests and killings as compared to
criminals in general. Their reactions to government sanctions (arrests) may not only
differ from criminals but among themselves too, because of heterogeneity in arrests
“caused by offender types, offense types, social settings, and level of analysis” (Sherman,
1993). For example, the arrested terrorists may be hardcore or peripheral, and their arrests
may have been executed through usual police procedures or through killings when they
resist usual arrest procedures. We should disaggregate these two kinds of arrests, since
they might have opposite effects on incidence and seriousness of terrorism, leading to
mutual cancellation of effects. This paper, using Sherman’s theory of defiance (1993),
clusters arrested terrorists into two homogenous groups—hardcore and peripheral—and
studies differential impacts of their arrests on incidence and seriousness of terrorism in
the future. In addition, it studies the diversity of effects caused by the mode of arrest
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made—ordinary arrest or arrest by killing. So, the study uses two outcomes (incidence
and seriousness) and five predictors (all arrests, hardcore, peripheral, ordinary arrests and
killings).
The available deterrence research on terrorism generally tests hypotheses about
the deterrent effect of metal detectors, police and military expenditures, UN conventions
and resolutions, military raids, targeted assassinations, and preemptive attacks. Only two
studies (Landes, 1978; Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero, 2005) examine the effect of
apprehension of arrests on airline hijackings. Indeed, the Campbell Systematic Review on
Terrorism (Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley, 2006) report that out of more than 20,000 studies
on terrorism, only 150 are empirical. And out of those 150 only one is about the
relationship between arrests and terrorism. Hence, deterrence research on terrorism
suffers from a clear gap: The impact of terrorist arrests on terrorism has not been studied
with enough details to make any generalizations. Clearly, a research study is needed to
discern the effects of arrests on incidence and seriousness of terrorism, taking into
account the diversity of terrorist types and mode of their arrests.

THE CONTEXT—SECTARIAN TERRORISM IN THE PUNJAB, PAKISTAN
The Punjab is a most suitable place in Pakistan to study the possible relationship
between arrests and terrorism for theoretical, practical, and methodological reasons. The
Punjab is the most populous province of Pakistan, with an estimated population of 81
million and an area of 205, 344 square km. The major religious groups are Shias 20% and
Sunnis 80% (Nasr, 2002: 86). Traditional Shia-Sunni differences were intensified after
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1979 because of two factors: the Iranian Revolution (1979) and the Afghan Jihad (1979)
against the Soviet Union. After the Iranian Revolution, with Iranian support, Shias
formed Tehrik-Nifaz-Fiqah-Jaferia (Movement for the enforcement of Shia
Jurisprudence) later named as Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP)—Movement of Shias of
Pakistan. Shias laid siege to Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, against the Zakat and
Usher Ordinance 1980 (Islamic tax law) enforced by General Zia-ul-Haque—a military
dictator attempting to Islamize Pakistan. General Zia, pressurized, accepted the Shia
demand for exemption from the ordinance. However, to counter the Shia rise, General
Zia-ul-Haque helped form a Deobandi organization, Anjman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba (Haqqani,
2006), later named Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)—army of companions of the Prophet.
Further complexity was added by the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980’s; parties to the war made
Pakistan a proxy theater (Fair, 2004: 104). The SSP was funded by the Saudi Arabia and
Iraq (Stern, 2000: 124), and by the U.S. (Barshied, 2005; Abbas, 2005), making it a “cash
rich organization” (Kamran, 2008: 80).
Until 1989, clashes between the groups remained confined to firebrand speeches
and assassination of prominent Shias such as the first two presidents of the TJP. In 1990,
the founder of the SSP was murdered in the city of Jhang, not exactly by Shias but by a
local political rival Sheikh family. But this murder was blamed on the Iranian diplomat
Sadiq Ganji, and the local Shias. Ultimately, Ganji was also murdered in 1990 in Lahore,
the capital of the province of Punjab. As the momentum of clashes increased, the TJP, in
1994, gave birth to a more militant splinter group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)—
army of prophet Muhammad, as did the SSP in 1996, to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)—army
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of Jhangvi, the founder of the SSP. The TJP/SMP and the SSP/LJ targeted people from
the other sect and the government officials whom they resented. The SSP/LJ killed
Iranian diplomats on two occasions. Four hundred and twenty eight terrorism incidents
took place from 1990 to 2009, with 2067 casualties (people killed and wounded). The
worst year was 1997, with 97 incidents and 345 casualties. Attacks consisted of targeted
killings (368 attacks) of prominent individuals or mass killings (60 attacks) in religious
gatherings. There were 26 cases of explosive use, including suicide attacks, and 402 of
firearms, mostly committed with AK-47 rifles. Figure 1 presents a graph of sectarian
incidents and casualties on a half-year basis.

0

0

50

20

Incidents

100
150
Casualties

40

200

60

250

Figure 1. Sectarian Incidents and Casualties in Punjab (1990-2009)
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Initially, the government responded, using the existing police force to arrest and
prosecute the accused. But when the problem spread beyond Jhang, the city of its
birthplace, the government set up a provincial Criminal Investigation Department (CID)
in February 1995, with a mandate to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on
sectarian terrorism, and further to arrest and interrogate the arrested terrorists. Between
1990 and 2009, the police arrested 615 terrorists and killed 70 while apprehending them.
The theoretical, methodological, and practical reasons for choosing Punjab for the
study will become clearer in the methodology section, but a few points are mentioned
here. First, the Punjab is the birth place of sectarian terrorism and it remained a Punjabi
problem, at least until 1996. It spread to the other parts of Pakistan later. Second, the
Punjab experienced terrorism across the province, whereas in the other provinces, it was
confined only to major cities like Quetta, Karachi, and D.I. Khan. As a methodological
necessity, it was easier to make cross-sections (8 regions) here with expected
probabilities of terrorism events. Third, the Punjab CID collected data from 1990 to 2009,
and it is reliable and sufficient to make statistical inferences. In the other provinces,
except for NWFP, the CID’s were established at a later stage and they have data for only
a limited number of years. Fourth, identifying an incident as sectarian is comparatively
easier in the Punjab than in the other provinces of Pakistan. In other provinces, the
sectarian incidents are sometimes indistinguishable from the incidents of tribal feuds or
language-based violence. Lastly, being resident of the Punjab and having served in the
Punjab Police for almost 12 years, I have particular insight into the dynamics of sectarian
terrorism here.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

In the following section, I review some of the theoretical bases for examining the
effects of arrests on terrorism.

DETERRENCE RESEARCH
Deterrence research is primarily based on the ideas of Cesare Beccaria (17381794) and Jeremy Bentham (1748 –1832). They believed that criminal decisions were
based on a few simple factors: humans have free will; humans are rational creatures; and
humans are able to weigh the prospective outcomes of their actions. The resultant theory
of deterrence postulates that offenders are rational actors who seek to minimize costs and
maximize benefits. Utilitarianism, as advanced by Bentham, proposes that as the
individuals act in their own self-interest, effective punishments will deter them from
engaging in specific actions that serve their self-interest. The deterrence perspective
maintains that an individual’s propensity to engage in violence or crime, including
terrorism can be altered by the actions of the government (LaFree, Dugan, and Korte,
2009). Deterrence theory suggests that government intervention—for example arrest—
will decrease terrorism by increasing fear caused by the threat or imposition of
punishment.
I divide empirical research studies based on deterrence theory into two categories:
terrorism studies, and crime studies. Terrorism studies focus on the impact of different
counterterrorism strategies on terrorism. Counterterrorism studies have explored the
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effects of metal detectors (Cauley and Im, 1988; Enders, Sandlers, and Cauley, 1990;
Enders and Sandlers, 1993, 2000), the probability of apprehension, the conditional
probability of incarceration, and sentences (Landes, 1978), police and military
expenditures (Barros, 2003), UN conventions and resolutions (Cauley and Im, 1988;
Enders, Sandlers and Cauley, 1990; Enders and Sandlers, 1993), military raids (BrophyBaermann and Conybeare, 1994; Enders, Sandlers, 2000, Nevin, 2003), and preemptive
attacks (Sheehan, 2006). Criminologists Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero (2005) estimated
the deterrent impact of several certainty-based and severity-based counter hijacking
strategies on the likelihood of differently motivated hijacking events. They found support
for deterrence caused by certainty of apprehension.
The results of these studies are mixed. The effects of the probability of
apprehension, large police expenditures, and metal detectors all support the deterrence
model; UN conventions show no effect; and preemptive raids and political efforts seem
to increase terrorist incidents. In short, the existing studies are not about the deterrent
effect of arrests on terrorism with the exception of the studies on metal detectors,
especially those of Landes (1978) and Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero (2005), which tell us
that terrorists want to avoid arrest. But the variables used in these studies are not exactly
‘arrests’ –they are measures of the probability of detection.
But the second category of studies, addressing a parallel but broader question of
whether arrests reduce crime, is more relevant to this study. Using a variety of ways to
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operationalize the concepts of arrest and crime 17 , and using different datasets on a variety
of offence categories, these studies offer several important findings helping us to
understand the possible effect of arrests on terrorism. First, these studies demonstrate that
the relationship between crime and arrests is two-way: crime impacts arrests (Decker and
Kohfeld, 1986) and arrests deter crime (Chamlin et al., 1992; Cloninger and Sartorius,
1979; Levitt, 1998). Second, they show that the impact of number of incidents on the
number of arrests is contemporaneous, but that the impact of arrests on the reported crime
is typically lagged such that arrests affect crimes in the future (Levitt, 1998). The
contemporaneous relationship between reported crime and arrests is positive but there is
no feedback relationship evident in studies using official records that look at the number
of crimes reported as an outcome and the frequency of arrest as predictor (D’Alessio and
Stolzenberg, 1998). Third, research from the early 1970s suggests that the arrests must
reach a certain critical level (tipping point) before they reduce crime (Tittle and Rowe,
1973) and that this tipping point is an attribute of smaller cities because the deterrent
effect of arrest certainty is stronger in smaller cities and counties than in larger ones
(Brown, 1978; Chamlin et al., 1992). Crime, especially terrorism, has cycles; incidents
peak after some period of time (Im, Cauley, and Sandler, 1987) and then start falling
sharply.
Studies generally are correlational in nature and time-series analysis seems to be

17

Crime in general or of a specific nature like robbery, burglary, and larceny. Number of arrests and number
of crime incidents in a raw form; or in terms of rates of arrests and rates of crime; or taking log of number
of arrests and log of number of incidents.
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the preferred way of studying this relationship over time. But within this generic
statistical approach, techniques have been evolving to address deficits of earlier methods.
To discern the relationship between crime and arrests appropriately, these studies
underscore the importance of aggregating crime data in proper time intervals (how much
time does it take incidents to influence arrests and vice versa), using proper time lags, and
selecting the proper level of aggregation.
In short, the missing topics from the above-described deterrence research include
the relationship of terrorism and arrests and the differential effects of the heterogeneity
present in arrests. The two categories of studies discussed above helped motivate the
current study and its methodology.

BACKLASH RESEARCH
Although deterrence models have been applied to a wide variety of criminal
behavior including terrorism, there is an influential group of researchers in terrorism
studies, psychology, and criminology who do not agree with this model of deterrence.
Instead, they believe that threat or punishment does not always reduce crime but may in
some cases increase it. LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) cite McCauley (2006), Nevin
(2003) as terrorism scholars, Sherman (1993), Pridemore and Freillich (2007) as
criminologists, and Brehem and Brehem (1981), and Tyler (1990) as psychologists who
argue that backlash is the likely result in many cases. They cite many researchers
including Collins, 2004, Geraghty, 2000, Kenny, 2003, Lichbach, 1987, Malvesti, 2002,
Nevin, 2003, Soule, 1989, Turk, 2002, who agree that the imposition of harsh criminal
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justice and the undertaking of military interventions to reduce terrorism may well be
counterproductive given the studies testing deterrence theory with regard to terrorism
often show null or negative effects.
An important study by criminologists deserves greater attention. LaFree, Dugan,
and Korte (2009) studied the impact of two criminal justice and four military strategies
aimed at reducing political violence in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1992 and found
strong support for backlash models in five of six interventions. The two criminal justice
interventions were “the internment” and “criminalization and Ulsterization.” During the
internment, a total of 1,981 suspected terrorists were detained by the authorities.
Criminalization revoked the special rights of the terrorists as political detainees and
started treating them instead as ordinary criminals. The four military interventions were
the Falls Curfew, Operation Motorman, and the Loughall and Gibralter. The Falls Curfew
was a 36-hour military curfew and search operation designed to locate IRA members and
weapons stockpiles. Operation Motorman was a British military deployment of 30,000,
aiming at eliminating “no go” areas in Londonderry and Belfast. Loughall and Gibralter
were incidents of targeted assassinations of terrorists. Except for the Operation
Motorman, all the other strategies support the backlash perspective. Operation Motorman
was followed by significant declines in the risk of new attacks. The results underscore the
importance of considering the possibility that antiterrorist interventions might both
increase and decrease subsequent violence. But they do not discuss conditions which
might lead to positive or negative outcomes. These conditions are detailed in Sherman’s
theory of defiance.
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SHERMAN’S (1993) THEORY OF DEFIANCE
Sherman (1993: 445) claims that it is wrong to ask, “does punishment control
crime?” because sanction effects vary widely depending on the type of offenders,
offences, social settings, and level of analysis. According to him, a more useful question
to ask is: “under what conditions does each type of sanctions reduce, increase, or have no
effect on future crimes?” Sherman gives four necessary conditions under which sanctions
will result in defiance: offender perceives criminal sanctions as unfair, offender defines
sanctions as stigmatizing personae, offender is poorly bonded to punishing community or
agent, and the offender refuses to accommodate shame.
Defiance is “the net increase in the prevalence, incidence, or seriousness of future
offending against a sanctioning community caused by a proud, shameless reaction to the
administration of a criminal sanction” (Sherman, 1993: 459). Defiance may be specific or
general: specific defiance is by the individual punished and general defiance is the
reaction of a group to the punishment of any of its members. Sherman (1993) adds
another dimension of direct and indirect defiance. Defiance shown directly to the
punishing agent is direct, while defiance shown to the community is indirect.
The theory of defiance states that there are four necessary conditions under which
sanctions cause defiance, predicting an increase in the incidence or seriousness of future
crime. Judged on these criteria, terrorists are more likely to meet these conditions as
compared to common criminals. There is no study known to the author which establishes
that terrorists really meet these conditions, a few examples which may lead us to assume
so are narrated below.
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Yousef Ramzi was tried in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York during January 1998 and convicted of planning a terrorism plot. On the day of
Ramzi’s conviction, the judge Kevin Duffy remarked "You adored not Allah but the evil
(emphasis added) you had become. I must say as an apostle of evil (emphasis added), you
have been most effective.” It is a good example of sanctions as stigmatizing personae. In
response, the convict proclaimed: "Yes, I am a terrorist and proud (emphasis added) of it
as long as it is against the U.S. government, and against Israel, because you are more than
terrorists; you are the one who invented terrorism and using it every day. You are
butchers, liars and hypocrites" (Tyre, 1998). Ramzi’s example illustrates the three criteria
of stigmatizing personae and the terrorists’ refusal to accommodate shame, as well as
their pride in what they do. Another example of pride is the wife of the suicide bomber
who attacked Central Intelligence Agency agents in Afghanistan. She said: "I am proud
of him, my husband has carried out a great operation in such a war. May God accept his
martyrdom” (Hacauglu, 2010).
The above examples support assumptions in this study that terrorists are proud of
what they do and that they refuse to accommodate shame. Even the governments’ attitude
towards them is that of stigmatizing. The direct evidence of the poor bond of the terrorists
with the society (evidence of network ties as noted by R. Collins, personal
communication, March 2, 2010) may be lacking. Arguably, the indirect evidence of their
poor bond is strong enough to let us assume so. First, their being terrorists distances them
from the society whom they have selected as victims. Second, the terrorists in this study
have created their own society and culture based on sectarian beliefs and have created a
strong sense of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’. Their opponents are kafirs (infidels). Lastly, the terrorists
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are poorly bonded to the punishing community or the government agents, as proved by
their killing of many government functionaries and police officers. For example, they
killed a former minister, Mohammad Siddique Kanju, and attacked Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif (who survived). They killed senior superintendents of police, Muhammad
Ashraf Marth, (brother-in-law of Prime Minister, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain), Ejaz
Ahmed Langerial, and deputy superintendent Tariq Kamboh. This is just to name a few
such incidents. These officers were killed because they had arrested and interrogated
important terrorists. The presumption that the terrorists were poorly bonded to the
community is supported by the fact that most of the terrorists, especially hardcore ones,
were (proclaimed offenders) fugitives of law.
Under the strong presumption that the terrorists meet the four necessary
conditions listed in defiance theory, I hypothesize that controlling for other variables,
terrorist arrests are likely to be associated with an increase in the incidence or seriousness
of terrorism in the future. But, as the terrorist organizations have hierarchies in which
terrorists have different roles, a wide diversity in this effect is expected. The arrests of
hardcore terrorists are likely to be linked with a greater increase in terrorism than the
arrests of peripheral terrorists. Defiance theory also suggests differential impacts caused
by the mode of arrests. Presumably, arrests executed through killings are likely to be
perceived as more unfair compared to arrests made through the usual police procedures.
Therefore, arrests made through killings of terrorists are likely to cause a greater increase
in terrorism than arrests through ordinary means.
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DATA AND METHODS
RESEARCH DESIGN
According to Sherman (1993: 467), the best test of defiance theory will be
randomized experiments. However, in the context of the present study this design may
not be feasible, because terrorists could not be randomized to be arrested or subjected to
some alternative condition. An alternative design mentioned by Sherman (1993) was the
longitudinal cohort design, mainly meant for studying specific deterrence. To study
general defiance, I use cross-sectional time series (panel design) commonly used in
economics to study the effects of policy shifts on changes in outcomes over time.
According to Allison (2005: 2), “using fixed-effects methods, it is possible to control for
all possible characteristics of the individuals in the study—even without measuring
them—so long as those characteristics do not change over time.” By using this design,
Allison (2005) claims that we can get closer to the benefits of randomized experiments
even with non-experimental data, if the data are cross-sectional time series. And there
should be no important omitted variable bias that is correlated with shifts in the outcome
over time.
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DATA
To test my hypotheses, I use data from January 1990 to December 2009 from the
province of Punjab in Pakistan collected by the CID 18 .
VARIABLES
Terrorism, Terrorism Incidents, and Terrorism Seriousness
Terrorism is defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence
by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear,
coercion or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184). For the specific purposes of
this paper, in the context of sectarian terrorism, I take a terrorist incident as an incident in
which unlawful use or threatened use of force is committed by a sectarian group against
the other sect for their differences in religious ideology or against the law enforcement
agency for its actions against the terrorists. The intention is to intimidate or coerce them.
I include successful incidents (in which somebody was killed or wounded) only. Defiance
theory postulates that defiance may increase the incidence or seriousness of future crime,

18

Police data sources generally have reliability problems, because many researchers have confirmed the
underreporting of crime. But research finds that underreporting is mostly for the minor offences. In case of
serious offences, Cloning and Sartorius (1979) found that underreporting was not a serious issue. They
considered for their analysis two crimes—homicide and auto theft—primarily because being serious
offences, these crimes showed no appreciable reporting errors in national surveys. LaFree (1999) quotes
Gove et al. (1985) and O’Brien (1996) reporting that data are probably most accurate for murder and
robbery, two serious offences. In case of the terrorist incidents, I argue that non-reporting of incidents is
nearly impossible because of the sensitivity of the incidents, their sensational nature, and proactive
behavior of the affected religious organizations. So, for all practical purposes, incidents are reported
consistently.
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and therefore, for the purpose of this study, I measure terrorism in two ways: by counting
the number of terrorism incidents and by counting the number of causalities 19 .

Terrorist Arrests
Arrest is defined as the taking or detaining in custody by authority of law (Gove
and Merriam-Webster, 2002), especially in response to a criminal charge. The date of
arrest is not the date on which terrorists are officially declared to be arrested but the date
on which they actually came into custody of the law enforcement agency and lost their
freedom of action. Arrests on criminal charges are included, but preventative arrests are
excluded. Sometimes, in the process of arrest, terrorists are killed while violently
resisting the arrest. I count these killings as a form of arrest because of two reasons. First,
Pakistani law considers killings during arrest a form of arrest, and second, the terrorists
are not alive to commit more terrorism. Thus, killings have a substantial impact on future
terrorism. Generally, the terrorists are involved in more than one incident of terrorism
and in different regions of the Punjab. Once arrested in one region, the same arrest date is
recorded in the other regions where that terrorist was wanted for terrorism cases. As a

19

Because of three reasons, I use casualties as a measure of seriousness instead of the casualties per
incident. 1) It is more intuitive to count total casualties than to count casualties per incident. If it can be an
indication of terrorists’ intentions, then they would be more concerned about increasing the number of
casualties in a time frame than to be intentionally counting the number of casualties per incident. 2) Poisson
models predicting casualties and casualties per incident are exactly the same except for one thing. In model
predicting casualties incidents are a predictor variable and population is exposure. But in the model
predicting casualties per incident, the predictors remain the same including incidents because outcome
variable is still the same as in case of casualties, only it has been offset by incidents. According to
MacDonald and Lattimore (2010), a predictor cannot be an offset variable. 3) Hoffman (2006: 86) mentions
the number of casualties as a measure of seriousness.
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result, the number of terrorists is fewer and the number of arrests is greater.

Terrorist Types
Fraser and Fulton (1984) posit that terrorist groups have four levels of hierarchy:
command, active cadre (people actually carrying out terrorist activity), active supporters,
and passive supporters. In the case of the Shia-Sunni organizations I study, the hierarchy
is almost the same but with a slight difference. The commanders are active cadres too,
and the passive supporters do not count because they are not the arrestees. Therefore, I
categorize terrorists as hardcore or peripheral. Hardcore terrorists are the terrorists who
have some leadership role in their organization, have participated in more acts of
terrorism than the others, or are involved in high profile cases. Generally the government
fixed a bounty (known as “head money” in Pakistan) for the arrest of hardcore terrorists.
Peripheral terrorists are those who were involved in minor cases, played support roles, or
have committed few acts of terrorism. Sherman (1993) quoted Hood and Spanks as
saying that contradictory effects in heterogeneous samples cancel each other out. The
division of arrested terrorists into two terrorist types makes the two resultant groups
comparatively homogenous and reduces the chances of an aggregation bias that can occur
with heterogeneous samples.

Control Variables
Localized Conflict. Sectarian terrorism in the early years of 1990s was mostly confined to
the city of Jhang where the SSP had its headquarters. Then the SMP established its
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headquarters in Lahore in 1994. Both of these periods when the SSP was operating from
Jhang and the SMP from Lahore are likely to have different effects on the course of
terrorism in Punjab. To control for this differential effect, Localized Conflict as a dummy
variable has been included as a control measure.
Type of Weapon. Sectarian terrorists in the Punjab have used many types of weapons—
blunt, firearms, or explosives. As the number of casualties in an incident depends greatly
on the type of weapon, in the model predicting casualties (to be discussed later), I use
type of weapon as a control variable.
Type of Target. It is just not the type of weapon which determines the number of
causalities; it is also the attack type—assassination or mass killing. A dummy variable of
whether it was targeted assassination or a case of mass killing is included in models
predicting casualties.
Interaction of Target Type and Weapon Type. An AK-47 rifle used for the assassination
of a single person would produce fewer casualties as compared to an incident in which
the same rifle was used on a mob. So it is just not the target type alone or the weapon
alone which actually predicts casualties, it is their interaction. Therefore, I have included
an interaction term of weapon types and target types 20 .

20

Some variables (Specialized Hardliner Groups, 9/11, and leader killed) were supposed to influence the
events of sectarian terrorism. They were included in the regressions as dummy variables but did not show
significant effect. Perhaps time dummies have served as proxies for these effects since they were
introduced during different time stages where terrorism was evolving. So, they were dropped from analysis.
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Population. To convert the counts to rates of terrorism per population, I use population as
an exposure variable.
The descriptive statistics of outcome variables (incidents, casualties) and their
likely predictors are shown in table 1. The data were aggregated on half-yearly basis for
eight regions 21 . The table shows that the mean of incidents in a region for six months is
1.34 with a standard deviation of 2.76. The minimum and the maximum values are 0 and
24 respectively. The mean of casualties is 6.46 with a standard deviation of 16.87, and
the minimum and the maximum values are 0 and 142 respectively. The mean of
population is 8.80 million with a standard deviation of 3.13. The statistics of mean,
standard deviation, the minimum, and the maximum, show that the data as counts are
skewed to the right. Following convention, the Poisson distribution was used to model
these counts. The predictor variable of interest (arrests) is also skewed to the right with a
mean of 2.77 and a standard deviation of 4.39, with the minimum and maximum values
of 0 and 26 respectively. The dispersion in incidents and arrests shows that arrests have
the potential to explain the variation in incidents. Whereas variance in casualties is almost
40 times the mean indicating that some variable in addition to the arrests is needed to
account for that dispersion. Table 1 also provides summary statistics for ordinary arrests
and killings, and hardcore arrests and peripheral arrests.

21

The Punjab traditionally has eight regions (Lahore, Faisalabad, Multan, Bahawalpur, D.G. Khan,
Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, and Sargodha) each headed by a deputy inspector general. Regions are further
subdivided into districts having police stations ranging in number from 10 to 100 plus.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Incidents, Casualties, and their likely Predictors
Variable

Mean

Standard N
Deviation

Sum

Minimum Maximum

Dependent variables
Incidents

1.3375

2.764276

312

428

0

24

Casualties

6.459375 16.86843

312

2067

0

142

8.795625 3.12895

312

28146

3.5

16.6

Arrests all
types

2.771875 4.385194

312

887

0

26

Arrests
Hardcore

.83125

1.644681

312

266

0

12

Arrests
Peripheral

1.6375

3.156299

312

524

0

21

Arrests
ordinary

2.46875

4.103553

312

790

0

26

Killings

.303125

1.096585

312

97

0

9

Firearms

1.253125 2.656097

312

401

0

23

Explosions

.084375

.3392869

312

27

0

3

Localized
conflict

.0625

.2424406

312

20

0

1

Exposure
Population
(million)
Predictors
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STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Spatial Aggregations
Earlier studies on deterrence concluded that the results were sensitive to the levels
of spatial aggregation used (Chamlin et al., 1992). Greenberg, Kessler, and Logan (1981)
found evidence for bias in the state estimates. They preferred city instead of state as an
aggregation level because the mutual influence of crime rates and sanction levels were
more likely to occur at the city rather than the state level. They believed that the
heterogeneity of bigger units like states made them unfit as a proper unit for analysis in
deterrence studies. I have chosen a police region as the unit of analysis for four important
reasons. First, each police region is 1/8th of the Punjab, having a separate police
administration, and a generally homogenous culture with a standard set of practices for
effecting arrests. Second, most of the terrorists worked in cells having police regions as
their area of operations, making it easy to know the effect of their arrests on terrorism in
that area. Third, if data were aggregated at the province level, there would be no panel
data possible as n would be one. Finally, if data were aggregated at the district level, n
would be 36, but many districts will be without incidents. To make panels possible,
according to Allison (2009), there should be at least two different values for a panel.
Temporal Aggregation
To properly discern the nature of the relationship between crime and arrests,
researchers have recommended that we aggregate crime and arrest data in proper time
intervals. In deterrence research, for the first time, temporal aggregation bias was noted
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by Greenberg, Kessler, and Logan (1981). Barros (2003) warned that time aggregation
may blur the lag structure and thus make causal interpretation impossible. Chamlin et al.
(1992) questioned the validity of panel designs of yearly lags and yearly aggregations of
arrests and crimes in macro-level research.
I aggregate data at half-yearly levels for three reasons. First, terrorism is a rare
event and data aggregated at monthly and quarterly levels show 84.90 % and 68.41%
zeros, respectively, making data analysis imprecise and unstable. Data aggregated at halfyearly basis show reasonable percentage of zeros (55.63%). Second, a half-year should
be enough time for terrorist organizations to respond to arrests of their members, making
any effect discernable. Lastly, data aggregated on a half-year basis will give statistical
power to hypothesis tests because they will have sufficient time periods (T).

Model Specification Issues
A best graphical illustration of possible relations between crime (in our case
terrorism) and arrests is presented by Greenberg, Kessler, and Logan (1979: 845).
According to their illustration, per capita crime rates at time t are determined by crime
rates at time t-1 and arrests at time t and t-1. It is not only arrests determining crime rates
but also crime rates at times t and t-1 determining arrests at time t. They have presented a
three-wave two variable model. “Lower case letters represent standardized regression
coefficients and correlations among residuals”. Whereas the capital letters stand for
variables: C for crime rates, A for arrest rates (clearance rates), U and V for residuals for
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the crime rate and clearance rate at time t, respectively. For the purposes of this study, I
am particularly interested in C2 in figure 2.
Figure 2. Greenberg, Kessler, and Logan’s (1979) Illustration of Relationship
between Crime Rates and Arrest Rates

The Poisson regression model can be expressed as the logarithm of the expected
count outcome according to the following form:
log (E(μ׀λ)) = α +x'β

(1)

In Equation 1, the expected average count of terrorism, μ, conditioned on λ is denoted by
(E(μ׀λ)), which is a function of the intercept (α) plus a set of linear predictor variables
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(X'). To make this generic formulation of the Poisson model specific to variables in this
paper, the model can be rewritten in a modified form in equations 2 and 3:
log (E(λi=terrorist incidents)) = α + yit-1 + Aitβ + Ait-1β + RiβRegion+
TiβTime+ßCONTROLS

(2)

log (E(λi=casualties)) = α + yit-1 + Aitβ + Ait-1β + RiβRegion+
TiβTime+ßCONTROLS

(3)

In Poisson regression, the rate is estimated by adding (log*exposure) to the righthand side of the equation, with the parameter estimate constrained to equal 1. The ‘y’
denotes the expected count of terrorism events in equation (2) and the expected count of
casualties in equation (3). That half-year, α is the intercept, A is the number of terrorist
arrests, β is the effect on terrorist events, t-1 shows the lagged variable, and R is the
police region having K-1 dummies for the K regions. βRegion is a vector of the fixedeffects of each of these regions. T represents time having T-1 dummies to control for
various time effects and to serve as a proxy for some unmeasured time stable variables.
βTime is a vector of the effects of each of these time dummies. To maximize confidence
in the results, I sought to control for a variety of competing explanations and hence have
included some controls. I assume that a significant increase in the number of terrorism
incidents/casualties is consistent with a defiance effect, and that a significant decrease is
consistent with a deterrence model. A null effect suggests that no relationship exists.
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Model Estimation Issues
To estimate this model, I conducted some preliminary analyses using STATA
version 10. The first analysis was of within and between variation in outcome and
predictor variables. The results are given in Appendix 1. The most important finding
from this summary is that for all variables, within variation (across time) is much higher
than the between variation (across regions) suggesting the suitability of fixed effects
models. This is important because in the fixed-effects models “the coefficient of a
regressor with little within variation will be imprecisely estimated and will not be
identified if there is no within variation at all”(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009: 238). To
handle the individual fixed-effects for regions, I included dummy variables for each
region. This technique assists in controlling for unobserved heterogeneity when this
heterogeneity is constant over time and correlated with independent variables 22 .
To control for time trends, seasonal variation, and to serve as a proxy for variables
changing slowly but not explicitly measured, I used time dummy variables to control for
long term time trends.

22

However, it is much difficult to assume that heterogeneity is constant over time or in Allison’s words
(2005: 2) characteristics of the regions do not change over time once the data are for twenty years as in the
present study. However, there are remedies. First, it is advisable to include some predictors which may be
causing between-variation. Second, dependent variable lags may be included in the model. Putting lagged
dependent variable in the model brings in the correlates from the previous year. Where, a stronger
correlation between the dependent variable and its lag shows that previous dynamics of the phenomenon
are continuing over time. I used both these techniques. Third, panel design primarily was developed for
data when regions are greater in number than the time periods. However, the use of long panels (crosssectional time series) with fixed effects is very common. It’s becoming popular even in many disciplines
and Cameron and Trivedi (2009) have discussed them separately, although in a summarized form.
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Earlier studies have mentioned the simultaneity of relationship between crime
rates and arrest rates. There is a strong possibility of this simultaneous relationship
between terrorism incidents and arrests. To reduce this potential source of endogeneity
and assess the impact of arrests on terrorism incident rates, I used a structural equation
model (control function) approach as described by Cameron and Trivedi (2009: 593-595)
using establishment of the CID as an instrumental variable. The CID has a correlation of
0.3148 with arrests but only -0.1098 with incidents. The CID was a direct response to
increase the probability of arresting terrorists. However, the CID has no direct bearing on
the incidents of terrorism, but does have effects on the arrests of terrorists. Therefore, I
considered it a valid instrument to use, though it is exactly identified and cannot be tested
against other potential instruments. The results of the two-step estimation are given in
appendix 2. The results show the coefficient for residual (lpuhat) as 0.00979 with a pvalue of 0.852 indicating no difference between regression with instrumental variable and
without it. This suggests that either the feedback relationship is too weak to be detected
or it has been removed with the use of lags of dependent and independent variables.
Another possible explanation might be that as in “the fixed-effects models, individual
specific effects are allowed to be correlated with the regressors xit, this allows a limited
form of endogeneity with the time invariant component of the error αi” (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2009).
An important question to ask is what estimates of the standard errors to use when
the number of regions is small and the number of time periods is large. Cameron and
Trivedi (2009: 328) recommend using a heteroskadasticity and autocorrelation-consistent
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estimate of the standard errors. Another complexity could be added by heterogeneity
generated by spatial correlation of regions, because the regions are adjacent and not
randomly sampled. But as the number of regions is just eight, it is possible to relax the
assumption that µit is independent over i (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009: 267). Terrorism
incidents being count show a standard deviation of 2.764276 as compared to mean of
1.3375. In the presence of significant over-dispersion, Berk and MacDonald (2008)
advise looking for the sources of dispersion: omitted predictors, incorrect functional form
specified, random variation in the conditional expectations, and dependence between the
events. They also argued against opting for negative binomial, unless really needed.
Cameron and Trivedi (2009: 561) recommend that instead of using negative binomial,
one way to modeling is to use Poisson with robust standard errors, which I used.
Post Estimation Tests
Many alternative estimation methods are available and choosing between them
involves trade-offs between fit, parsimony, and ease of interpretation. The criteria I used
to assess my models included tests of omitted variables, goodness-of-fit, and squared
correlation between observed and fitted values. I also checked whether results were also
consistent with a priori expectations. Berk and MacDonald (2008: 272) state that if the
“model is on sound footing, the conditional expectations estimated by the fitted values
will be the same as the residual variances around those fitted values, save for random
error introduced by the Poisson process itself.” In other words, “what one wants to see is
whether the estimated mean from the regression model equals the variance” (MacDonald
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and Lattimore, 2010). However, the assumption that the conditional mean and variance
are equal is rarely met with observational data in criminology.

RESULTS
I estimated eight fixed-effects Poisson regression models using regional dummies,
time dummies, robust standard errors, and population as exposure variable. Eight models,
are presented in table 2. The results of models through IV method and through usual
procedure using arrests as predictor were similar. Therefore, I present and discuss results
of six models estimated through usual Poisson regression for cross-sectional time series
(panel) and include the results of estimates through IV method as appendix 2 and
Appendix 3.
Table 2. Eight Estimated Models for Incidence and Seriousness of Terrorism
Incidence

Seriousness (casualties)

Incident rate on arrests through IV
method

Casualty rate on arrests through IV
method

Incident rate on arrests

Casualty rate on arrests

Incident rate on ordinary arrests vs.
killings

Casualty rate on ordinary arrests vs.
killings

Incident rate on hardcore vs. peripheral

Casualty rate on hardcore vs. peripheral

These are the models which have been found best fit through various post estimation
procedures. Table 3 presents the results of three models predicting expected rates of
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terrorism incidents per half year per million people. Table 4 presents the results of three
models predicting casualties per incident with different operationalizations of arrests.
Poisson regression coefficients are not as straight to interpret as the ordinary least
square regression coefficients are. We can interpret them in three ways: as a difference
between the logs of expected counts, as incidence rate ratios, and as the marginal effects.
I use incidence rate ratios approach as described by MacDonald and Lattimore (2010).
This interpretation tells, to what percentage a predictor increase or decreases the expected
count or incidence of crime; such that 1.7 would be interpreted as increasing the expected
count by 70%, and 0.6 would be interpreted as reducing the expected count by 40%
(MacDonald and Lattimore, 2010).

ARRESTS AND INCIDENCE OF TERORISM
All Arrests
Model 1 in table 3 shows the relationship between incidents as outcome and
arrests and lagged arrests as predictors. The coefficient of arrests of 1.066 indicates that
one more arrest is associated with a 6.6% increase in the number of expected terrorism
incidents. The coefficient of lagged arrests of .95 indicates that one more arrest in the
prior period (previous six month) is associated with a 5.0% decrease in the number of
expected terrorism incidents in the current period. In simple terms, controlling for prior
period, the current level of terrorism are correlated positively with current arrest levels
and negatively correlated with prior arrest levels. Coefficients estimated through two138

stage least square IV approach are almost equal to the coefficients estimated through
simple Poisson regression: 0.064 for arrests and 0.050 for prior arrests and the coefficient
of residual (lpuhat) is not significant, eliminating the need for IV approach in this case.
To assess goodness-of-fit of models estimated in this paper, I used four methods:
comparison of predicted mean and the observed mean and comparison of their variances;
R-Square of the model and the squared correlation of coefficient of observed and
expected counts; Chi-Square goodness-of-fitness test with the null hypothesis that
Poisson is the appropriate model; and the graph of predicted and observed probabilities of
counts. In addition to the tests of fitness, I tested all the models for omitted variables
using linktest described in STATA manual and multicollinearity using variance inflation
factor (VIF).
For model 1 in table 3, predicted mean of 1.339786 is almost equal to the
observed mean of 1.3375 suggesting a good fit. Variance of the predicted counts of
5.942232 is more than the predicted mean but it is reasonable. R-Squared is 0.54 and the
squared correlation of coefficient between observed rates of incidents and expected is
0.77, which are quite high indicating a good fit of the model. On testing, goodness-of-fit
likelihood ratio test is equal to 279.3891 on a chi-square distribution with a probability of
0.2199 confirms the null hypothesis that Poisson is an appropriate model here. The graph
of predicted and observed probabilities of counts presented in figure 3 indicates that
model fits the data well except for the count of 3.
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Test for omitted variables suggests no omitted variable. In the test for
multicollinearity, the VIF for various variables in this model are ≤ 3.5 which is
acceptable because some authors consider a VIF of 10 (90% shared variation) as the
upper limit, while others set the limit at a VIF of 4 (75% shared variance).
The results of this model support the hypothesis that controlling for other
variables, the increased number of arrests are associated with a significant increase in the
rate of terrorism incidents. The prior arrests are associated with a significant decrease in
the rate of terrorism incidents.
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Ordinary Arrests vs. Killings
Model 2 in table 3 shows the relationship of ordinary arrests and killings with
terrorist incidents. The table also shows association of their priors with the current levels
of incidents. The coefficient of ordinary arrests of 1.086 indicates that one more ordinary
arrest is associated with a 8.6% increase in the expected number of terrorism incidents.
Table 3. Fixed-Effects Cross-Sectional Time Series Poisson Estimates of Impact of
Terrorist Arrests on Terrorism Incidence
Model 1
Incidents

IRR

Robust
Std. Err.

Arrests

1.066016*** .0183478

L1.

.9514013**

Model 2
IRR

Robust
Std. Err.

Model 3
IRR

Robust
Std. Err.

.0183591

Ordinary

1.086203*** .017762

L1.

.9600003

.0210585

Killings

.8466877

.0897299

L1.

.8731503

.0766264

Hardcore

1.102049*** .0298641

L1.

.9833673

Peripheral

1.068208*** .0200394

L1.

.9440803*

.0343181

.0258224

L.Incidents

1.050988

.0221694 1.041343

.0216949 1.049485

.0225141

Localized
conflict

2.401983

.6105556 2.818199

.680039

2.620336

.652011

Faisalabad

1.697677

.3271494 1.595206

.3108642 1.632492

.314937
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Multan

1.423785

.3527135 1.402608

.3513543 1.481895

.3893684

Bahawalpur 1.413175

.3518777 1.362337

.3465058 1.481176

.3778169

D.G. Khan

1.164425

.3442679 1.118804

.3225042 1.224964

.3568523

Rawalpindi

.9064685

.2522641 .7773355

.2161424 .9447363

.2669148

Gujranwala

.4876415

.1714124 .4716708

.1599997 .5229984

.1877464

Sargodha

.6666742

.2436704 .6490401

.2325938 .720228

.2670257

Population

Exposure

N

312

312

312

R2

0.5450

0.5536

0.5489

NOTES: Time dummies included in regression but not shown in the table.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 stars only for relevant IRR

The exponential of the coefficient of killings, and lagged killings are not statistically
significant at a significance level of p<0.05. One possible explanation for the coefficients
not turning out statistically significant could be stated as the sparseness of the predictor,
killings. Killings are concentrated in a few years; one in 1991, one in 1992, eight in 1998,
42 in 1999, one in 2000, 33 in 2002, four in 2004, three in 2007, and three in 2008.
Assessment of the fitness of the model on various criteria produces the following
results. R-Square of the model is 0.55 and the squared correlation between incidents and
their expected values is .80 showing a high fit as substantiated by a formal goodness-offit test. The goodness-of-fit likelihood ratio equal to 267.3015 on a chi-square distribution
with a probability of 0.3645, confirms the null hypothesis that Poisson is an appropriate
model here. Another proof of goodness-of-fit may be that against an observed mean of
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1.3375 and variance of 7.641223, mean of the expected values is 1.3397 and variance
6.009586.
Post estimation test of omitted variable indicate no omitted variable. Test for
detecting multicollinearity produces the VIF levels for all variables ≤ 3.55, showing
absence of multicollinearity. The model is primarily geared to test the differential effects
of ordinary arrests and killings, on the expected counts of terrorism incidents. Because
the coefficient of killings is not statistically significant, its equivalency test with the
ordinary arrests was not conducted.
Hardcore vs. Peripheral
Model 3 in table 3 shows the association of arrests of hardcore terrorists and
arrests of peripheral terrorists with terrorist incidents. The table also shows association of
their lags with the incidents in the current period. The exponential of the coefficient of
hardcore arrests of 1.102 indicates that one more hardcore arrest is associated with a
10.2% increase in the expected number of terrorism incidents. The coefficient of arrests
of peripheral terrorists of 1.068 indicates that one more peripheral arrest is associated
with a 6.8% raise in the number of terrorism incidents. The coefficient of prior peripheral
arrests of .944 shows that one more prior peripheral arrest is related to a 5.6% expected
decrease in the number of terrorism incidents.
Goodness-of-fit test produces likelihood ratio of 273.8899 with a probability of
0.2651on a chi-square distribution, suggesting a good fit. R-Square is 0.55 and the
squared correlation between observed and expected values is .78443105. The predicted
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mean and variance are 1.339697 and 7.641223 respectively against the observed mean of
1.3375 and variance 5.968196. All these tests show a good fit between the observed and
the fitted counts. Test of omitted variable shows no omitted variable and the maximum
VIF is 3.53 for any predictor, showing no problem of multicollinearity. Wald test of
equivalency of coefficients of hardcore and peripheral arrests shows likelihood ratio of
0.88 with a probability of 0.3482 on chi-square distribution, supporting the null
hypothesis of no difference.
To summarize the results of relationship between incidence of terrorism and
arrests types and terrorist types, the current level of terrorism incidents are correlated
positively with all arrests, hardcore arrests, peripheral arrests, and ordinary arrests while
controlling for prior period and other variables. There is no differential effect of hardcore
and peripheral arrests.

ARRESTS AND SERIOUNESS OF TERRORISM
All Arrests
Model 1 in table 4 shows the relationship between casualties as outcome and
arrests and lagged arrests as predictors. The exponential of the coefficient of arrests of
1.04 indicates that one more arrest is associated with a 4.0% increase in the expected
number of casualties. The coefficient of lagged arrests of .97 indicates that one more
prior arrest is associated with a 3.0% decrease in the number of casualties. In simple
terms, controlling for prior period, the current level of casualties are correlated positively
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with current arrest levels and negatively correlated with prior arrest levels. Coefficients
estimated through two-stage least square IV approach are almost equal to the coefficients
estimated through simple Poisson regression: 1.034 for arrests and 0.97 for prior arrests
eliminating the need for IV approach in this case. Predicted mean of 6.459375 is almost
equal to the observed mean of 6.44229 suggesting a good fit. Variance of the predicted
counts of 284.5438 (286.4662 observed) is more than the predicted mean but it is
reasonable in the presence of many sources of heterogeneity—spatial, temporal, weapon
types, and attack types. R-Square of 0.79 and the squared correlation of coefficient
between observed rates of casualties and expected is 0.92 which is quite high indicating a
good fit of the model. On testing, goodness-of-fit likelihood ratio of 888.3089 with a
probability of 0.0000 on chi-square distribution shows lack of fit. Figure 4, presenting
graph of the observed and predicted probabilities of counts of casualties, supports the
results of goodness-of-fitness test. However, because the observed mean and expected
mean are equal, but the number of sources of heterogeneity is more as compared to the
incidents, even the present fit is acceptable.
Test for omitted variable suggests some omitted variable, which might not be a
serious problem because in criminology, it is hard to control all the variables, but results
may still remain valid. The VIF levels for the predictors are not more than 3.43,
indicating no problem of multicollinearity.
The results of this model support the hypothesis that controlling for other
variables, the increased number of arrests are associated with a significant increase in the
rate of casualties. This was what was predicted by the defiance theory (Sherman, 1993).
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Ordinary Arrests vs. Killings
Model 2 in table 4 shows the relationship of ordinary arrests and arrests through
killings with casualties. The table also shows association of their priors with casualties in
the current period. The exponential of the coefficient of usual arrests of 1.043346
indicates that one more arrest through usual police procedures is associated with a 4.3%
increase in the number of casualties.
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Table 4. Fixed-Effects Cross-Sectional-Time-Series Poisson Estimates of Impact of
Terrorist Arrests on Casualty Rate
Model 1
Casualties

IRR

Robust
Std. Err.

Arrests

1.040559
*

.018611
3

L1.

.9713416

.017748
8

Model 2
IRR

Robust
Std. Err.

Ordinary

1.043346
*

.022470
1

L1.

.9745976

.018800
3

Killings

.980865

.098579
9

L1.

.9291487

.085167
9

Model 3
IRR

Robust
Std.
Err.

Hardcore

1.221203**
*

.048260
8

L1.

1.008772

.029792
9

Peripheral

.9912978

.020245
5

L1.

.9602945

.023469
8

Explosion

1.77956

.285352
1

1.842578

.283959
5

1.781901

.293183
4

Masskillings

7.967083

1.31929
6

7.934212

1.18075
6

7.753611

1.28547
8
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L.Incidents

1.106992

.029130
7

1.111802

.027006
5

1.105708

.030552
4

Localized
conflict

.7913891

.175085
5

.7611159

.173201
4

.8171355

.183314
4

Faisalabad

.8876634

.208025
9

.9410469

.172090
2

.8915402

.205347
2

Multan

.8415803

.186994
2

.8634653

.199465

.847005

.190788
1

Bahawalpur

1.306452

.363817
4

1.479601

.407211
2

1.294005

.358231
6

D.G. Khan

1.281137

.310458
2

1.291889

.307177
1

1.273417

.307424

Rawalpindi

1.403407

.336188
6

1.735565

.428563
5

1.345172

.355337
1

Gujranwala

.7638767

.216035
3

.8417158

.244104
6

.7517765

.217110
8

Sargodha

.9626048

.269911
3

1.145638

.327925
4

.9522645

.269549
2

Population

Exposure

N

312

312

312

R2

0.7940

0.8058

0.7944

NOTES: Time dummies included in regression but not shown in the table.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 stars only on relevant coefficients

The coefficients of lagged ordinary arrests, killings and lagged killings are not
statistically significant at a significance level of 0.05. One possible explanation for
coefficients of killings not being significant could be stated as the sparseness of the
predictor killings as explained earlier. R-Square is 0.79 and the squared correlation
between incidents and their expected values is =.92 showing a high fit but not
148

substantiated by a formal goodness of it test showing goodness-of-fit likelihood ratio of
885.8593 of chi-square distribution with a probability of 0.0000. Against an observed
mean of 6.459375 and variance of 284.5438, mean of the expected values is 6.442287
and variance 286.024. Test of omitted variable show the presence of some omitted
variable but the VIF levels for all variables are below 3.50, negating the presence of a
significant problem of multicollinearity.
Hardcore vs. Peripheral
Model 3 in table 4 shows the connection between arrests of hardcore terrorists and
arrests of peripheral terrorists with casualties. The table also shows association of their
lags with the incidents in the current period. The coefficient of hardcore arrests of 1.22
indicates that one more hardcore arrest is associated with a 22% increase in the rate of
casualties. Goodness-of-fit likelihood ratio equal to 808.3898 on chi-square distribution
with a probability equal to 0.0000, suggests a lack of fit. R-Square is 0.80 and the squared
correlation between the observed and predicted counts of casualties is .93638573. The
predicted mean and variance are 6.442308 and 287.5784 against the observed mean of
6.459375 and variance 284.5438, showing a good fit. As a test of multicollinearity, the
maximum VIF for any predictor is 2.94, indicating absence thereof, of the problem of
multicollinearity.
In sum, controlling for prior period, the current level of casualties are correlated
positively with current arrests, hardcore arrests, and ordinary arrest levels and with all the
other arrests types show no or statistically not significant relationship. The effect sizes for
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all the arrest variables on casualties are weaker as compared to the effect sizes on
incidents with the exception of hardcore arrests. It has the coefficient of 1.22 and that
may be the reason for the other coefficients being weaker; may be it has sapped the
impact of others. Only the hardcore arrests seem to be the major influence on casualties.
The Wald test of no difference between hardcore and peripheral is rejected at likelihood
ratio of 25.64 on chi-square distribution with a probability of 0.0000.
Before I actually proceed to the conclusion section, I feel an urge to discuss an
important question: if these results could be given a causal interpretation. Literature
discusses two criteria for causality: unbiasedness and unconfoundedness. While
unbiasedness is achieved through randomized experiments, unconfoundedness could be
reached at through different statistical methods. I would support a causal interpretation on
the following five grounds eliminating confoundedness: common sense, use of fixedeffects methods, use of IV methods, use of time dummies, and explicit use of some
controls. First, the IV methods have been well-recognized methods instrumental in the
recovery of causal effects of interest. In this paper, IV method was applied and results
were similar to the methods without IV leading us to believe that these relationships are
not endogenous in the current structural equations. Second, the fixed effects model
controls for time-stable unmeasured variables, making causal interpretation possible,
assuming relevant predictor variables are included. Third, to control for some
unmeasured time-variant variables, time dummies were used. Fourth, some of the control
variables, which could be measured explicitly, were included in the regressions. Finally,
the results are supported by common sense: terrorists, highly motivated as usually they
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are, would like to pay in the same coin if they could, until overwhelmed by the
government action beyond their expectations. These reasons enhance our confidence that
the chances of confounding variables are minimized.

CONCLUSION
The current study tested Sherman’s (1993) defiance theory by examining the
effects of arrests on the incidence and seriousness of terrorism in the Punjab province of
Pakistan. Fluctuation of the incidence and seriousness of terrorism in eight police regions
over 20 year are explained by the changes in the number of arrests, after controlling for
other variables. Assuming that terrorists meet defiance theory’s four necessary
conditions, the likelihood was strong that their arrests would induce defiance in general,
instead of inducing deterrence. In addition to testing the impact of arrests in general, I
separated the arrests into hardcore vs. peripheral, ordinary vs. killings, and studied their
differential impact on the future incidence and seriousness of terrorism.
The general findings of the study can be grouped in three categories: the nature of
relationships in the current period, the nature of relationships in the lagged period, and
the differential impacts of hardcore vs. peripheral and ordinary arrests vs. killings.
Controlling for other variables, arrests in general, arrests through the usual police
procedures (ordinary), and arrests of hardcore terrorists in the current time period are
associated with higher expected counts of both the incidence and seriousness of terrorism
in the same six-month time period. Defiance theory predicts these effects, based on the
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assumption that terrorists fulfill the four necessary conditions likely to create defiance in
them instead of deterrence. Peripheral arrests are associated with higher expected counts
of incidence of terrorism only. Their null relationship with seriousness of terrorism could
be explained by their weaker impact, most probably caused by the strongest coefficient in
the study (1.22) of hardcore arrests in case of seriousness. It seems that in the case of
arrests of hardcore terrorists, terrorists not only want to increase the incidents but also to
increase the casualties per incident. Logically this is understandable because hardcore
terrorists “are more important an emblem or identity-markers for the group” (R. Collins,
personal communication, March 2, 2010), and any damage to them is likely to be taken
more seriously by the terrorist community, hence the strongest reaction. Then why would
terrorists like to generate more casualties as compared to increasing the number of
incidents? Perhaps, terrorists want to punish the government in a bigger way on the arrest
of their hardcore group member and one way to do so is to commit a mass-killing event.
Terrorist events of bigger magnitude (mass-killing) are sure to have a bigger impact on
the government and the other audiences, as compared to the impact of a target killing of
one person.
The lags of arrests and the lags of peripheral arrests exhibit an inverse relationship
with the expected count of incidents. This indicates a likely decay in the defiance effect
in the lagged six months. Perhaps, it becomes difficult for terrorists to keep the same
level of escalation of violence for longer periods because of many reasons. It could be
their own internal exhaustion, or the fear of government’s harsher reaction, and may be
the realization that the public may become used to the violence, reducing the desired
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effects of terrorism. The lagged effects of arrests do not appear in the case of seriousness
of terrorism. This discrepancy could be explained by arguing that the coefficients of
arrest variables except the hardcore terrorists in case of seriousness are weaker as
compared to their counterparts in the models on incidence of terrorism. The possible
reason behind this may be the inclusion of more explanatory variables (weapon types,
target types) in the seriousness model. The weaker overall coefficients make it hard for
them to be discernible.
Some of the predictions of defiance theory about the differential effects are
supported. Defiance theory predicts that hardcore arrests will generate more defiance as
compared to peripheral arrests. This prediction was confirmed in the seriousness model
but not in the incidence model. As I discussed earlier, in the case of hardcore arrests, the
terrorists would most probably emphasize on increasing causalities. Therefore, the
coefficient for hardcore arrests is the strongest one for casualties, making the difference
between hardcore and peripheral discernible. However, in the case of terrorism incidence,
though the difference is present, but comparatively smaller to be statistically significant.
There are no comparable research studies on the defiant effect of terrorist arrests
on the future incidence or seriousness of terrorism to compare the current study with.
However, LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) cite the researchers (Atran, 2003; Crenshaw,
2002; Higson-Smith, 2002) arguing that the extent to which government-based
counterterrorist strategies outrage participants or energize a base of potential supporters
may increase the likelihood of further terrorist strikes. LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009)
cite McCauley (2006) pointing out that because of this principle, the responses to
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terrorism can be more dangerous than terrorism itself. Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare
(1994) conclude that Israeli counterterrorist strategies did significantly reduce future
terrorist strikes, but that these strategies were only effective to the extent that they
exceeded the level of counterterrorist violence anticipated by terrorist groups. Moreover,
the effects were only short term and lasted no more than nine months, as shown in this
study too in the form of decreasing defiance. This account shows that findings of the
current research study are consistent with the findings of earlier studies conducted not on
arrests but on other counterterrorism strategies. And that’s what, possibly, imparts to this
study an external validity.
In the light of this study, one of the recommendations would be to avoid arresting
terrorists as it leads to defiance. However, this recommendation rather seems as
simplistic, because an arrest is not only preventive but also the starting point of further
criminal justice processes. Terrorists have to be arrested not only to initiate the criminal
justice process but also to achieve the deterrence effect which comes after some time. In
the light of findings of this study, my recommendation to the practitioners and policy
makers would be what Braithwaite has suggested “in the case of counterterrorism
policies, it [incapacitation] may mean either arrest or imprisonment of high-profile
offenders or targeted assassination” (Braithwaite, 2005: 96). For the immediate defiance
reaction, I would argue that either the arrests should be made after making preparations
for the counterattack or proper preparation should be made immediately after arrests.
Another policy implication of the current study derived from defiance theory
concerns the theory’s four necessary conditions. We need to look out for ways to keep
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terrorists from fulfilling those conditions, as a preventative measure. We need to break
their pride. I fear that humane treatment and fairness in court would add glamour to their
situation. Fairness is likely to lead to failure of cases in the court, because terrorists are
not bound by any ethics, and they would intimidate the judges and the witnesses. It is
unrealistic to believe that the judges and witnesses could be provided with foolproof
security. In Pakistan, judges and witnesses have not only been verbally threatened, they
have been killed, ultimately leading to weaker prosecutions.
In addition to its theoretical and policy implications, the study has wider
importance for the international community, which shares a growing concern over the
terrorism situation in Pakistan. They should know that the sectarian terrorism which this
study uses as its context is, “the principal source of terrorist activity in Pakistan”
(Haqqani, 2006).
I consider it important to recognize the limitations of this study. First, I have
conducted this study and interpreted the results in the framework of Sherman’s defiance
theory (1993). According to this theory defiance to appear needs to have four necessary
conditions. One of the conditions is that the terrorists are poorly bonded to the
community. This study possibly lacks direct evidence of the existence of this condition,
although circumstantial evidence is presented in the relevant section. This has two
implications for the study. The possibility of interpreting the results of the study in terms
of other frameworks such as backlash and escalation of violence may not be ruled out.
Further, it makes it hard to interpret the relationship between arrests and terrorism
incidence and seriousness as causal. Therefore, I have used the words associated, linked,
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connected and correlated while describing the results. However, I have argued that
common sense, use of fixed-effects and IV methods, use of time dummies and the
explicit use of some controls have enhanced our confidence that the chances of
confounding variables are minimized.
Second, the sample is from a specific location (Pakistan) and about a specific type
of terrorist. Further study is needed to see if these results can be extrapolated to other
locations and terrorist types. Third, the method used is still emerging. Panel data methods
are originally designed for data sets where the number of locations (n) is larger than the
number of time points (T). The smaller the T, the better it is. The present study features
data with the reverse – a larger number of T and a smaller n. Although methods of crosssectional time series are emerging, they are not very far along in their development. I
would recommend cross-checking these findings using data with a large number of
locations and few time periods. Fourth, the impact of killings is contrary to our
expectations in light of defiance theory, but despite larger coefficients, they are not
statistically significant. I presume that sparseness of the variable killing may be
responsible for coefficients not showing significance. I recommend using a dataset in
which this variable is not sparse and then see whether we get the same results with
statistical significance.
In short, the study supports defiance theory to a large extent. As a policy
implication, I believe that we have no option but to arrest terrorists. We have to arrest
them, but only after doing our own target hardening.
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EPILOGUE
Despite such a high number of terrorist incidents in recent years, Pakistan has just
2.9% of the world terrorism (based on the GTD) incidents vis-à-vis its population of 2.6%
in the world, suggesting terrorism in Pakistan is a problem but not as disturbing as it may
seem in isolation. In fact, Pakistan has an image problem 23 . Media generally portrays
Pakistan as a failed state, marginalized, epicenter of terrorism and an absolutely poor
country where systems rarely work. However, there is some evidence to the contrary.
Pakistan has achieved some economic and military targets which were impossible
without a working system. Pakistan's economic growth rate has been better than the
global average during the first 40 years of its establishment. Its GDP growth rate
remained 7% during the middle years of the current decade, which is one of the highest in
the world. Pakistan has the 27th largest economy in the world, by purchasing power
adjusted exchange rates. Pakistan is ranked 46th on the A.T. Kearney/FP Globalization
Index, which measures global integration. In 2010, a Pakistani was included in the world
list of billionaires for the first time. Pakistan is the 7th atomic power in the world, The
Pakistani military is the 7th largest in the world, in terms of the number of active duty
personnel. Pakistan has won the Hockey World Cup a record four times (1971, 1978,
1982 and 1994). Pakistan has been the World champion of cricket twice, in 1992 and
2009 (ICC World Twenty). Pakistan won the Squash Championship in the World Open

23

I googled the phrase “Pakistan’s image” and it gave 40,900 entries, which suggests how much literature
is available on the topic.
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and in the British Open 30 times. The Pakistani player Jahangir Khan remained unbeaten
in 555 consecutive matches. Pakistan can boast of a Nobel Prize in Physics. All of these
achievements may be taken as indicative of a social system that is making positive
strides.
Pakistan’s contributions to the international community are listed as the
following. Pakistan is the biggest contributor in terms of providing peacekeepers to the
United Nations, with 10,700 personnel deployed in 2009. Pakistan is one of the founders
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and a member of the Commonwealth of
Nations, Next Eleven economies 24 , and G20 developing nations. Pakistan is also a
member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). In the early 1950s, Pakistan was the United
States' "most allied ally in Asia" and a member of the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), both of them U.S.-led
defense pacts. During the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s, Pakistan was a
major U.S. ally, and Pakistan’s ISI had a leading role in defeating the Soviets. During the
Gulf War, Pakistan sent 5,000 troops as part of a U.S.-led coalition. In the wake of the
American War on terrorism, Pakistan is classified as major non-NATO ally of the United

24

The Next Eleven (or N-11) are eleven countries identified by Goldman Sachs investment bank as having
a high potential of becoming the world's largest economies in the 21st century. Goldman Sachs used
macroeconomic stability, political maturity, openness of trade and investment policies, and the quality of
education as criteria (Wikipedia).
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States. Pakistan’s successful operations against the militants in Swat and Waziristan are
taken by the world as a big contribution to fight terrorism.
Except for the religious conflict already discussed, the rests of the conflicts are
most likely to be resolved without using force. But in the earlier days, these conflicts
were used as political tools both by governments and the parties involved, and the
international actors exploited them. However, some of the steps which the government of
Pakistan has taken to reduce the conflicts are: enforcement of a quota system in services,
constitutional amendments (to grant maximum provincial autonomy), local rule in the
Northern Areas, adult franchise in the FATA, distribution of the long pending rents to the
provinces and the distribution of federal resources on both a population and poverty
basis. The present government is ready to introduce a bill in the assembly to change
Frontier Crime Regulations, the laws enforced in the FATA.
Here it is appropriate to understand Pakistan’s behavior as a country in the
international arena. The major determinant factor of Pakistan’s behavior is its relationship
with India. All other relationships are subservient to this factor. India is almost five times
bigger than Pakistan. There have been four wars between these two countries. India
encouraged, trained guerillas and eventually intervened militarily to separate East
Pakistan. Pakistan’s support of the independence movement in the Indian-held Kashmir,
Pakistan’s support of Taliban in Afghanistan to gain strategic depth, Pakistan’s providing
bases to the U.S. against the Soviet Union, Pakistan’s making of an atomic bomb,
Pakistan’s joining defense pacts with the U.S. and Pakistan’s maintaining a big military
are all part of a defense system against a much bigger enemy i.e. India. Even the long
160

military dictatorships, and curtailing of the provincial autonomies in the name of
country’s integrity and solidarity could be explained just by this factor. Kashmir is the
lynchpin of this entire problem. If the international community becomes interested to
solve this problem, many of the issues in the region are likely to be solved.
Despite these problems, Pakistan is doing fairly well. With this problem resolved
Pakistan could become one of the top economies in the 21st centuries. It has the 4th largest
coal reserves in the world, and the 6th largest available gas reserves in Asia Pacific. There
is a strong evidence of large unexploited oil and gas reserves. Pakistan has one of the
largest canal irrigation systems in the world. Pakistan’s geostrategic position is perhaps
its biggest resource. It can provide an economically beneficial land route to China,
Afghanistan, India and the Central Asian States.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. Within and Between Variation in Outcome and Predictor Variables

. xtsum incidents casualties
Variable

Mean

arrests hardcore peripheral
Std. Dev.

arrests_usual arrests_killing

Min

Max

Observations

incide~s overall
between
within

1.3375

2.764276
1.038629
2.587346

0
.3
-1.5375

24
2.875
22.4625

N =
n =
T =

320
8
40

casual~s overall
between
within

6.459375

16.86843
4.342562
16.37044

0
1.825
-7.140625

142
13.6
134.8594

N =
n =
T =

320
8
40

arrests

overall
between
within

2.771875

4.385194
1.168213
4.246417

0
1.2
-1.703125

26
4.475
25.34688

N =
n =
T =

320
8
40

hardcore overall
between
within

.83125

1.644681
.3839992
1.604852

0
.275
-.46875

12
1.3
11.93125

N =
n =
T =

320
8
40

periph~l overall
between
within

1.6375

3.156299
.7555745
3.075895

0
.825
-1.0625

21
2.7
20.6875

N =
n =
T =

320
8
40

arrest~l overall
between
within

2.46875

4.103553
1.0856
3.975513

0
1.1
-1.45625

26
3.925
25.34375

N =
n =
T =

320
8
40

arrest~g overall
between
within

.303125

1.096585
.1933896
1.081513

0
.05
-.271875

9
.575
8.728125

N =
n =
T =

320
8
40

.
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APPENDIX 2. Two-Step Estimation of Effects of Arrests on Terrorism Incidence

. xi:regress
i.panel
i.halfyear

arrests l.incidents L_arrests localized_conflict i.panel i.halfyear CID, vce(robust)
_Ipanel_1-8
(naturally coded; _Ipanel_1 omitted)
_Ihalfyear_60-99
(naturally coded; _Ihalfyear_60 omitted)

Linear regression

Number of obs
F( 48,
263)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

arrests

Coef.

incidents
L1.
L_arrests
localized_~t
_Ipanel_2
_Ipanel_3
_Ipanel_4
_Ipanel_5
_Ipanel_6
_Ipanel_7
_Ipanel_8
_Ihalfyea~61
_Ihalfyea~62
_Ihalfyea~63
_Ihalfyea~64
_Ihalfyea~65
_Ihalfyea~66
_Ihalfyea~67
_Ihalfyea~68
_Ihalfyea~69
_Ihalfyea~70
_Ihalfyea~71
_Ihalfyea~72
_Ihalfyea~73
_Ihalfyea~74
_Ihalfyea~75
_Ihalfyea~76
_Ihalfyea~77
_Ihalfyea~78
_Ihalfyea~79
_Ihalfyea~80
_Ihalfyea~81
_Ihalfyea~82
_Ihalfyea~83
_Ihalfyea~84
_Ihalfyea~85
_Ihalfyea~86
_Ihalfyea~87
_Ihalfyea~88
_Ihalfyea~89
_Ihalfyea~90
_Ihalfyea~91
_Ihalfyea~92
_Ihalfyea~93
_Ihalfyea~94
_Ihalfyea~95
_Ihalfyea~96
_Ihalfyea~97
_Ihalfyea~98
_Ihalfyea~99
CID
_cons

.4605068
.1174906
-2.156052
-.2850697
.6406293
-.7805877
-1.026591
.6083878
-1.195118
-1.487866
.7249531
.2435106
-.1447466
(dropped)
1.156334
.9971417
.0205122
-.0248068
2.302503
.1633965
-8.809712
-7.881274
-6.603083
-2.71865
(dropped)
-7.104063
-1.63424
-1.803661
-3.682701
-4.269035
-4.396732
-4.352673
-5.120743
-3.861117
-1.978607
-5.618208
-6.687492
-7.939006
-3.002897
-7.383227
-6.635074
-5.789447
-6.402124
-5.761256
-5.027124
-4.365242
-7.010923
-4.140127
-6.971678
8.274344
-.0707967

Robust
Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

=
=
=
=
=

312
4.97
0.0000
0.4819
3.4585

[95% Conf. Interval]

.1491629
.0601999
1.398604
.7405815
.8291021
.7394968
.7258556
.982981
.6998439
.7370479
.798907
.6707236
.809373

3.09
1.95
-1.54
-0.38
0.77
-1.06
-1.41
0.62
-1.71
-2.02
0.91
0.36
-0.18

0.002
0.052
0.124
0.701
0.440
0.292
0.158
0.537
0.089
0.045
0.365
0.717
0.858

.1668013
-.0010445
-4.909938
-1.743293
-.9918934
-2.236675
-2.455819
-1.327126
-2.573128
-2.939132
-.8481147
-1.077161
-1.738422

.7542123
.2360257
.597834
1.173154
2.273152
.6755
.402637
2.543902
.1828921
-.0366005
2.298021
1.564182
1.448929

.8804178
.8166666
.6843232
.7069869
1.481066
1.075056
2.235115
2.196669
2.198342
2.60705

1.31
1.22
0.03
-0.04
1.55
0.15
-3.94
-3.59
-3.00
-1.04

0.190
0.223
0.976
0.972
0.121
0.879
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.298

-.5772303
-.6108953
-1.326937
-1.416882
-.613752
-1.953416
-13.21071
-12.20657
-10.93167
-7.851996

2.889899
2.605179
1.367962
1.367268
5.218758
2.280209
-4.408714
-3.555977
-2.274493
2.414696

2.677716
2.840315
3.252427
2.608935
2.777271
2.552837
2.373562
3.174045
2.439123
2.594473
2.455157
2.303979
2.219888
3.265857
2.25232
2.215421
2.744925
2.427815
2.253112
2.547357
2.488741
2.366252
2.713579
2.403788
2.230552
.8546939

-2.65
-0.58
-0.55
-1.41
-1.54
-1.72
-1.83
-1.61
-1.58
-0.76
-2.29
-2.90
-3.58
-0.92
-3.28
-2.99
-2.11
-2.64
-2.56
-1.97
-1.75
-2.96
-1.53
-2.90
3.71
-0.08

0.008
0.566
0.580
0.159
0.125
0.086
0.068
0.108
0.115
0.446
0.023
0.004
0.000
0.359
0.001
0.003
0.036
0.009
0.011
0.049
0.081
0.003
0.128
0.004
0.000
0.934

-12.37655
-7.226892
-8.207771
-8.819759
-9.73755
-9.423331
-9.026275
-11.37052
-8.663812
-7.087189
-10.45247
-11.22408
-12.31002
-9.43345
-11.8181
-10.99729
-11.19427
-11.18255
-10.19769
-10.04293
-9.265635
-11.67013
-9.483233
-11.7048
3.882331
-1.75371

-1.831573
3.958412
4.600449
1.454356
1.19948
.6298677
.3209301
1.129032
.9415782
3.129975
-.7839433
-2.1509
-3.567992
3.427656
-2.948353
-2.272855
-.3846217
-1.621695
-1.324822
-.0113156
.5351506
-2.351714
1.202978
-2.238559
12.66636
1.612117
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. predict lpuhat, residual
(8 missing values generated)
. xi: poisson incidents l.incidents arrests l.arrests localized_conflict i.panel i.halfyear lpuhat, vce(robust)
> nolog
i.panel
_Ipanel_1-8
(naturally coded; _Ipanel_1 omitted)
i.halfyear
_Ihalfyear_60-99
(naturally coded; _Ihalfyear_60 omitted)
note: _Ihalfyear_71 dropped because of collinearity
note: _Ihalfyear_75 dropped because of collinearity
Poisson regression

Number of obs
Wald chi2(49)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log pseudolikelihood = -323.71528

incidents
incidents
L1.
arrests
--.
L1.
localized_~t
_Ipanel_2
_Ipanel_3
_Ipanel_4
_Ipanel_5
_Ipanel_6
_Ipanel_7
_Ipanel_8
_Ihalfyea~61
_Ihalfyea~62
_Ihalfyea~63
_Ihalfyea~64
_Ihalfyea~65
_Ihalfyea~66
_Ihalfyea~67
_Ihalfyea~68
_Ihalfyea~69
_Ihalfyea~70
_Ihalfyea~72
_Ihalfyea~73
_Ihalfyea~74
_Ihalfyea~76
_Ihalfyea~77
_Ihalfyea~78
_Ihalfyea~79
_Ihalfyea~80
_Ihalfyea~81
_Ihalfyea~82
_Ihalfyea~83
_Ihalfyea~84
_Ihalfyea~85
_Ihalfyea~86
_Ihalfyea~87
_Ihalfyea~88
_Ihalfyea~89
_Ihalfyea~90
_Ihalfyea~91
_Ihalfyea~92
_Ihalfyea~93
_Ihalfyea~94
_Ihalfyea~95
_Ihalfyea~96
_Ihalfyea~97
_Ihalfyea~98
_Ihalfyea~99
lpuhat
_cons

312
10929.21
0.0000
0.5448

Robust
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

.055199

.034809

1.59

0.113

-.0130255

.1234235

.0543724
-.0489129
.8773116
.3554873
.3816858
-.1110851
-.4489567
-.7245708
-.8437708
-1.276957
-.3111531
.2784494
.3342507
-.814894
-.5888288
-.594475
.4759891
.3009289
.4886733
.5009073
-.0814908
.8461286
.9627307
.412539
.3204565
-.3606415
-.4726857
-.748885
-.932284
.2872675
-.3678984
-.1218878
-1.365715
-2.002381
-16.31478
-1.380303
-1.370415
-1.351537
-1.516453
-16.28615
-2.110028
-16.479
-16.33656
-2.317358
-16.30798
-1.323582
-16.18956
.00979
.2756117

.0460247
.0211584
.2871784
.1960115
.2501629
.2520693
.2971972
.2846079
.3530678
.3672035
.3945249
.4196914
.3614821
.4713401
.4004427
.4701978
.5268418
.3803758
.3098076
.3629808
.3386448
.389207
.2390363
.4387913
.4948472
.3763037
.4867964
.3425315
.3966873
.4285255
.3479144
.2699743
.8002895
.940452
.4903313
1.02941
.4625691
.6656228
.7906711
.4990965
1.073504
.486173
.4653303
.8786168
.496264
.5242187
.5020295
.0525429
.3822432

1.18
-2.31
3.05
1.81
1.53
-0.44
-1.51
-2.55
-2.39
-3.48
-0.79
0.66
0.92
-1.73
-1.47
-1.26
0.90
0.79
1.58
1.38
-0.24
2.17
4.03
0.94
0.65
-0.96
-0.97
-2.19
-2.35
0.67
-1.06
-0.45
-1.71
-2.13
-33.27
-1.34
-2.96
-2.03
-1.92
-32.63
-1.97
-33.90
-35.11
-2.64
-32.86
-2.52
-32.25
0.19
0.72

0.237
0.021
0.002
0.070
0.127
0.659
0.131
0.011
0.017
0.001
0.430
0.507
0.355
0.084
0.141
0.206
0.366
0.429
0.115
0.168
0.810
0.030
0.000
0.347
0.517
0.338
0.332
0.029
0.019
0.503
0.290
0.652
0.088
0.033
0.000
0.180
0.003
0.042
0.055
0.000
0.049
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.000
0.012
0.000
0.852
0.471

-.0358343
-.0903826
.3144523
-.0286882
-.1086245
-.6051318
-1.031453
-1.282392
-1.535771
-1.996663
-1.084408
-.5441306
-.3742412
-1.738704
-1.373682
-1.516046
-.5566019
-.4445938
-.1185386
-.2105219
-.7452224
.0832968
.4942283
-.4474762
-.6494261
-1.098183
-1.426789
-1.420234
-1.709777
-.5526269
-1.049798
-.6510276
-2.934253
-3.845633
-17.27581
-3.397908
-2.277033
-2.656134
-3.06614
-17.26436
-4.214058
-17.43188
-17.24859
-4.039415
-17.28064
-2.351032
-17.17352
-.0931921
-.4735712

.1445792
-.0074431
1.440171
.7396629
.871996
.3829616
.1335391
-.1667496
-.1517706
-.5572514
.4621015
1.101029
1.042743
.1089157
.1960245
.3270957
1.50858
1.046452
1.095885
1.212336
.5822407
1.60896
1.431233
1.272554
1.290339
.3769002
.4814178
-.0775356
-.1547912
1.127162
.3140014
.4072521
.2028237
-.1591287
-15.35375
.6373032
-.4637959
-.0469403
.0332342
-15.30794
-.005998
-15.52612
-15.42452
-.5953003
-15.33532
-.2961325
-15.2056
.1127721
1.024794

Coef.

[95% Conf. Interval]

. test lpuhat=0
( 1)

=
=
=
=

[incidents]lpuhat = 0
chi2( 1) =
Prob > chi2 =

0.03
0.8522
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APPENDIX 3. Two-Step Estimation of Effects of Arrests on Terrorism Seriousness
. xi:reg arrests l.incidents l.arrests CID
localized_conflict i.region i.halfyear, vce(robust)
i.region
_Iregion_1-8
(naturally coded; _Iregion_1 omitted)
i.halfyear
_Ihalfyear_60-99
(naturally coded; _Ihalfyear_60 omitted)
Linear regression

arrests
incidents
L1.
arrests
L1.
CID
localized_~t
_Iregion_2
_Iregion_3
_Iregion_4
_Iregion_5
_Iregion_6
_Iregion_7
_Iregion_8
_Ihalfyea~61
_Ihalfyea~62
_Ihalfyea~63
_Ihalfyea~64
_Ihalfyea~65
_Ihalfyea~66
_Ihalfyea~67
_Ihalfyea~68
_Ihalfyea~69
_Ihalfyea~70
_Ihalfyea~71
_Ihalfyea~72
_Ihalfyea~73
_Ihalfyea~74
_Ihalfyea~75
_Ihalfyea~76
_Ihalfyea~77
_Ihalfyea~78
_Ihalfyea~79
_Ihalfyea~80
_Ihalfyea~81
_Ihalfyea~82
_Ihalfyea~83
_Ihalfyea~84
_Ihalfyea~85
_Ihalfyea~86
_Ihalfyea~87
_Ihalfyea~88
_Ihalfyea~89
_Ihalfyea~90
_Ihalfyea~91
_Ihalfyea~92
_Ihalfyea~93
_Ihalfyea~94
_Ihalfyea~95
_Ihalfyea~96
_Ihalfyea~97
_Ihalfyea~98
_Ihalfyea~99
_cons

Number of obs
F( 48,
263)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=

312
4.97
0.0000
0.4819
3.4585

Robust
Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

.4605068

.1491629

3.09

0.002

.1668013

.7542123

.1174906
8.274344
-2.156052
-.2850697
.6406293
-.7805877
-1.026591
.6083878
-1.195118
-1.487866
.7249531
.2435106
-.1447466
(dropped)
1.156334
.9971417
.0205122
-.0248068
2.302503
.1633965
-8.809712
-7.881274
-6.603083
-2.71865
(dropped)
-7.104063
-1.63424
-1.803661
-3.682701
-4.269035
-4.396732
-4.352673
-5.120743
-3.861117
-1.978607
-5.618208
-6.687492
-7.939006
-3.002897
-7.383227
-6.635074
-5.789447
-6.402124
-5.761256
-5.027124
-4.365242
-7.010923
-4.140127
-6.971678
-.0707967

.0601999
2.230552
1.398604
.7405815
.8291021
.7394968
.7258556
.982981
.6998439
.7370479
.798907
.6707236
.809373

1.95
3.71
-1.54
-0.38
0.77
-1.06
-1.41
0.62
-1.71
-2.02
0.91
0.36
-0.18

0.052
0.000
0.124
0.701
0.440
0.292
0.158
0.537
0.089
0.045
0.365
0.717
0.858

-.0010445
3.882331
-4.909938
-1.743293
-.9918934
-2.236675
-2.455819
-1.327126
-2.573128
-2.939132
-.8481147
-1.077161
-1.738422

.2360257
12.66636
.597834
1.173154
2.273152
.6755
.402637
2.543902
.1828921
-.0366005
2.298021
1.564182
1.448929

.8804178
.8166666
.6843232
.7069869
1.481066
1.075056
2.235115
2.196669
2.198342
2.60705

1.31
1.22
0.03
-0.04
1.55
0.15
-3.94
-3.59
-3.00
-1.04

0.190
0.223
0.976
0.972
0.121
0.879
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.298

-.5772303
-.6108953
-1.326937
-1.416882
-.613752
-1.953416
-13.21071
-12.20657
-10.93167
-7.851996

2.889899
2.605179
1.367962
1.367268
5.218758
2.280209
-4.408714
-3.555977
-2.274493
2.414696

2.677716
2.840315
3.252427
2.608935
2.777271
2.552837
2.373562
3.174045
2.439123
2.594473
2.455157
2.303979
2.219888
3.265857
2.25232
2.215421
2.744925
2.427815
2.253112
2.547357
2.488741
2.366252
2.713579
2.403788
.8546939

-2.65
-0.58
-0.55
-1.41
-1.54
-1.72
-1.83
-1.61
-1.58
-0.76
-2.29
-2.90
-3.58
-0.92
-3.28
-2.99
-2.11
-2.64
-2.56
-1.97
-1.75
-2.96
-1.53
-2.90
-0.08

0.008
0.566
0.580
0.159
0.125
0.086
0.068
0.108
0.115
0.446
0.023
0.004
0.000
0.359
0.001
0.003
0.036
0.009
0.011
0.049
0.081
0.003
0.128
0.004
0.934

-12.37655
-7.226892
-8.207771
-8.819759
-9.73755
-9.423331
-9.026275
-11.37052
-8.663812
-7.087189
-10.45247
-11.22408
-12.31002
-9.43345
-11.8181
-10.99729
-11.19427
-11.18255
-10.19769
-10.04293
-9.265635
-11.67013
-9.483233
-11.7048
-1.75371

-1.831573
3.958412
4.600449
1.454356
1.19948
.6298677
.3209301
1.129032
.9415782
3.129975
-.7839433
-2.1509
-3.567992
3.427656
-2.948353
-2.272855
-.3846217
-1.621695
-1.324822
-.0113156
.5351506
-2.351714
1.202978
-2.238559
1.612117

Coef.

.
. predict lpuhat2, resid
(37 missing values generated)
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. xi:poisson casualties incidents arrests L.arrests EXP Mass
localized_conflict i.region i.halfyear lpuhat2 ,
> vce(robust) irr nolog
i.region
_Iregion_1-8
(naturally coded; _Iregion_1 omitted)
i.halfyear
_Ihalfyear_60-99
(naturally coded; _Ihalfyear_60 omitted)
note: _Ihalfyear_67 dropped because of collinearity
Poisson regression

Number of obs
Wald chi2(52)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log pseudolikelihood = -705.22344

=
=
=
=

312
33093.82
0.0000
0.7955

Robust
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

1.107872

.0293086

3.87

0.000

1.051892

1.166831

1.03416
.97279
1.777306
8.019786
.8175314
.7493635
.8696808
.824337
.6999174
.7574185
.6780054
.4030655
.8825389
1.463996
1.113361
.6685297
.9457075
.811947
1.039575
1.009005
.7047054
1.520724
1.149786
1.469914
.4838789
.5497358
3.262362
1.622421
.5662595
1.016914
1.219302
1.257725
2.864833
1.14513
1.867155
.7382004
.4299516
3.83e-11
.2386184
2.544863
.3306456
1.014794
3.89e-11
.077895
3.64e-11
3.29e-11
.0715363
3.77e-11
2.180037
4.46e-11
1.006508

.0677731
.0192752
.2902903
1.365516
.1930915
.1816631
.2029566
.2417818
.1715016
.185366
.2010174
.1221956
.339899
.8433705
.3346775
.258641
.4795612
.2969516
.3394267
.2914132
.1869099
.6798932
.3226372
.4284531
.3079947
.547434
1.43292
.9212915
.390872
.5528928
.5372823
.7663663
1.714106
.4521368
.706673
.370834
.2479776
1.80e-11
.22808
1.253297
.2313703
.4988096
1.91e-11
.0803995
1.75e-11
1.64e-11
.0710619
1.76e-11
.8440144
2.07e-11
.0612386

0.51
-1.39
3.52
12.23
-0.85
-1.19
-0.60
-0.66
-1.46
-1.14
-1.31
-3.00
-0.32
0.66
0.36
-1.04
-0.11
-0.57
0.12
0.03
-1.32
0.94
0.50
1.32
-1.14
-0.60
2.69
0.85
-0.82
0.03
0.45
0.38
1.76
0.34
1.65
-0.60
-1.46
-50.99
-1.50
1.90
-1.58
0.03
-48.78
-2.47
-50.05
-48.49
-2.66
-51.48
2.01
-51.29
0.11

0.608
0.164
0.000
0.000
0.394
0.234
0.550
0.510
0.145
0.256
0.190
0.003
0.746
0.508
0.721
0.298
0.912
0.569
0.905
0.975
0.187
0.348
0.619
0.186
0.254
0.548
0.007
0.394
0.410
0.975
0.653
0.707
0.079
0.731
0.099
0.546
0.143
0.000
0.134
0.058
0.114
0.976
0.000
0.013
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.000
0.044
0.000
0.915

.9095041
.9357355
1.290429
5.744207
.514589
.4659524
.5504473
.4639204
.432988
.4688328
.3791979
.2224951
.4148624
.4733525
.6176803
.3131897
.350041
.3964784
.5481938
.5728698
.4190273
.6331266
.6633833
.8301988
.1389751
.0780758
1.379307
.5331
.1463715
.3503393
.5140808
.3810001
.8867537
.528167
.8892442
.2757873
.1388299
1.52e-11
.0366518
.9693121
.0838942
.3872398
1.49e-11
.0103024
1.42e-11
1.24e-11
.0102087
1.51e-11
1.020742
1.80e-11
.8933626

1.175901
1.011312
2.447882
11.19684
1.298818
1.205157
1.374055
1.464759
1.131404
1.22364
1.212273
.7301812
1.87743
4.527884
2.006818
1.427033
2.555023
1.662784
1.971413
1.777178
1.185149
3.652667
1.992827
2.602565
1.684754
3.870717
7.716199
4.937627
2.190658
2.951751
2.891952
4.151893
9.255412
2.482781
3.920483
1.975942
1.331546
9.63e-11
1.553505
6.681365
1.303148
2.65935
1.02e-10
.5889508
9.33e-11
8.73e-11
.5012827
9.41e-11
4.655986
1.11e-10
1.133983

casualties

IRR

incidents
arrests
--.
L1.
EXP
Mass
localized_~t
_Iregion_2
_Iregion_3
_Iregion_4
_Iregion_5
_Iregion_6
_Iregion_7
_Iregion_8
_Ihalfyea~61
_Ihalfyea~62
_Ihalfyea~63
_Ihalfyea~64
_Ihalfyea~65
_Ihalfyea~66
_Ihalfyea~68
_Ihalfyea~69
_Ihalfyea~70
_Ihalfyea~71
_Ihalfyea~72
_Ihalfyea~73
_Ihalfyea~74
_Ihalfyea~75
_Ihalfyea~76
_Ihalfyea~77
_Ihalfyea~78
_Ihalfyea~79
_Ihalfyea~80
_Ihalfyea~81
_Ihalfyea~82
_Ihalfyea~83
_Ihalfyea~84
_Ihalfyea~85
_Ihalfyea~86
_Ihalfyea~87
_Ihalfyea~88
_Ihalfyea~89
_Ihalfyea~90
_Ihalfyea~91
_Ihalfyea~92
_Ihalfyea~93
_Ihalfyea~94
_Ihalfyea~95
_Ihalfyea~96
_Ihalfyea~97
_Ihalfyea~98
_Ihalfyea~99
lpuhat2

166

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbas, H. (2005). Pakistan's drift into extremism: Allah, the army, & America’s war on
terror. New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc.
Albini, J. L. (2001). Dealing with the modern terrorist: The need for changes in strategies
and tactics in the new war on terrorism. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 12(4), 255281.
Allison, P. D., (2005). Fixed effects regression methods for longitudinal data using SAS.
Cary, N.C.: SAS Institute.
Asal, V., Fair, C. C., & Shellman, S. (2008). Consenting to a child's decision to join a
jihad: Insights from a survey of militant families in pakistan. Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 31(11), 1001-1022.
Atran, S. (2008). Who becomes a terrorist today? Perspectives on Terrorism, II(5).
Babbie, E., Halley, F., & Zaino, J. (2007). Adventures in social research: data analysis
using SPSS 14.0 & 15.0 for windows. (6th Edition), Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge
Press, An Imprint of Sage Publications, Inc.
Bajoria, J. (2008). Pakistan's new generation of terrorists. Inc.: Council on Foreign
Relations.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans_new_generation_of_terrorists.html
167

Barro, R. J. (2002). The myth that poverty breeds terrorism. Business Week, (3786), 2626.
Barros, C. P. (2003). An intervention analysis of terrorism: The spanish eta case. Defence
and Peace Economics, 14(6), 401-412.
Barshied, C. (2005). The sipah-e-sahaba dossier. Center for Policing Terrorism, The
Manhattan Institute.
Barth, R. (1962). The system of social stratification in Swat, North Pakistan. Aspects of
caste in south india, ceylon & north-west pakistan (Ed.) E. R. Leach. University
Press, 1962.
Bergen, P. (2008). Al qaeda, the organization: A five-year forecast. The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618(1), 14-30.
Bergesen, A.J., & Lizardo, O. (2004). International Terrorism & the World-System.
Sociological Theory, 22.
Berk. R, & MacDonald, J.M. (2008). Overdispersion & Poisson regression. Journal of
Quantitative Criminology, 24:269–284.
Berrebi, C. (2007). Evidence about the link between education, poverty & terrorism
among Palestinians. Peace economics, peace science and public policy: Vol. 13: Iss.
1, Article 2.

168

Black, D. (2004). Terrorism as social control. In M. Deflem. Terrorism and Counterterrorism:
Criminological Perspectives. Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, 5(9-19)

Bloothooft, G., & Groot, L. (2008). Name clustering on the basis of parental preferences.
Names, Vol. 56, No. 3, 111-163.
Boyns, D., & Ballard, J.D. (2004). Developing a sociological theory for the empirical
understanding of terrorism. The American Sociologist, Summer 2004.
Braithwaite, J. 2005. Pre-empting terrorism. Current Issues in Criminal Justice. 17:96–
114.
Brophy-Baermann, B., and Conybeare, J.A.C. (1994). Retaliating against terrorism:
Rational expectations and the optimality of rules versus. American Journal of
Political Science, 38(1), 196.

Brown, D.W. (1978). Arrest rates and crime rates: When does a tipping effect occur?
Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press.
Brynjar, L., & Katja H-W, S. (2000). Why terrorism occurs - A survey of theories and hypotheses
on the causes of terrorism No. FFI/RAPPORT-2000/02769). Norway: FORSVARETS
FORSKNINGSINSTITUTT (FFI), Norwegian Defense Research Establishment.

Cameron, A.C., & Trividi, K. (2009). Microeconometrics using Stata. Stata Press.
Cauley, J., & Im, E. I. (1988). Intervention policy analysis of skyjacking and other
terrorist incidents. American Economic Review, 78(2), 27.
169

Hacauglu, C., "Wife says CIA bomber hated the United States" Associated Press–Thu
Jan 7, 4:22 pm ET; (retrieved January 21, 2010).
Chamlin, M. B., Grasmick, H. G., Bursik, R. J., Jr., & Cochran, J. K. (1992). Time
aggregation and time lag in macro-level deterrence research. Criminology, 30(3),
377-396.
Cloninger, D. O., & Sartorius, L. C. (1979). Crime rates, clearance rates and enforcement
effort: The case of Houston, Texas. American Journal of Economics and Sociology,
38(4), 389-402.
Collins, R. (2008). Violence: A micro-sociological theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Collins, R. (1975). Conflict sociology: Toward an explanatory science. With a
contribution by Joan Annett. New York: Academic Press.
Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics, (13), 379-399.
Crenshaw, M. (1990). The causes of terrorism. In C.W. Kegley Jr. (Ed.), International terrorism
(1990th ed., pp113-126). New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Cronin, A.K. (2009). How terrorism ends: Understanding the decline and demise of
terrorist campaigns. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
D'Alessio, S. J., & Stolzenberg, L. (1998). Crime, arrests, and pretrial jail incarceration:
An examination of the deterrence thesis. Criminology, 36(4), 735-761.

170

Decker, S.H., Kohfield, C. (1986). Crimes, crime rates, arrests, and arrest ratios:
Implications for deterrence theory. Criminology, 23(3), 437-450.
Deflem, M. (2004). Social control and the policing of terrorism: Foundations for
sociology of counterterrorism. The American Sociologist, Summer 2004.
Dugan, L., LaFree, G., Piquero, A.R. (2005). Testing a rational choice model of airline
hijackings. Criminology, 43:4.
Enders, W., Sandler, T. (2000). Is transnational terrorism becoming more threatening? A
time-series investigation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2000.
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (1993). The effectiveness of antiterrorism policies: A vectorautoregression-intervention analysis. American Political Science Review, 87(4), 829.

Enders, W., Sandler, T., Cauley, J. (1990). Assessing the impact of terrorist-thwarting
policies: An intervention time series approach. Defence and Peace Economics, 2(1),
1-18.
Engene, J. O. (1998). Patterns of terrorism in Western Europe, 1950-1995. Universitetet i Bergen,
Norway.

Evans, A. (2006). Understanding madrasahs. Foreign Affairs, 85(1), 9-16.
Fair, C. C. (2008). The madrassah challenge: Militancy & religious education in pakistan.
Journal of Peace Research, 45(6), 853.

171

Fair, C. C. (2008). Who are pakistan's militants and their families? Terrorism and
Political Violence, 20(1), 49-65.
Fair, C. C., & Chalk, P. (2006). United states internal security assistance to pakistan.
Small Wars & Insurgencies, 17(3), 333-355.
Fair, C. Christine. (2004). Urban battle fields of south asia: lessons learned from sri
lanka, india and pakistan. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Fraser, J., Fulton, I. (1984). Terrorism counteraction. FC–100–37 (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
U.S. Army Command).

LaFree, G., Yang, S., & Crenshaw, M. (2009). Trajectories of terrorism: Attack patterns
of foreign groups that have targeted the United States, 1970–2004. Criminology and
Public Policy. 8(3).
Gayer, L. (2007). Slums, guns, and yellow devils: A genealogy of urban conflicts in
Karachi. Modern Asian Studies, Cambridge University Press.
Global Terrorism Database (2009): GTD Variables & Inclusion Criteria, Version 3.0,
May 2009, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism at the University of Maryland.
Gove, B., & Merriam-Webster, I. (2002). Webster's third new international dictionary of
the english language, unabridged. Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster.

172

Grare, F. (2007). The evolution of sectarian conflicts in pakistan and the ever-changing
face of islamic violence. South Asia, XXX(1), 127-144.
Greenberg, D.F., Kessler, R.C., & Logan, C.H. (1981). Aggregation bias in deterrence
research: An empirical analysis. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency,
18(1), 128-137.
Greenberg, D.F., Kessler, R.C., & Logan, C.H. (1979). A panel model of crime rates and
arrest rates. American Sociological Review, 44(5), 843-850.

Hamm, M. S. (2004). Apocalyptic violence: The seduction of terrorist subcultures.
Theoretical Criminology, 8(3), 323-339.
Haqqani, H. (2006). Weeding out the heretics: sectarianism in pakistan. Current Trends
in Islamic Ideology, (4) November 01, 2006. Hudson Institute’s Center for Islam,
Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World.
Hassan, N. (2004). Al-qaeda’s understudy, The Atlantic Monthly, June 2004.
Hird, C., & Ruparel, C. (2007). Seasonality in recorded crime: preliminary findings.
London, England: Home Office Online Report, February 2007. Retrieved on January
14, 2010 from http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/rdsolr0207.pdf.
Hudson, R. A., & Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. (2002). Who becomes
a terrorist and why: The 1999 government report on profiling terrorists. Guilford,
Conn.: Lyons Press.
173

Hussain, R. (2005). The effect of religious, cultural and social identity on population
genetic structure among Muslims in Pakistan. Annals of Human Biology, 32(2):
145–153.
Im, E.I., Cauley, J., Sandler, T., (1987). Cycles and substitutions in terrorist activities: A
spectral approach. Kyklos, (40)2, 238 – 255.

Kamran, T. (2008). Contextualizing sectarian militancy in Pakistan: A case study of
Jhang. Journal of Islamic Studies, (20), 55-85.
Krueger, A.B., Maleckova, J. (2003). Education, poverty & terrorism: Is there a causal
connection? Journal of Economic Perspectives, (17) 4, 119-144.
Kukreja, V. (2003). Contemporary Pakistan: Political processes, conflicts and crises.
New Delhi: Sage Publications.
LaFree, G. (1999). Declining violent crime rates in the 1990s: predicting crime booms
and busts. Annual Review of Sociology. (25), 145-168.
LaFree, G., Dugan, L., & Korte, R. (2009). The impact of british counterterrorist
strategies on political violence in northern ireland: Comparing deterrence and
backlash models. Criminology, 47(1), 17-45.
Landau, S. F., & Fridman, D. (1993). The seasonality of violent crime: the case of
robbery and homicide in Israel. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 30 (2),
163-191.
174

Landes, W. M. (1978). An economic study of U.S. aircraft hijacking, 1961-1976. Journal
of Law & Economics, 21(1), 1-31.
Levitt, S.D. (1998). Why do increased arrest rates appear to reduce crime: Deterrence,
incapacitation, or measurement? Economic Inquiry, (36)3, 353.

Lieberson, S., & Bell, E.O. (1992). Children’s first names: An empirical study of social
taste. The American Journal of Sociology, (98)3, 511-554.
Logan, C.H. (1975). Arrest rates and deterrence. Social Science Quarterly (Southwestern
Social Sciences Association), (56)3, 376-389.

Looney, R. (2003). The role of foreign aid in the war on terrorism: Examples from
pakistan. Political Crossroads, 10-11(1-2), 5-18.
Looney, R. (2004). Failed econom ic take-offs and terrorism in pakistan. Asian Survey,
44(6), 771-793.
Lum, C., Kennedy, L. W., & Sherley, A. (2006). Are counter-terrorism strategies
effective? the results of the campbell systematic review on counter-terrorism
evaluation research. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 2(4), 489-516.
MacDonald, J.M., Lattimore, K. (2010). Count models in criminology. In D. Weisburd &
A. Piquero. The Handbook of Quantitative Criminology. NY: New York: Springer

Mehrotra, S. (2006). Intelligence & security informatics. Berlin, New York: Springer.
175

Ministry of Labour, Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis. (2007). Pakistan Employment
Trends 2007. Labour Market Information & Analysis Unit, Government of Pakistan.
http://202.83.164.26/wps/wcm/connect/53aa0d8048703734a45cf584e866145a/PEM
P2FINAL.pdf.pdf?MOD=AJPERES retrieved on March 21, 2010 at 6:15 a.m.
Morken, G., & Linaker, O.M. (2000). Seasonal variation of violence in psychiatric
patients and the general population. European Journal of Psychiatry, 14 (3), 153160.
Nasr S.V.R. (2002). Islam, the state and the rise of sectarian militancy in Pakistan. In
Jaffrelot, C., (2002). Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation. New Delhi: Manohar
Publishers & Distributors.

Nawaz, Shuja. (2009). FATA — a most dangerous place. Center for Strategic and
International Studies, January 2009.
Nevin, J.A. 2003. Retaliating against terrorists. Behavior & Social, Issues, (12),109–28.
Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2007. (2007), Federal Bureau Of Statistics, Governement
of Pakistan.
http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/publications/yearbook2007/yearbook2007.html
retrieved on March 21, 2010 at 6:30 p.m.
Pape, R.A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political Science
Review, (97) 3.
176

Pape, R.A. (2005). Dying to Win. New York: Random House.
Tyre, P. (1998, 01, 08). 'Proud terrorist' gets life for Trade Center bombing January 8,
1998, Web posted at: 1:22 p.m. EST (1822 GMT). Retrived
http://www.cnn.com/US/9801/08/yousef.update/on January 21, 2010 at 9:30 a.m.
Rashid, A. (1999). Taliban: Exporting Extremism. Foreign Affairs. 22.
Riedel, B. (2008). Pakistan and terror: The eye of the storm. Annals of the American
Academy of Political & Social Science, 618, 31-45.
Riedel, B. (2008). Pakistan: The critical battlefield. Current History, 107(712), 355-361.
Rosenfeld, R. (2004). Terrorism and criminology. In M. Deflem. Terrorism and
Counterterrorism: Criminological Perspectives. Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance,
5(19-32).

Rosenthal, J. A. (2006). Razing the terrorism monolith: Group typologies and state
strategies. (Ph.D., Columbia University).
Russell, C., & Miller, B. (1977). Profile of a terrorist. Military Review, 57(8), 21-34. Sage
Publications India Pvt. Ltd.
Sampson, R.J. & Laub, J.H. (1990). Crime and deviance over the life course: The
salience of adult social bonds. American Sociological Review, (55)5, 609-627.

177

Sandler, T., & Enders, W. (2007). Applying analytical methods to study terrorism.
International Studies Perspectives, (8)3, 287-302.

Schaffer, T. C. (2008). The madrassah challenge: Militancy and religious education in
pakistan. Survival, 50(5), 199-200.
Schmid, A. P., & Jongman, A. J., (1988). Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors,
concepts, data bases, theories, & literature. Amsterdam; New York; New Brunswick USA:
North-Holland Pub. Co.; Transaction Books, distributors for the Western Hemisphere.

Schmid, A.P. (1992). Terrorism and Democracy. Terrorism & Political Violence, 4, 14.
Sheehan, I.S. (2006). When terrorism and counterterrorism clash: preemptive force and
its impact on transnational terrorism. A time series intervention analysis. Ph.D.
dissertation, George Mason University.

Sherman, L. W. (1993). Defiance, deterrence, and irrelevance: A theory of the criminal
sanction. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30(4), 445-473.
Smelser, N.J., & Mitchell, F. (2002). Terrorism: Perspectives from the behavioral and
social sciences. The National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Washington,
DC 20001.
Stern, J. (2000). Pakistan's jihad culture. Foreign Affairs, 79(6), 115 .

178

Tellis, A. J. (2008). Pakistan's record on terrorism: Conflicted goals, compromised
performance. Washington Quarterly, 31(2), 7-32.
Tittle, C.R., & Rowe, A.R., (1973). Certainty of arrest and crime rates: A further test of
the deterrence hypothesis. 52 Soc. F. 455 (1973-1974).
Travis, A. (2008). MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain. Guardian.co.uk.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1, retrieved on
March 23, 2010 at 2:0 p.m.
Turk, A. (2004). Sociology of terrorism. Annual Review of Sociology, (30), 271-286.
Weimann, G., and Brosius, H. (1988). The predictability of international terrorism: A time-series
analysis. Terrorism, 11(6), 491-502.

Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., and Canetti-Nisim, D. (2003). The social and religious
characteristics of suicide bombers and their victims. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 15(3), 139-153.
Weiner, T. (1998). Afghan taliban camps were built by nato. The New York Times,
August 24, 1998, Washington.
Williams, B. G. (2008). Talibanistan: History of a transnational terrorist sanctuary. Civil
Wars, 10(1), 40-59.

179

